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SlUIllllary 
Between 1960 and 1974, the Scottish National Party underwent 
a remarkable organisational expansion. Not only did the number of 
members, branches and constituency associations greatly increase, but 
by the end of 1974 the Party also succeeded in getting eleven 
parliamentary candidates elected to the House of Commons. 
This thesis is concerned with the two major organisational 
elements of this growth. The actual mechanics of change, this is, 
the structural, administrative and personnel dimensions. Secondly, 
we examine the nature of the intra-party power relationships as they 
evolved in the years under study. 
In essence, we argue that far from having a devolved power base, 
where decision on orga~isational matters such as publicity; Party 
finance; election strategy; and candidate selection etc., were taken 
only after consultation with the membership, the SNP had a highly 
centralised management structure. 
This view is contrary to most of the prevailing thinking on the 
subject. We slUIllllarise all of the major writings on the SNP's organisation 
in Chapter Two. 
We seek to show what factors in the growth of the SNP during this 
period, propelled it towards the centralisation of organisation decision-
making. We utilise Party records to demonstrate that growth brought in 
its wake certain strains which could only be contained, and deflected, 
within a hierarchical management structure. 
(viii) 
With this in mind, during the course of the thesis we draw upon 
studies in organisational management which have been undertaken in other 
fields. These, we contest, confirm our hypothesis regarding the 
inevitability of the need for centralisation in a rapidly expanding 
organisation. 
In the specific context of political party management, we test the 
relevance of Robert Michels' view of the tendency towards 'oligarchy' 
even in parties with an ideological commitment to organisational 
democracy. We affirm the value and worth of Michels' views in so far 
as these can be applied to the SNP between 1960 and 1974. 
Our study is largely empirical. Consequently, we examine and 
analyse such critical organisational areas as the SNP's internal 
communications; finances; management committee structure; and election 
organisation. We also look at certain administrative aspects of the 
Labour and Conservative parties, to see how these compared in terms of 
centralisation etc., with the SNP. In other words, was the SNP, in the 
period under study, more decentra1ised, than the two major British 
parties? Most researcl1ers have answered that question in the affirmative. 
We conclude by summarising the factors which, we believe, led to 
the centralisation of organisational power within the SNP between 1960 
and 1974. Explain what elements complicated intra-party power relations 
after 1974. And, finally, outline what has happened to the leadership's 
control of the Party in recent years. We relate this to our hypothesis 
regarding the SNP's growth and consequent leadership domination. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Background 
This thesis is concerned with two main subject areas. The first 
is a description of the organisational growth of the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) between 1960 and 1974. The second, the central hypothesis, 
focuses on the distribution of organisational power within the Party 
during this same period. The argument is that in organisational matters 
(note, not policy) a small group of individuals, the Party leaders, 
controlled the direction taken by the SNP. 
MOreover, and contrary to prevailing thinking (see below), this 
power structure meant that the rank-and-file's role in administrative 
matters was largely confined to endorsing, and later implementing, the 
programmes devised by the leaders of the Party. 
Our concern in this thesis is with organisational/administrative 
matters; Party finance and structure; publicity campaigns and election 
strategy; membership drives; and candidate selection. In other words, 
the management patterns which prevailed between 1960 and 1974. We have 
chosen this area rather than policy questions, because during the 
period under examination the SNP had to face the absolute need to 
develop and coordinate a coherent organisation with which to contest 
elections, or face the possibility of ultimate demise. In this sense 
then, management preoccupations were more important to the Nationalists 
than policy matters. It may be that after the election successes of 
1974 this situation was reversed, that is, the pressures of parliamentary 
politics compelled the Party to turn its attention to policy questions 
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as the latter came up for debate, and subsequent voting, in the House 
of Commons. Mbreover, the elections of 1974 might have been viewed as 
the culmination, and vindication, of the previous fourteen years 
organisational efforts. Therefore the Party, having resolved its 
organisational problems, had to confront broader policy concerns. 
The centralisation of power in the hands of the leadership was an 
organisational imperative, something which had to be done if electoral 
success was to be achieved. It was vital for the efficient functioning 
of an organisation which previously had a virtually anarchic 
administrative structure where decision-making was typically devolved 
to the membership, and where the leaders had to refer back to the 
latter on even the most trivial of matters. Faced with an extremely 
small membership, little cash, and virtually no electoral impact, a 
few Party leaders, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, set about improving, 
indeed transforming, the structure of the Party. It was this approach 
that led to power centralisation. Because of the mess the SNP was in, 
the members were content to allow the leaders to institute and 
implement reforms designed to improve the fortunes of the Party. 
After all, as we shall see, the SNP was in a state of such disrepair 
that coherent organisational changes were unlikely to have made 
matters worse. 
The reforms of the early 1960s had a centralising impact. Mbreover, 
they were followed (although we are not implying a clear causal 
connection) by both improvements in organisation and electoral 
performance. As a result of this we are suggesting the membership 
were content to allow the leaders a clearly disproportionate role in 
the management of the Party, and for two main reasons. The first has 
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just been dealt with. The structural innovations corresponded to 
advances in terms of votes and Party organisation. The second reason 
is no less :important. The many thousands of new members who joined 
the Party had little political experience and were not in a position 
to challenge the expertise of the existing management. MJreover, the 
very growth of the SNP gave rise to facets of administrative life which 
actually served to increase centralisation: executive decision-making, 
monitored information output, management financial skills, and a 
pyramid of power with senior figures at the top and extending down 
through paid officials to activists and non-activist members. 
In summary then, we are suggesting that the failures of the 1950s 
encouraged leadership innovation in an attempt to combat decline. 
Having apparently succeeded, this same leadership group were trusted 
with power as the Party expanded in the 1960s. The membership was 
reconciled to leadership domination of organisational matters because 
of the latter's successes, and growing expertise in the management of 
an increasingly complex organisation. 
In policy matters, that is, the socio-economic and political 
concerns which denote the ideology of a political party, the membership 
continued to have a significant voice. But in tactical and strategic 
management, the rank-and-fi1e played a subsidiary role following the 
lead, on almost every occasion, of the leadership. 
For most of the 1960s policy questions were less important to the 
SNP than the creation of a viable and healthy organisation. After all, 
unless the Party could actually elect a body of MPs then all the policy 
debates in the world would be of little practical value. But perhaps 
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even IIDre important was the nature of the SNP itself. MJre than most 
it was a single issue Party, the issue being the attainment of 
independence for Scotland. In a survey(l) of activists taken by the 
Party in 1970, the following was discovered. When asked what the 
primary function of the Party should be 70 per cent replied 'self-
government'. Only 24 per cent said 'reformist rule' and/or 'social 
reform' (2). In terms of the usual perception of British politics as 
being dominated by 'class' it is worthwhile noting that 80 per cent 
of those surveyed did not identify with any class, and 78 per cent had 
never previously been members of any other political party.(3) 
These figures may help, at least in part, to explain our contention 
about the primacy of organisational questions within the SNP. Clearly 
an overwhelming majority believed that efforts should be directed 
towards the primary goal of the Party. MJreover, there was no 
distinctive sense of 'class' within the SNP, and this is normally the 
touchstone of policy issues in British politics. This view is 
reinforced if we look at the 'previous political allegiance' of the 
activists, which was another question asked in the survey. Of those 
who had not actually supported the SNP or had been neutral, 11 per cent 
had been Liberals, 9 per cent Conservatives, 9 per cent 'Left/ 
Socialist', 5 per cent Radical/libertarian (the exact recipients of 
their support are unspecified), and 5 per cent Labour. (4) The 
potential for disagreement and disarray among such a diverse activist 
base must have been great indeed. In such circumstances it is easier 
to understand why there should have been a concentration on organisation 
rather than policy. 
In any event there already exists a theoretical base (albeit a 
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controversial one) on which to base arguments about the tendencies 
within mass political parties to elite domination. Robert Michels 
pointed(5) to what he believed to be the inevitability of such power 
concentration, even in avowedly democratic socialist parties, in his 
important study PoliticaJ Parties. During the course of this thesis 
we shall find occasion to refer to, and utilise, certain aspects of 
Michels' work on oligarchy in European socialist parties. 
Yet despite Michels' contentions, and more substantially the 
findings of researchers in other organisations, those writers who have 
examined the SNP have, for the most part, failed to note the disparity 
in power - at least in so far as administrative matters were concerned -
within the SNP. :M::>st have taken the view that the SNP was a 
thoroughly 'open' and democratic Party where the membership took a 
co-equal role with the nominal leaders in managing the Party. By 
'open' we mean the following: the majority of the rank-and-file had 
easy access to those in leadership positions. Mbreover, that ordinary 
members could significantly influence the formulation and implementation 
of important decisions taken by the leadership. Leadership is defined, 
in the first instance, as those who sat, either as officials or as 
elected members, on the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the 
Party. Further, that the leadership made strenuous efforts (6) to 
solicit the opinions of the mass membership before the taking of such 
decisions. 
We shall argue that this is not only at odds with the empirical data 
specific to the SNP, but it also largely ignores the findings of 
other organisational research. We believe that a majority of those 
who have investigated the SNP have tended to confuse, or at least 
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failed to distinguish conceptually, the role played by the members in 
policy-making from their function in the administration of the Party. 
Another cause of failure has been the tendency among writers to 
accept the formal organisation-chart description of the SNP's power 
structure - which does appear to bestow the preponderance of power on 
the active members - rather than to analyse the source, flow, and 
outcomes of organisationally-orientated decisions. In this sense we 
shall place a heavy. reliance upon establishing the source and decision-
flow patterns of all the major decisions which impacted upon the 
Party's organisation and administration. 
The period 1960 to 1974 has been selected for study because this 
is an era in which the SNP emerged from political obscurity, and went 
to the forefront of Scottish politics. After 1974 an alternative 
power bloc emerged within the Party, the Parliamentary group, which 
greatly complicated organisational relationships. It was also in this 
period that the major decisions were taken which prepared the Party 
for the electoral successes of 1974. The leadership was, for the most 
part, more concerned with building and strengthening the SNP's 
organisation and electoral muscle than with the broader policy questions 
which came to the fore after 1974. 
Data Source s 
The overwhelming bulk of our data comes from primary sources from 
within the SNP. These include Minutes of the following Party committees: 
National Executive Committee, Finance and General Business Committee 
CGBC), the Organisation Committee COC) , National Council CNC) , 
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National Assembly, and annual conference reports. 
We shall also be using the papers of a past Chairman of the Party, 
Arthur Donaldson. These are located in the National Library of 
Scotland, and cover a substantial part of the Party's history from 
around 1945 until the late 1960s. These documents also include private 
correspondence regarding individuals, and those of a formal kind about 
committees, and general Party matters. 
To some extent also we shall be utilising interviews with the Party 
principals of the period in order to relate their experiences, and 
interpretations of events, to the data Uncovered in the minutes. 
Finally, during the course of the thesis we shall call upon work 
already undertaken in organisation theory, as well as empirical studies 
of organisational behaviour, in an attempt to relate such findings to 
events within the SNP. In other words, was the evolution of a power 
hierarchy predictable given what has happened in other organisations? 
~thodology 
As noted above we shall be concerned primarily in tracing not only 
the organisational development of the SNP, but also the distribution 
of Party power, as it affected administration, between 1960 and 1974. 
We shall seek to prove our hypothesis via an analysis of the major 
organisational decisions of the period. This will be done by following 
their progress through the various administrative channels, such as 
committees and Party conferences, to their eventual implementation. 
The primary, and outstanding sources of such information are the 
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minutes of the committees, or the forums, which were responsible for 
debating, deciding, and/or implementing the ideas. 
It will be noted that although interviews are used they are not 
given a prominent place. We believe that in a study of this kind, 
where we have complete and unrestricted access to the written 
documents, objectivity is best achieved, and the truth best served, 
through this medium. On the other hand, interviews can help to 
illuminate and extend our knowledge of events. But as Duverger (7) 
notes, interviews of political leaders are often disappointing in 
practice: 
. .. they are more inclined through altruism or ideology, 
or in the interests of the Party or the doctrine which 
they support, or through a desire to appear in a favourable 
light, to distort the truth than other men. It must be 
remembered that for politicians prestige has greater 
importance than for ordinary men and their public 
appearance is part of the job. (8) 
Nevertheless, as Duverger also reminds us (9). such interviews 
can be vi tal. Consequently, we shall be us ing them wherever they can 
enhance our knowledge of particular events. 
The use of minutes, memos, letters, and other primary sources, is 
not free from methodological weakness. As any organisational theorist 
will confirm, even the most direct access to information about the 
workings of, for example, a board of directors, may, in fact, divert 
one from the real source of decision-taking. Such matters can be 
resolved over a dinner-table, or the proverbial round of golf. Many 
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minutes of meetings can' and do reflect only the most formal aspects of 
what goes on. While there need not be outright tampering with the 
. . f . . R' h d C (10) . mInutes, SlllS 0 omIssIon are common: ~IC ar rossman was 1ll 
little doubt that such occurred in Harold Wilson's Cabinets. 
Any researcher who has spent time going through the minutes of 
some committee or other will be aware that on occasions there is more 
than an element of the Quixotic to the quest. The problems are 
legion: even the most rigorous of minutes take no account of the 
human element in decision-making. For example, Mr. A moves a 
particular course of action. Mr. B has a strong personal antipathy to 
Mr. A, and on that basis, although rationalising his opposition on 
other grounds, votes against A's proposition. Such personality clashes 
are rarely the stuff of minutes. Few like to concede such manifest 
human frailty, and therefore find some plausible explanation for their 
opposition. 
Another problem concerns 'opinion-leaders'. In the course of an 
organisations life-span certain individuals come to the fore, and their 
opinions are more valued than those of their peers. Such people need 
say very little in a meeting to dominate it. Unfortunately, minutes 
take no account of such informal dominance. 
Other difficulties include cross-cutting cleavages, or the 
alliances which permeate most organisations and make some people allies 
on certain issues, but opponents on others. Care has to be taken to 
determine which is which. 
These difficulties are not insoluble. One can, for example, use 
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interviews to determine whether or not certain decisions were taken 
because of personality clashes, or some other factors not accounted for 
in the minutes. 
Another method is the analysis of memos and private correspondence 
of the principals involved in decision-taking. Such material often 
betrays deep personal antagonisms, and/or ideological differences. 
There is a wealth of such data in the Arthur Donaldson Collection in 
the National Library of Scotland. As Party Chairman, Donaldson was 
often used as confessor and confidant for warring individuals, or 
factions. MOreover, certain individuals, in the leadership of the 
1960s, were incorrigible memo writers, and as such greatly facilitated 
a deeper understanding of the minutes. 
With such caveats in mind our analysis will be based on the 
documentary evidence of minutes, etc., because we still believe that 
it remains the most accurate and reliable method of evidence-gathering, 
especially as we had unrestricted access to all documents. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One will include a summary of the main writings on the 
Party's organisation and/or internal power relationships. In this 
chapter we shall also seek to place the SNP in the political party 
classification scheme outlined by Maurice Duverger (11) Finally, 
since we are seeking to establish whether or not there was a small 
group of managers wielding disproportionate administrative power, 
that is, an oligarchy, it is important that we examine Michels' views 
on oligarchy, and whether or not these can be applied to the SNP. 
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The second chapter will attempt to explain and define the two 
central concepts of the thesis, power and leadership. We shall examine 
and analyse how these have been utilised in other organisational 
studies, and conclude with the probable reasons why the SNP of the 
late 1950s and 1960s was likely to see the emergence of a specific 
leadership group. 
The subsequent chapters will be dominated by an analysis of the 
primary material, starting with the condition of the Party's 
organisation prior to the beginning of the 1960s. This is necessary 
for obvious comparative reasons; we have to know the condition of the 
SNP's organisation in this period in order to appreciate the extent of 
the changes it illlderwent thereafter. 
The fourth chapter will trace, and analyse, the financing of the 
SNP between 1963 and 1974 (we shall have covered the period 1960 to 
1963 in the previous chapter). How, and from what sources, a political 
party raises its income has profoillld implications for its ideology and 
power structure. Where did the drive and the ideas behind this revenue-
raising originate? How was cash channelled throughout the Party? Was 
there evidence in all of this of leadership control? 
The fifth chapter will focus on two reports, written in the early 
1960s, which had important consequences for the management structure of 
the Party. Indeed, one of the reports completely altered the way in 
which the SNP was administered, and in so doing increased the power of 
the leadership. 
The next chapter will be devoted to tracing the organisational 
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growth, and the nature of the internal power structure, of the Party 
from 1963 until the end of the decade. What condition was the Party 
machine in as it faced the 1970s? Where did organisational power lie? 
In chapter seven we shall complete our description of the evolution 
of the SNP's organisation up to and including 1974, and high1igl1t the 
single most important organisational event of this period, the 'It's 
Scotland's Oil' campaign. We are not concerned here with the policy 
implications of 'oil' as an issue, but only with the 'oil' campaign 
as a case study in organisational technique and implementation. 
The 'oil' campaign is instructive not merely because of the 
publicity it has received, but also because it helps us to understand 
the part played by the leadership and the rank-and-file, respectively, 
in the formulation and design of the campaign. As an organisational 
exercise it represented the zenith of the SNP's campaigning 
achievements. In our view it also clearly demonstrates the extent of 
centralisation within the Party in the early 1970s. 
The campaign itself was widely publicised within the Party and 
generated a great deal of discussion. Consequently, if the membership, 
or even a small minority of the latter, had a role to play in the 
organisational management and publicity formulation of the SNP, then 
one might have expected to find evidence of this role during the oil 
campaign. There were few, if any, better opportunities for the 
activists to contact, advise, or oppose the leaders on matters of 
administration and propaganda, in the history of the Party. A 
virtually uninterrupted flow of communications came from the centre 
on the subject, and the members could have been in little doubt as to 
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the implications of the proposed campaign. Here surely there would be 
evidence of an exchange of ideas, with the members contributing to the 
overall campaign. Particularly since the entire operation was funded 
by the branches. 
On the other hand, if our argument about the nature of decision-
making within the SNP is correct, then we would expect to find a 
campaign designed by treleadership, rather like architects, and carried 
out by the activists, rather in the manner of artisans. 
Chapter eight will contain an analysis of the composition of the 
strategic management decision-making committees of the Party between 
the years 1964 and 1974 (we begin in 1964 because the whole committee 
structure of the SNP was reformulated in that year). The management 
committees will be analysed for evidence of over-lapping membership of 
more than one committee, and the stability, or otherwise, of their 
composition over time. 
The intention is to seek to establish if a coterie of individuals 
was dominant on the committees, for if the Party was open, diffuse, 
devolved etc., then we would expect to find a large reservoir of 
people contributing to, and sitting on, its management committees. 
After all, these were critical forums for the initiation and review of 
the Party's activities, where decisions affecting the whole life of the 
SNP were taken. Given this state of affairs the more active sections 
of the rank-and-file might have sought to influence events at the core 
rather than being left on the periphery. And if the arguments of those 
who espouse the devolved view of the SNP's structure are correct, then 
membership participation on these committees would have been the norm. 
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This chapter will endeavour to look at power within the SNP from a 
'positional' perspective and thereby to reinforce the overall thrust 
of our 'decisional' analysis. 
Chapter nine will focus on the internal communication system of 
the Party. For it is through such a system that centre and periphery 
are kept in touch with one another. Uhless there is effectiveness in 
this respect, some degree of peripheral anarchy will occur with the 
branches going their own way, and paying little heed to what is going 
on at the centre. If the leadership fail to communicate their ideas 
and programmes to the activists, then how can any coherent strategy be 
devised? 
In chapter ten we will examine the conduct of the General Elections 
of 1974, the culmination of the SNP's organisational expansion of the 
preceding fourteen years. Were these planned and managed in a 
typically decentralised fashion? This is the view of most of the 
writers on the subject. In an effort to comprehend the overall direction 
of the campaigns we shall analyse the various strands of an election 
campaign. How were the candidates chosen? How much contact was there 
between the Party leaders and the constituencies? Who was responsible 
for the drawing up and distribution of election literature and 
propaganda? How much reliance did the candidates place on the centre 
for advice and guidance? Finally, how~re the campaigns financed? 
By 1974 most SNP activists were experienced campaigners, and the 
organisation as a whole had been through years of maturation. In such 
circumstances the need for central direction might easily have 
diminished to a point where the constituencies were their own masters 
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controlling their own affairs during the campaign, and where reliance 
on the centre was minimal. 
In chapter eleven we shall attempt to place the SNP in a political 
party classification system vis-~-~is the two major British parties. 
How did the management structure of the Nationalists compare to the 
larger parties in the years under study? Was it as centralised, or 
more open or devolved? 
If our analysis is correct then we would expect to find that the 
SNP's leadership had no less a grip on the organisation of the Party 
than their equivalents in the Labour and Conservative parties. In 
fact, their control, in the 1960s through to 1974, might even have 
proved to have been greater. 
In the Pt:iSt5CRfPl) we shall summarise and synthesise our 
observations about the SNP's organisation and its power structure 
between the years 1960 and 1974. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Ibid., p. 3. 
Ibid., p.3. 
Ibid., p.3. 
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Statistics, December 1970, 
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17 
Chapter One 
Organisational Writings on the Scottish National Party 
There are several predominant characteristics about the writings 
on the organisation of the SNP. First of all such studies are rather 
few in number. The SNP has interested many, but relatively few writers 
have bothered to devote much time to an analysis of the organisational 
aspects of the Party's growth. Secondly, among the few who have 
examined the structure of the Party there is almost unanimity that the 
SNP was, and remains, highly open and democratic, with a remarkably free 
flow of information from top to bottom, and bottom to top. Indeed it 
might be said that this was considered to be the hallmark of the Party. 
Finally, almost all the writers are in agreement that 'organisation' 
played a significant part in the successes of 1974. Only one writer, 
Richard Mansbach (1), actually challenges the long-term effectiveness 
of the National Party's organisation, which he considered to be too 
much dominated by the localities or branches. 
The following review of these writings catalogues them in relation 
to the amount of attention paid by the authors to the Party's 
organisation, rather than chronologically. 
Among academics Jack Brand has most comprehensively examined the 
organisation and management structure of the SNP (2). For him, the 
improvements implemented during the 1960s were one of the main reasons 
for the subsequent political breakthrough of the Party. And he 
highlights the most important decisions taken by the Party which 
affected the evolution of its organisation. 
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In cOJIlIlK)n with most other writers on the subject, Brand does not 
believe that power was highly concentrated at the centre, that is, in 
the hands of the fonnal leadership. On the contrary, he points to the 
participatory nature of the SNP which distinguishes it from the other 
major British parties. An indication of Brand's attitude can be gauged 
from the following quotes: 
the organisation of the SNP is one which is particularly 
open and ready to take guidance from the grass roots ••. 
What is noteworthy, is the extent to which the participation 
of the membership has been buH t into the structure. In this 
it is different, if only in degree, from the other major 
British parties. (3) 
Later, he writes: 
and, 
..• one has to say that the development of the SNP into 
a mass party has made for more openness and participation 
in the structure rather than less. (4) 
.•• points of decision are more accessible to the SNP members 
than are the equivalent organisations in other parties as I 
hope I have shown. (5) 
It is Brand's view that prior to the 1960s the Party was more 
centralised than in the period of its greatest growth, that is, from 
the middle 1960s to the early 1970s. Despite this, he also reports 
that there is no evidence of any recommendation coming from the 
National Executive Committee being rejected by either the National 
Councilor Annual Conference. If the Party was the participatory 
body suggested, one might have expected to find a dispute which led to 
a rejection of an NEC recommendation on at least one of the many 
management issues presented to the delegates. The fact that he could 
not find one strongly suggests that whilst the delegates may have 
vigorously debated matters presented to them by the Executive, they 
had either enough confidence in, or so respected the leadership's 
management of the Party, that they were unwilling to reject such 
proposals. It is, of course, possible that the mass of the delegates 
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were so apathetic that it did not matter to them what the NEC did. 
However, given the fact that they bothered to attend Council and/or 
Conference, this seems an unlikely proposition. 
By allowing the members to express themselves at Council and 
Conference, the leadership engendered a cathartic effect: the release 
of tension without diminishing the leadership's right to lead. Verba 
refers to 'pseudo-democracy' (6); democratic leadership amounts to 
the membership being given a choice of alternatives for action. This 
gives the impression that the decision is actually made by the mass. 
Brand makes much of the fact that the sheer size of the SNP's 
membership made for an open structure, the point being that supervision 
of a dozen or so branches was easier than the regulation of five 
hundred or so such units. At first sight this proposition is not 
difficult to accept. However, the opposite is suggested by studies 
in organisational theory: as an organisation grows the control system 
tends to become tighter, with more power concentrated in the hands of 
comparatively few people. Basically, if one fails to exert authority 
and exercise control then the organisation becomes less, and not 
more efficient. We shall call this tendency 'peripheral anarchy'. 
So much power is located at the periphery, the grass-roots, that 
nothing gets done at the centre. Efficient business practice is 
sacrificed in the name of democracy. 
In lIDSt mass-based political parties the vast bulk of the member-
ship are card-carrying non-activists. For the other members some 
degree of centralisation is important if goals are to be set and 
achieved. Constant reference back to all of the membership would 
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ensure that little would get done. Even soliciting the opinions of 
one thousand out of one hundred thousand members, whilst possible on 
some issues, would be impossible on others, especially given the 
limited resources of a political party. 
In any event such was not the case. As we shall see, the most 
likely forum for change was National Council (see Appendix) since 
this embraced the most active members of the Party. Yet, as a matter 
of fact, even by the late 1960s it was attended by only a few htmdred 
delegates at its quarterly meetings. We shall attempt to demonstrate 
that this forum, however democratic in appearance, did not act as a 
check on the leadership so far as organisational questions were 
concerned. 
One might summarise Brand's position on the structure of the SNP 
in the following way. Between 1942 and the end of the 1950s, the SNP 
was marked by a concentration of power, and doctrinally the Party was 
pure. MacCormick was gone, the 'Home-rulers' had left, and those who 
remained were fundamentalists, that is, they were committed to full-
scale independence for Scotland. It was during this period that the 
Party was dominated by an oligarchy of five people. This group 
controlled the affairs and outlook of the Party, they were its 
leadership faction. Thereafter the SNP became more decentralised and 
open, in the manner described above, and the oligarchy was replaced by 
a less centralised and more democratic leadership. 
Before we go any further it is perhaps opportune to ask one 
fundamental question: is a political party dominated by an oligarchy 
when five people out of a membership of under one thousand take most 
of the important decisions, but not dominated by an oligarchy when 
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something like twenty people out of a membership of aromd one hmdred 
thousand take most of the important decisions? This was the 
contrasting situation between 1959 and 1969. 
We shall argue that in the first instance it was much easier for 
an ordinary member to contact one of the leadership about some aspect 
of Party activity. Furthermore, if one wished, it was comparatively 
easier to get elected to office prior to the early 1960s, than it 
would become later. Finally, connnmications were much easier, in terms 
of contacting the majority of the membership, when the latter numbered 
only a few hWldred, as in the 1950s, than when they numbered tens of 
thousands, the situation for lIDst of the 1960s. Logistically one can 
report to, and hear from, a body of less than one thousand people far 
more easily than from a body of one hmdred thousand m::lmbers. 
The aspect of an increasingly democratic Party with the branches 
playing a formative role in decision-making is at the heart of Brand's 
analysis. However, we believe that there is a danger in considering 
that the independence of branches was somehow equal to the latter 
having a serious role in decision-making. In truth, there is no 
evidence to suggest that branches, either individually or collectively, 
interfered in any significant way with Executive decisions regarding 
the raising of cash, organisational structure, or even national 
publicity. Rather we shall endeavour to show that whilst the branches 
had a developed sense of autonomy, they nonetheless acted as agents 
for the NEC, and carried out decisions taken by the Executive and its 
sub-connnittees. 
Another reason Brand gives for the diffusion of power concerns 
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the alternative power bloc in Parliament. So far as we are concerned 
this feature of Party power is irrelevant; the SNP only gained a 
significant parliamentary presence in 1974, the final year of our 
analysis. It would take some years for this new organisational 
development to impact upon the power structure. 
Finally, Brand tells us of the fierce debates which took place 'at 
Conference and National Council, and how the leadership's statements 
and reports were questioned and argued over (7) Certainly, policy 
changes did occur at Conference on socio-economic and political rnatters~ 
But the membership rarely challenged the leaders on internal questions. 
We shall deal with National Council and Annual Conference decision-
making in a later chapter, which we believe will emphasise the extent 
of leadership dominance of these forums. 
Brand also has sections on internal financial procedures, and 
candidate selection. These, he believes, further endorse his views 
about the nature of the Party power structure. Candidates were 
selected by way of a procedure which involved both branches and the 
constituency party. Indeed both were given a central role in the 
selection process. Brand says of candidate selection: 
... the method of selecting candidates still tells us a 
great deal about the distribution of power in a party 
and its attitude towards politics. Once again we see the 
openness of the Nationalists and the degree to which as 
many party activists as possible are brought into the 
process of selection. (8) 
Later, Brand observes: 
It seems clear from the description of this· procedure 
that the SNP •.. invol ves more of its members in the 
selection of parliamentary candidates than is true of 
the Labour and Conservative parties. (9) 
Whilst not taking issue with Brand on the mechanics of the 
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candidate adoption procedure, we will nevertheless dispute in a later 
chapter the effect on Party power of these methods. 
Likewise we shall also deal with the vitally important subject of 
finance, in a subsequent chapter, and present evidence which we believe 
strongly suggests that the branches acted much as tax-gatherers for 
the Party headquarters. 
Brand's work is undoubtedly the most important and thorough 
investigation hitherto available. MOreover, he correctly points to a 
largely ignored area in his explanation of the SNP's successes of the 
1960s and 1970s, the organisational strategy developed during th~s 
period. 
Where we find cause to disagree with Brand is in his analysis 
about the nature of internal power which, we believe, fails to 
distinguish between a leading role for the membership in po1icy-
making, and the utter dominance of the leadership in organisationa1/ 
management concerns. 
There are then, in our view, two models of power within the SNP 
between, approximately, 1960 and 1974. 
The first, the one which interests us, relates to power concerning 
management and administrative matters. We have already explained 
our conception of how this was distributed. 
The second model deals with substantive policy issues such as 
the national economy etc. This depicts a Party where the mass of the 
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membership, through their delegates, had a dominant role. 
We would contest that policy issues were not of immediate interest 
to the leadership because they had first to build an organisational base 
which would enable the Party to gain independence for Scotland. Policy 
would become more important when the SNP had an established organisation 
throughout Scotland. 
If the rank-and-file's energies were being expended in policy 
fields, then the leaders would have a virtually free hand in the 
management of the Party. As we shall see later, a forum specifically 
designed to debate policy, National Assembly, was created by the 
leadership to deflect activists' attention from a move to widen and 
extend the membership of NEe. 
Ian MtAllister (10) is another writer who has turned his attention 
to the organisational elements which lay behind the SNP's growth. Like 
Brand, but not in such great detail, McAllister examines the growth of 
the SNP. In fact, he offered it as a partial explanatory factor behind 
the Party's electoral successes of 1974. 
He believes that political scientists have spent over much time on 
'exogenous' factors in trying to account for the rise of the SNP. 
These include r~J~tive _deprivation, and internal colonialism. But in 
themselves these are insufficient, and require to be topped up with an 
'endogenous' account. What was the SNP doing to aid its own growth? 
MCAllister recognises that the SNP had no serious organisational 
base prior to the middle 1960s. But thereafter a formidable political 
-----
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machine was developed. Like Brand, MtA1lister believes that internally 
generated organisational changes played a crucial role in this 
transformation (interestingly, he argues that it is difficult to place 
the SNP into Duverger's cadre/mass party scheme. A reservation which 
Brand does not share). Similarly, he also considers that there emerged 
a highly decentra1ised branch structure which was internally democratic, 
and it was the membership, meeting at Conference, which detennined 
policy: 
Although the structure is internally democratic, insofar 
as the mass membership meeting in conference determined 
party policy, the structure is also (unlike conventional 
mass parties) highly decentra1ised .•• (11) 
Both Brand and MCAllister attach a great deal of importance to a 
report written by Cordon Wilson in 1963 (see Introduction) on the need 
to institute organisational reforms within the Party. It advocated, 
amongst other things, centralised direction as an aid to branch growth, 
and a transfer from Council to the NEC of responsibility for 
organisation and administration. These and other innovations had much 
to do with the SNP's transfonnation, between 1962 and 1970, into a 
mass party. 
So for MCAllister, good leadership, attention to grievance, and 
the resolution of potential conflict, were all essential for electoral 
success. All of this was in the context of an organisationally 
expanding, but thoroughly decentra1ised structure. 
Keith Webb (12) likewise pays some attention to the Nationalists' 
organisation. He shares with Branch and McAllister the view that the 
SNP's expansion was, in part, due to its own efforts. However he comes 
much closer to a recognition of the inherently centralising tendencies 
of this growth. To be sure, he does state that: 
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between 1966 and 1970 the SNP successfully made 
the transition from being a small, loosely coordinated 
organisation to a mass political party, albeit with a 
very decentralised organisational structure. (13) 
However, later in the book Webb appears to recognise the organisational 
outcome of rapid growth, that is, centralisation. He indicates the 
clear consequences for internal communication, party finance, and a 
party hierarchy (14), and the changes these institute for the member-
ship in terms of the latter's participation in the organisation: 
If at times the SNP in and out of conference appears 
more unruly than other parties, that is because the 
party devolves very much more power to the branches and 
constituency associations than is normally the case. 
This may, however be changing in practice if not in 
theory ... the necessity to coordinate the activities 
of so large a party, and the dissemination of information, 
has automatically meant greater centralisation. (15) 
Webb deals with this organisational theme, in greater detail, in 
a paper written in cooperation with Eric Hall (16) In this piece the 
authors endeavour to explain the rise of Scottish nationalism via 
internal adjustments to pressures created by the British political 
system. 
In the first instance they dispute that the growing SNP vote was 
a consequence of an increasing protest element in the vote. Nor are 
they much impressed by the internal colonial or !~lative deprivation 
explanations for the SNP's success. However, they do accept that the 
Scottish media did have a role to play in aiding the SNP's growth. 
And likewise inter-election opinion-polls tended to exaggerate the 
support for the SNP, and in so do ing aided the Party. 
But for Webb and Hall there was no 'mono-causal' explanation for the 
rise of the SNP. Rather two sets of elements came together to aid the 
Party's growth. 
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The first were the adjustments made by the Nationalists over the 
years as they attempted to become relevant to serious political debate 
in Scotland. These included the development of a policy programme beyond 
the single issue of Home Rule; the formation of the SNP itself in 
1934, which in turn led to the 'right' and 'left' wings of the Party 
leaving, thus strengthening the 'centre'; thirdly, the debate over 
the SNP's stance on the issue of 'devolution' and 'independence' which 
was resolved in favour of the latter; finally, the old argument 
about whether or not the SNP should compete in the electoral arena was 
concluded when it was decided that the Party should contest elections. 
The secondary contributory set of elements was the perceived 
failures of both Labour and Conservative policies towards Scotland. 
These can be viewed in a number of ways: the Labour and Conservative 
parties did not succeed in communicating what measures were taken on 
behalf of Scotland. Moreover, a visible sign of the weakness of 
central government policy was Scotland's consistently higher 
unemployment rate. These failures were matched by other shortcomings. 
These included promising Scotland devolved government as a response to 
increasing Nationalist support. There was an absence of consistency 
on the part of both Labour and Conservative parties. The former was 
badly split on the issue, whilst the Conservatives were opposed to 
extensive devolution, and may not have implemented proposals in any 
case. 
Thus by a combination of resolving its own internal problems, and 
by the failures and weaknesses of the major parties, the SNP emerged 
in the 1960s and 1970s as a major force in Scottish politics. 
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Richard Mansbach, on the other hand, challenges the viability of 
the emergent organisational structure of the SNP (17). Rather he 
reinforces the general view that the Party was highly democratic with 
a preponderance of power at the 'grass-roots'. However, where 
Mansbach differs from the other writers is in his belief that this 
would prove to be a fatal weakness in the Party's bid for national 
power. He argues that this 'polyarchical' structure leads to a 
constant preoccupation with localist concerns at the expense of 
national questions. 
Mansbach goes on to detail further problems; there was a bias 
towards the rural areas with the urban centres losing out as a 
consequence; there was a non-movement of funds within the Party; the 
vertical and horizontal communication systems were, in intra-Party 
terms, weak; and the Party conferences between 1967 and 1969 were 
dominated by the branches. 
This catalogue of weaknesses grew out of the nature of the 
organisational structure: the branches were not effectively controlled 
by the centre, indeed they often responded to policies independently 
without reference to Party attitudes. 
We believe that these assumptions are totally erroneous, and on 
the contrary we shall demonstrate a marked fluidity of both funds and 
personnel within the Party - especially during parliamentary by-elections -
and that this was achieved because of the centralisation of the Party 
machine. Finally, that whilst there was inadequate horizontal 
communications, that is, between branches, and between branches and 
constituencies, there was nevertheless an extremely good vertically 
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downward information system. Moreover, this system served only to 
reinforce the centralised nature of the SNP between 1962 and 1974. 
Christopher Harvie (18) in what is really an historical study of 
nationalism in Scotland, also finds time en pass~t to glance at the 
organisation of the SNP. 
He believes that the SNP began to develop after the West-Lothian 
by-election, sometime in 1963. At around that time younger, 'leftist' 
elements joined the organisation, and in the process it became more 
centrally directed. But for Harvie the most remarkable thing about 
the SNP's growth until 1973, was that it was almost 'completely 
unaided by external circumstances'. (19) 
James Kellas (20) devotes a chapter to Nationalism but does not 
much discuss the nature of the SNP's organisation. However, he 
appears to share the general view of a decentralised party, with 
basic power resting in the branches. He does discuss the socio-
economic profile of the new men joining during this period, that is, 
the 1960s. This group was 'less romantic' and 'more practical' than 
the usual personnel, and it came together with a new found 
campaigning zeal which did much to aid the growth of the Party. 
Nevertheless: 
The SNP is essentially a decentralised party, and its 
strength is in the local branches (not constituency 
associations). (21) 
S'. E. Finer, in a Jrore recent work (22), asserts unequivocally: 
The party is highly decentralised. Its basic unit is 
the branch •.• Headquarters leaves them to themselves. 
He actually fails to give any supporting evidence at all for this 
claim, and indeed goes on to make several factual errors (23) 
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concerning the actual structure of the organisation. It seems then 
that he simply relied upon the assessments of previous writers on the 
subject. 
Roger Mullin (24) believes that the Party's branches are involved 
in all of the major Party activities, and that: 
The noticeable lack of strong leadership and centralised 
control which is welcomed by many party activists at 
present •.• may prove more of a handicap than help come 
independence or even devolution. (25) 
Finally, Mullin, much like Webb, does recognise that the 
organisational growth of the 1960s was leading to the development of 
'centralising tendencies'. 
Victor Hanby (26) examined the changing campaign techniques of the 
SNP between the 1960s and the two elections of 1974, and the effect these 
had on the electoral fortunes of the Party. He too shares the general 
view of a decentralised Party which is, as we have seen, common to 
most writers on the subject: 
While the SNP seems to have adopted some of the trappings 
of conventional parties, in one fundamental respect its 
structure differs quite considerably from the structure 
of its main opponents. Unlike them the primary organisational 
emphasis is one of decentralisation and branch autonomy. (27) 
Like most of the other writers, Hanby believes that improvements 
in organisation contributed to the successes of the SNP in 1974, and 
he appears to affirm what McAllister calls the 'endogenous' factors: 
The growth of the SNP denotes a prime example of the speed 
with which a party, combining the twin pillars of emotive 
appeal and campaign professionalism and efficiency, may 
impact on the political process in circumstances where its 
traditional guardians have grown apathetic and complacent. (28) 
There are, of course, other writings on the SNP. But the above 
cover those which specifically highlight the organisational aspects of 
the Party. .And of these we can see that there is near unanimity 
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concerning the beneficial effects that the Party's organisational 
improvements of the 1960s had in aiding its electoral growth. A clear 
majority of writers are also of the view that the Party was characterised 
by decentralisation and openness of structure; the members had a 
crucial role to play in the formulation of policy, had easy access to 
the leadership, and a profound sense of local autonomy. 
Unfortunately, few, if any, bother to distinguish between 
management/administrative decisions and the broader policy questions 
such as agricultural, industrial or fishing matters. Therefore it is 
not hard to understand just why a confusion can arise as to the extent 
of membership participation in the running of the Party. We do not 
dispute that the members did have a significant voice in the 
formulation of policy questions. However, in management matters, as 
well as tactical and strategic concerns, the Party was controlled by 
a small and relatively stable group of leaders. It may be that the 
writers have simply failed (or deemed it unimportant) to distinguish 
between policy-making and organisation. In which case we believe, 
and will seek to prove, that they have missed a crucial dichotomy in 
Party power. 
In the next section we shall seek to place the SNP in the 
typology of parties drawn up by Duverger (29). Several writers we 
have just looked at referred to the SNP as a 'mass' party. But what 
exactly is a 'mass' party, and what are its predominant characteristics? 
Type of Party 
One certainly cannot doubt the intention of the SNP's leaders of 
the 1950s to turn their Party into a full-blooded competitor to the 
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established parties on the Scottish political scene (one may, however, 
question the efficacy of their approach). Certainly by the late 1960s 
their intention had become realised in fact; they had indeed presided 
over the growth of an embryo into a state of political adulthood. 
Duverger (30) describes a 'mass' party as having four main 
characteristics. It recruits members, and the latter act both as 
educators among the electorate at large, and as a source of funds; 
the 'mass' party should be based on the branches - a striking feature 
of the SNP throughout its history; it is centralised and held fairly 
tightly together (amazingly, most of the writers appear to have ignored 
this element altogether); finally, the new member will fill in some 
kind of membership form and pay dues. 
Blondel (31) likewise has a typology of 'mass' party characteristics. 
Not surprisingly even by these categories the SNP qualifies, by the 
mid-1960s, as a 'mass' party. That is to say, it had voluntary help, 
either in cash or in kind; it had a permanent organisation at either 
the national or local level; its leadership was responsible to the 
electorate, and a section of the latter identified with the Party; its 
electoral appeal was in a party rather than on an individual context; 
the Party had access to, and utilised the mass-media; finally, the 
SNP had an image by which it could be identified. 
By the middle of the 1960s then, the SNP, by Blondel's typology, 
was a 'mass' party. These did not exist in the 1950s, rather they 
evolved from around 1962 onwards. Had this not occurred it is entirely 
possible that the SNP would have fallen into utter obscurity, and indeed 
disappeared: 
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a mass party cannot survive for long without foreseeable 
success. Its final fate becomes a race against time. (32) 
This was the dilemma which confronted the Party leaders around 
1959 to 1960: unless some sort of breakthrough could be engineered 
the Party faced the prospect of disintegration as the remaining 
members drifted away. 
The SNP had to expand its membership base, and increase general 
party effort, if it wished to have a serious role in electoral 
politics. But in the process, and out of necessity, power became 
concentrated in the hands of that group which was responsible for the 
transformation. Someone, or some group, had to take charge of executive 
decision-making, and in the process a Party elite was born. 
Such an occurrence was forecast as inevitable by Robert Michels (33). 
For him even the best of democratic intentions are overwhelmed by the 
realities of party management. And it is to Michels' study of 
'oligarchy' within political parties to which we now turn. 
The 'Law of. 01igar,chy': Relevance to the SNP 
It is our contention that as the SNP expanded, from around 1962/63 
onwards, the imperatives of organisational life propelled the 
leadership of the Party (34) to adopt management techniques which led 
to a centralisation of control. If the Party was to grow and prosper 
e1ectora11y then it became vital to introduce a hierarchy of power, 
centralised communications, an efficient revenue-raising system, and 
a tight control of membership activity. 
Thus faced with near political extinction the Party managers 
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responded with a series of internal adjustments (which we catalogue 
in a later chapter). As we shall see in the next chapter such an 
outcome was entirely consistent with what is already known 
empirically about the life history of organisations in general, 
even of the normative variety (that is, political parties, voluntary 
societies and religious organisations). 
In our view the leadership stratum changed very little between 
1960 and 1974, and it was from this group that the organisational 
innovations, which so distinguished the SNP of the period, came. 
Michels believed that leadership dominance emerged for two sets 
of reasons: 'psychological' and 'technical'. Of these the latter 
are the most significant because 'technical' expertise is necessary 
if the whole structure is not to collapse. 
First of all we shall list the 'psychological' factors (35): 
one who holds office comes to acquire a moral right to that office, 
and is unchallenged on that basis; the masses feel a deep need to be 
led; they feel gratitude to those who work on their behalf. This 
feeling strengthens the hold the leaders have on them; the masses 
admire, indeed venerate the leaders, and in doing so they enhance the 
latter's power; oratorical talent separates the leadership from the 
rank-and-file; other qualities are strength of will and conviction, 
and in some cases, admittedly exceptional, a goodness of heart. A 
quality which may lead to a reawakening of religious sentiment among 
the masses. But, above all, being a celebrity is enough to convince 
the masses that they can put their affairs in the hands of the leader. 
MOreover, the leadership constitutes a more stable group, and they 
are superior in respect of age and experience. 
------
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So much for the 'psychological' factors. The 'technical' 
factors (36) are: 
a) The inability of the masses to come together (that is, meet in 
specific forums) to formulate resolutions. Now, whilst this is 
difficult for a membership numbering between 1,000 and 10,000, 
thereafter it becomes impossible. This is, quite simply, a reference 
to the difficulties of communication and contact, inherent in the 
spatial diversity of a large political party. 
b) As the party grows in size delegates become necessary. Initially 
they may be bound by the membership, but as the duties of the 
delegates become more arduous: 
The more extended and the more ramified the official 
apparatus of the organisation, the greater the number 
of its members, the fuller its treasury, and the more 
widely circulated its press, the less official becomes 
the direct control exercised by the rank and file, and 
the more is this control replaced by the increasing 
power of committees. (37) 
Increasingly more and more power is vested in the committees and 
decisions are taken in camera, and as the organisation grows in 
size any delegate control over the leadership becomes 'purely 
fictitious' . 
c) A hierarchy emerges as an outcome of technical conditions, and 
an executive division of labour comes about. To be an effective 
fighting organisation, and to gain respect, the modern political 
party must centralise its operations. 
For our purposes we are concerned with the take-over of the 
management administration, although as Parry indicates: 
Mass control conflicts with efficiency and is replaced 
by professional direction in both policy-making and in 
technical administration. (38) 
Therefore, we can see how the party pyramid emerges, and how it 
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is composed. At the top there is the small group of' influentials. ' 
Next comes those who although they may nominally be in the leadership, 
are nevertheless not at the centre of things. For example, an 
executive member who loses his place after only a few years on the 
NEC, and who never held senior office. Beneath this group are the 
'activists'. These are the people who attend National Council and 
conferences, and constitute the most committed elements of the mass-
membership. Finally, there are card-carryingtnon-activists'who take 
no part at all in the affairs of the Party nationally, and who may 
not even be regular attenders at their branch. This latter group 
constitutes the overwhelming majority of the Party. 
Thus, as Michels insisted, 'organisation becomes the vital essence 
of the party' (39) As we indicated above, as more and more people 
joined the Party in the 1960s so also did the SNP continue what it 
began earlier in the decade: the improvement of administrative 
efficiency. This led to the development of expertise among the Party 
administrators (who were also the actual political leaders), and in 
the process their power was reinforced, and they came to be seen as 
virtually indispensable. 
The debate about oligarchy in a democratic political party hinges 
upon what is meant by 'centralised control'. Thus whilst a developing 
hierarchy and the other attributes of professional management might 
be inevitable, does this necessarily mean that the majority of the 
membership are deprived of real power? Perhaps they are content to 
allow the leaders to take decisions on management matters because they 
are happy with the outcome, and/or because they can, if they wish, 
remove the leaders at election time. In such circumstances can one 
realistically talk of oligarchical control? 
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Before we attempt to answer this question, we believe that it 
will prove useful to examine briefly what one writer had to say about 
elites, and how one might recognise them: 
Elites connote domination of the decisional process by 
a single group or a few men, limited rank-and-file access, 
little or no opposition, and a failure on the part of most 
of the adult community to use their political resources to 
influence decisions. (40) 
That quote is taken from Pres thus ' important study :M;;n At The Top. 
Although it examined power relationships within communities, its 
overall conclusions are of relevance for our work on the SNP, at least 
in so far as the 'particapatory' element of pluralism is concerned. 
As Presthus reminds us, much of the case for pluralism 'rests on the 
supposed fact that the essential thing is competition and 
participation among organised groups, not amongst individuaE' (41) 
Yet, of course, many such groups have themselves become Oligarchic 
and restrictive of membership participation. MOreover, he does not 
assume 
that those who have power can achieve their ends all 
the time, or that they constitute a single, impenetrable, 
monolithic entity, or that the locus of power does not 
change historically ... or that community power rests 
entirely upon the possession or control of economic 
resources. Such requirements, it seems, are a caricature 
of power relations, if not a mere straw man. (42) 
However, Presthus does believe that an elite will be a small 
proportion of the community, and will not be socially representative 
but rather composed of the middle or upper-middle classes. 
He concluded that citizen participation, direct or indirect, was 
low in the two communities he investigated. MOreover, organisations 
did not link the individual to the decision-making process. 
To follow on from this one might say that although the elite 
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themselves do not attempt to exclude the rank-and-file from 
participation, rather this occurs simply because the latter do not 
regard themselves as competent enough to formulate ideas and/or 
assist in the taking of decisions. So that whilst one may join 
the party, or organisation out of a belief in its aims, one may 
nevertheless feel that one's commitment should be limited to working 
for it and contributing to its funds. However, when activists do 
seek to challenge the leadership, and initiate or reverse decisions, 
they are unsuccessful. In the case of a democratic party this would 
usually take the form of the leadership appealing to the members, by 
way of their delegates, against the dissident element. Moreover, the 
channels of communication are restricted and virtually always 
dominated by the leadership. In any case, on most occasions the 
members are content to allow the leaders to get on with the job. 
Presthus' view of what constitutes an elite is helpful because 
he acknowledges that there may be occasions when its will does not 
prevail. Nor can it be said to be impenetrable; aspirants to an 
elite position can, on occasion, get elected. In fact, as we shall 
see in the case of the SNP, so far as administrative questions are 
concerned, the elite almost always got its own way, but over the 
fourteen years under study there was a steady trickle of new faces 
into the leadership (although its nucleus hardly altered). 
If the SNP was as democratic, open and participatory as the 
writings given above suggest, then we would expect to find at least a 
section of the membership, or even numbers of individuals, proposing 
recommendations to the Party's delegates, on matters concerning 
management and administrative procedures. If, on the other hand, 
39 
all such changes were innovated and instituted by the leadership, and 
despite some opposition from the rank-and-file, were almost always 
successful then there are strong empirical grounds for believing that 
the leadership held most of the power within the Party. If it can be 
further shown that only a small percentage of the members even bothered 
to participate in the discussions which went on prior to the decisions 
being endorsed,then that further strengthens our case. A useful 
parallel is that of the British Cabinet and its relationship with its 
own backbenchers. It is a rare occurrence for the government to be 
rebuffed by its own members of parliament on some matter of legislation, 
even allowing for the fact that the Cabinet would always take into 
consideration the opinions of its supporters. Few would assert that 
the British system of government was characterised by the crucial role 
played by the back benchers in the formulation of government policy. 
Elite power is surely related to the actuality of decision-making, 
that is, to the conception and implementation of organisational 
initiatives emanating from a small and distinctive group at the top of 
the Party. Merely giving the membership a formally delineated right 
to participate in decision-making is many times removed from the 
membership actually exercising that prerogative. If we construct a 
continuum of participation we would find that in a highly democratic 
organisation the more members that can be shown to have consented to 
a recommendation from the leadership, then the more democratic and 
participatory the body in question. If, on the other hand, few members 
say less than five percent, give their consent, can we still speak of 
a democratic party? 
To suggest that the absence of opposition is tantamount to 
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acceptance, and therefore democracy, is to assert without giving 
supporting evidence. If members do not participate how can we 
continue to speak of particiEatory democra~? 
This section has been concerned with the relevance of the concept 
of oligarchy to the SNP. We believe that so many of the 'technical' 
(and even some of the 'psychological') factors which Michels pointed 
as causing oligarchy, can be seen in the context of the experiences 
of the Scottish Nationalists. Although the SNP was not 'socialist' in 
its ideology, it was, nevertheless, thoroughly committed to membership 
participation and democratic decision-making, and yet, as we shall 
seek to demonstrate in the following chapters the SNP fell into the 
same methods of organisational behaviour which Michels claimed had 
occurred in the European socialist parties. 
Herbert Simon observed (43) that if concepts are to be 
scientifically useful then they must be operationalised. It is no 
good simply adumbrating the allocation of functions and the formal 
structure of an organisation, one must go behind the facade to 
discover the substance: 
Consider the term "centralisation". How is it determined 
whether the operations of a particular organisation are 
centralised? ... A realistic analysis of centralisation 
must include a study of the allocation of decisions in the 
organisation, and the methods of influence that are employed 
by the higher levels to affect the decisions at the lower 
levels. (44) 
In this thesis we shall be examining not only the source of ideas 
of the managerial innovations, but also their outcomes, that is, how 
these were achieved, and their overall effect on the system. Such a 
decision-making analysis will, hopefully, allow us to meet the 
conditions laid down in the above quote, and to discover if the SNP 
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between 1960 and 1974 became highly centralised, elite-dominated, 
organisation. 
In the next chapter we shall extend the discussion of party 
leadership into a more theoretical field, that is, why was it likely 
that as the SNP grew in size it was always probable that it would 
become dominated by a leadership group? Furthermore, what is empirically 
known about leadership in organisations in general? 
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Chapter Two 
Organisational Leadership and Power 
Our concern in this thesis is with trying to establish if there 
was a leadership group, within the SNP, which enjoyed disproportionate 
power over administrative/management matters between 1960 and 1974. 
In other words was there a recognisable leadership cadre, controlling 
the direction of the Party during those years? 
For the moment we are not concerned with the size or the composition 
of this group. Rather our attention will be focused on defining what 
we mean by 'leadership' and 'power', since unless we understand what is 
meant by these concepts, it will prove fruitless to speak of leadership 
control, or centralised direction. At the heart of both of these 
notions lies the idea of a leadership group utilising power in what 
they believed to be in the best interests of the Party. It is these 
critical, but much misunderstood terms, which will now interest us. 
Leadership ~d Power 
Though they are widely used throughout the social sciences, it is 
not at all uncommon to find these concepts left without a definition. 
It would seem that an assumption is made that the reader will know 
exactly what is meant by each. This failure to outline a definition 
is not perhaps, surprising, for they are notoriously difficult to tie 
down to a generally agreed meaning. In truth, the latter appear to 
shift depending upon the discipline and the context in which they are 
used. Nor can it be said that there is widespread agreement within 
46 
political science about the use of what Dahl calls 'influence terms'. (1) 
Of the two concepts, perhaps 'leadership' is the least confusing and 
easiest to specify. Even so, as Blondel has noted (2) , controversies 
still rage around the use of the word. One can say of 'leadership' that 
it involves a relationship beyond the individual. MOreover, the 
followers must recognise and accept, that a number of their group, party 
etc., actually constitutes the 'leadership'. What is critical is that 
leaders should be recoggised by their followers as being leaders, 
regardless of the origins or causes of this recognition. It is clear 
that followers have to view themselves as followers for the power 
relationship to be also one of 'leadership'. (3) 
But by itself even this does not take us very far. After all it 
could simply mean that in one particular instance the leaders should be 
followed. Leadership in a normative organisation is more complicated 
still. Compliance with directives is not normally a consequence of 
utilitarian considerations such as job dismissal. But more likely 
because one is idealistically c.onunitted to the philosophy of the body 
concerned. We shall return to the specific theme of political 
leadership presently. 
Perhaps one of the principal difficulties in defining leadership 
lies in the fact that it has been studied from starkly different 
methodological perspectives. Of these approaches the two most common 
are the 'trait' approach and, secondly, the attributes which flow from 
'position' . 
The former amounts to enquiries into, and the listing of, those 
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personality traits most connnonly found amongst organisational leaders. 
The second method, the 'positional', examines the social and physical 
nature of the environment in which the leaders operate, the nature of 
their task, as well as the personality traits of the leaders (4). 
Within certain limits this is the approach we shall be adopting. 
However, we will not utilise the listing of traits, since we consider 
this requires an expertise in psychological analysis (which we do not 
have), and is open to the intrusion of too many subjective factors in 
the absence of the latter. 
We shall use the 'positional' (see Chapter Eight for an 
empirically based analysis of the 'positional') perspective which has 
the merit of simplifying the quest for a suitable definition, since if 
someone holds a position, officially defined as being part of the 
leadership, then it increases the likelihood that he/she will be 
treated as such. But we must go even beyond this in our search for a 
definition. 
In a normative organisation leaders should have legitimacy, that 
is to say, the membership should believe that the leadership should have 
the right to issue directives and speak on behalf of the organisation as 
a whole. This means, if they are to be effective, they must have 
authority; in fact, Dahl calls legitimate 'power' or 'influence', 
authority (5) As Welsh says: 
An authorative leader is one whose actions in organising, 
mobilising, and allocating resources are accepted by the 
persons for whom these sections are relevant ... If the 
followers attach legitimacy to the acts of a leader, we may 
speak of the relationship between leaders and followers as 
one of the authority. (6) 
Therefore, for our purposes a 'leader' is one who holds a specific 
and senior position within the organisation (see previous chapter for 
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the exact posts within the SNP delineated as composing the leadership), 
and who is regarded as having the right to hold that position by the 
membership: 
Political leadership rests on a moral basis when leaders 
command authority among their followers in the absence 
of any legal sanctions. (7) 
Dion (8) believes that the essence of political leadership is 
not the 'leader~mass' relationship but the amount of influence that the 
leaders have on the core of the party's faithful, as well as the former's 
control of the party. This is a reference to the prevailing relationship 
between the leadership and the activists of the party, and the degree to 
which the former actually manage the affairs of the organisation. The 
leaders must convince the activists that they have the good of the 
organisation at heart. In this way the leadership can gain control of 
the party. Thus whilst apparently adhering to political norms they will 
usually seek to accumulate power for the centre. In this way control 
becomes easier and less subject to the ever changing whims of the 
membership; the minimisation of membership caprice is essential for 
sound management. 
Leadership within a political party is a delicate balance between 
ensuring that legitimacy is retained, and trying to effect increasing 
power for the centre, the latter being a vital component of good 
management. We shall return to what elements are likely to assist in 
the exercise of leadership (and concomitant legitimacy) below. However, 
before that we must now seek to define an equally popular, though much 
misunderstood concept, power. 
Power 
This thesis, in common with most other studies in politics, is 
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centrally concerned with the idea of 'power distribution'. Too often, 
however, it is taken as a given and consequently left without a 
definition, for example, in the preceding paragraph we referred to 
'increasing power for the centre', without actually specifying what 
we meant by 'power'. 
In the first instance we see that 'power' is related to action in 
the sense that Group A motivates Group B to behave in accordance with 
A's wishes. This distinguishes it from the mere coincidental, that 
is, B behaved in a fashion that A desired, although B had no way of 
knowing that such was A's wish. 
Yet, of course, power goes beyond even this. It can be 'coercive', 
as in a prison, where the inmates do as they are told for fear of 
retribution; or it can be exercised on a 'reward' basis, as on the 
shop-floor, where action occurs on the basis of wage reward. Such 
power is different in degree and type from a 'coercive' application. 
French and Raven identify five types of power: 
Reward power. One actor believes that the other can mediate wage 
rewards for him, that is, the latter has resources from which the 
former will benefit. 
Referent power. This is power based on a liking, or identification, 
with another person, and from that affection, or empathy, flows the 
source of the other's power. 
Coercive power. A believes that B can mediate punishment for him. 
Legitimate power. A believes that B has the right to influence A, and 
that A has an obligation to accept that influence. In formal 
organisations such power is usually attached to an office. One method 
50 
of gaining such legitimate power is through winning elections. 
Expert power. A believes that B has some specialist knowledge in a 
certain area, and such is the basis of B's power. However, the 
exercise of influencing must be restricted to his sphere of expertise 
because any attempt to go beyond it can reduce his power by 
undermining A's confidence. (~) 
Now, it is obvious that these categories need not be mutually 
exclusive; it is quite possible for a party's 'general secretary' to 
exert all five. Nor need we accept this typology as being definitive. 
For example, Janda's concept of 'power' (10) excludes 'reward', 
'referent', 'expert' and 'coercive' power as a basis for understanding, 
or describing, the nature of organisational 'power'. He believes 
that leadership: 
does not occur unless the power-wielder secures the 
desired behaviour from the power recipient on the 
basis of leg~timat~ power. (11) 
He goes on to outline what he considers to be 'legitimate power', 
and gives a threefold typology thereof: 'cultural values', by which 
he means that the predominant cultural orientation gives to the 
leader(s) the right to prescribe behaviour; 'social structure' works 
in the following way. If A accepts a hierarchy as right then he will 
accept legitimate power within his group; finally, designation by a 
'legitimising agent', for example, election to office. 
Janda does not consider 'cultural values' as being to be of great 
significance, but the other two are very important for the acquisition 
of legitimate power. Thus it would seem that he believes that a 
'power' relationship exists whenever group members believe that 
another within the group has the right to prescribe behaviour patterns. 
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The distinctions between Janda's view and that taken by French 
and .Raven are typical of the many difficulties which proliferate in 
this area; there is no general agreement, and indeed much confusion 
over the concept and even less consensus over its operationalisation. 
The important thing would appear to be that whenever one discusses 
'power' one defines it clearly so that quantification and 
measurement may begin from a basis which all can understand - if not 
exactly agree upon. 
Yet there are elements of political power which make it easier 
to analyse than is the case in other power studies, as Blondel has 
noted, 
One element of the distinction between power involving 
leadership and other forms of power is the fact that 
leaders and led have to belong to the same group while 
this is not necessarily true of other forms of power. (12) 
For our purpose we define 'power' within the democratic political 
party as the right to command exercised by those in senior positions 
within the organisation, even if such powers are not formally 
elucidated. This means that the leaders are exercising powers in 
given areas, even although in constitutional terms they should not. 
However, this state of affairs is allowed to persist either because 
that section of the membership which opposes it is unable to muster 
enough support to prevent the leaders from so increasing their powers, 
or the leaders have the tacit agreement, and/or acquiescence, of a 
majority of the membership in this power extension. There is also 
the possibility that the great bulk of the members, or at least a 
significant minority, simply do not know that the leadership is using 
powers that have not been formally given to them. 
This allows for the possibility of the leadership increasing their 
S2 
share of organisational power either with or without the consent of 
the rank-and-fi1e. This also means that we can actually know whether 
or not the leadership group has increased their share of power through 
time, in what areas, and how this was achieved, for example, did they 
ask Conference for more powers, or did they simply assume such powers 
without reference to the membership? If there was consent from the 
members on what basis was this given, for example, did the membership 
believe in the expertness of the leaders, or was it related to some 
perception of coercive power which the leadership group had at its 
disposal? 
In the next section we shall examine what elements are most likely 
to assist in increasing the powers of the leadership, and thereby aid 
in the centralisation of party management. 
Organisational Leadership and Internal Party Power 
In this section we shall be concerned with what elements are 
likely to advance the status and power of leadership within organisations, 
so that when we come to analyse the specific case of the SNP we will be 
in a position to relate events within the Party to organisations in 
general. To do this we will refer to work already undertaken in the 
field of organisational analysis. 
Katz and Kahn have suggested that three basic types of leadership 
behaviour occur within organisations: 
(1) the introduction of structural change, or policy 
formulation, 
(2) the interpolation of structure, that is, piecing out the 
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incompleteness of existing formal structure, or improvisation, 
and 
(3) the use of structure formally provided to keep the 
organisation in motion and in effective operation. (13) 
Whilst they consider number one to be the most challenging, they 
nonetheless believe it to occur as a consequence of external pressures. 
Number two involves structural improvisation and is important in 
avoiding the breakdown of the system. The third behavioural type means 
that the use of structure as it exists in response to potential 
disruption. 
On the face of it, it is difficult to distinguish between these 
three types, nonetheless they do represent recognisable leadership 
strategies. In the case of the SNP we can immediately understand the 
pressures which were placed on the SNP leadership of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s to innovate or face the virtual extinction of the Party. 
However, whilst some utterly new elements appeared there was also the 
'piecing out' that Katz and Kahn describe. In the end however, it is 
difficult to separate the various threads. We can certainly understand 
from the above typology what organisational leaders do in general, but 
we must look at the specific decisions taken by the Nationalist leaders 
between 1960 and 1974 to grasp the type of leadership strategy adopted 
by them. That strategy, especially in the early years, was directly 
related to the then external and internal crises that confronted them. 
Since the SNP was so ineffective, risk-taking was better than a 
prolongation of the torpor. 
Therefore, it follows that if a group is now at some low 
point in effectiveness, if it faces a difficult problem, 
or many obstacles blOCK the path to its goals, a great 
deal of leadership must occur before maximum need satisfaction 
or maximum effectiveness is attained by the group '" the 
further a group is from maximum effectiveness, the more--
leadership is_possible and required .. , (14 ) , 
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Bass gives further examples from work by Baxter and Cassidy, Frank, 
Hemphill and Gibbs (IS)? all of which confirms the view that groups 
are more likely to accept leadership and command when they are in a 
state of ineffectiveness and lacklng clear dlrection. whether this is 
true in every case seems open to question, for example, the current 
disputes within the Labour Party. However, it certainly is borne out 
by the experiences of the SNP in the late 1950s and early 1960s. We 
shall give supporting evidence in later chapters. 
If groups low in morale and success are more amenable to the 
exercise of control we must also ask what sort of individuals are most 
likely to emerge, and be accepted, by the rank-and-file, as 
organisational leaders? 
In the case of a political party this questions of 'who leads?' 
is to some extent resolved by the adoption of a 'positional' approach: 
if the individuals composing the leadership have won or retained office 
at an election, then we may assume it is because the membership, or 
at least a section of it, is happy with them in that position. To 
begin with, therefore, leadership means adherence to group norms; the 
rank-and-file like to believe that their leaders are of the same stock 
as themselves with the interests of the organisation, as a whole, at 
heart (16) Thereafter, and once their legitimacy has been established, 
the leaders begin to react upon and change the group structure. 
Their control over the means of dominance puts them in 
position to convert the group norms into an ideology which 
sanction their preferred style of command. (17) 
Having established themselves in the leadership via the electoral 
process, they must then seek to reinforce their position by means of a 
strategy which brings success to the organisation. As Dion has argued (18) 
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the prevailing style of leadership in politics will be similar to that 
which one finds in business, education and voluntary organisations. 
But as Tannenbaum and Schmidt argue (19), the actual exercise of 
authority can vary between, on the one extreme, the manager simply 
taking a decision and announcing it, and on the other, where the 
subordinates suggest the solution and the manager's initial role simply 
involves the identification of the problem. 
But in terms of increasing their power the leaders will find that 
nothing succeeds liKe success: 
The proportion of successes compared to attempts to lead will 
increase among those whose previous leadership acts have been 
effective ... (20) . 
As successes increase; rapidly growing membership, election victories 
or an increasing share of the poll, and publicity for the party etc., 
then the leadership will find that their intra-organisational power is 
likewise advancing. 
On a continuum of events we can illustrate the progress which 
results in increasing the power of the leadership. In the beginning 
the organisation is struggling for survival. Strong leaders institute 
the necessary adjustments to end the decline and begin the expansion. 
Given the fact that the members acknowledge the need for innovation, 
increased leadership power is accepted, and perhaps welcomed. 
If success, in the form of organisational expansion, is effected, 
then this further strengthens the position of those who were responsible 
for the advance. They are seen to be skilled and capable people who 
were worthy of the confidence which the membership had in them. 
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MOreover, once they are in power other factors begin to lend 
security to their position. When individuals gather together voluntarily 
to achieve a certain goal, if it so happens that their interaction 
potential is low because of, for example, a large membership, then they 
tend to vest control in a few executive positions. Once ensconced in 
such positions, the office-holders come to gain additional knowledge, 
control of communications, expertise in the mechanics of the organisation, 
and decision-making authority, so that in the end: 
Status differentiation may reach a high degree in what 
began as a voluntary collection of individuals of equal 
status. (21) 
This expertise of office, Michels' 'technical factors', gives the 
leadership considerable advantages when debates about, or arguments over, 
internal power arise. According to Linz, Michels' analysis emphasised: 
••. the constraints derived from organisational needs, the 
growth of the organisation, the need to make rapid decisions, 
the difficulties in communicating with the members, the growth 
and complexity of the tasks, the division of labour, the need 
for full-time activity and from the consequent processes of 
selection of leadership and development of knowledge and 
skills. These processes, in turn, lead to the emergence 
of stable leaders, whose professiona1isation, combined 
with consciousness of their own worth leads to oligarchy. 
The important, p?_int ,is that the leaders' deviation from 
norms that they themselves accept is not the resUlt of 
their motivation. (My italics) (22) 
We included this lengthy quote because we believe that it adequately 
summarises what we believe to have occurred within the SNP between 1960 
and 1974. Linz is pointing to the fact that Michels recognised that 
the party leaders had a commitment to democracy but were forced to act in 
ways which damaged the democratic process as a direct result of 
organisational imperatives. 
The rise of bureaucracy which is attendant upon membership expansion 
of a political party is somewhat complicated in the case of the SNP. 
This complexity is born of the nature of the SNP's staffing arrangements. 
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For most of the 1960s, whilst the SNP had a bureaucracy, defined as 
paid, full-time officials, much, indeed most of the administrative 
management burden was carried by the senior-elected officers (23) of 
the Party. These bureaucrats did not meet all the criteria normally 
associated with the Weberian view of bureaucratic authority (24): 
administrative activities are normally carried out on a regular basis; 
officials have clearly specified duties; there is a hierarchical 
demarcation of offices; recruitment is on the basis of specialist 
competence and is effected through examinations, and the staff's 
conduct is governed by written procedures. 
Now, in fact, several of these criteria were not met by the 
majority of the Party's bureaucracy. They did not have a fixed and 
regular salary - indeed they were not even employees, consequently did 
not have tenured positions. However, need we take Weber's 'ideal-type' 
as our guide when we come to analyse bureaucracy in the real world? 
Whatever aspects of criteria a working concept of 
bureaucracy which should be settled, not by an intuitional 
typology, but by comparison of relevant historical documents. (25) 
The SNP, as we shall discover, went through many of the changes 
normally associated with bureaucratic growth, but rather than identifying 
the ideal-typical attributes established by Weber, we consider Friedrich's 
view (26) of what is normally found in a nascent bureaucracy, as most 
helpful: centralisation of control and supervision, differentiation 
of functions, qualifications for office, precision and continuity, 
secrecy and discretion. These are potentially quasi-quantitative, 
allowing, as they do, for the judgement "more or less". Indeed, 
Friedrich suggests that further research could lead to the extension 
or reduction of the list. In any event, of Friedrich's group the only 
elements which one could not apply to the unpaid bureaucracy of the 
SNP are; objectivity and qualification for office. 
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It is this latter element which is at the heart of the problems 
surrounding the question whether or not we can describe the SNP's part-
time administration as bureaucratic? 
What were the group's qualification for office? During the course 
of the thesis we shall argue that, effectively, they were two-fold: 
they were often seen by the membership as having technical skills, for 
example, as being good at book-keeping, or as administrators, or as 
communicators. Such skills would be particularly true of those who 
filled the posts of National Secretary, or Vice-Chairman (Organisation), 
or Treasurer. But once elected, these established skills were reinforced 
by the more overtly political attributes of party leadership, and of 
the status and prestige that such a position bestowed. Therefore the 
SNP's leaders were in the strange position of being held accountable 
for all of the administrative aspects of the Party's work, and also the 
projection of the SNP politically. 
Yet leadership power to be effective must have a control element, 
for there are occasions in the life of a party when such control will 
be vital for optimising the possibilities of electoral success. Indeed 
according to Etzioni (27) organisational success largely depends upon 
the leaders' ability to control the membership, and he lists three types 
of control normally employed - depending upon the type of organisation: 
'physical', which is coercive; 'material', which is based upon the 
utilisation of goods and services; and 'symbolic', this is based upon 
normative considerations such as the leadership urging the members to 
greater efforts. 
MOst of the time organisations utilise more than one type of 
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control. In the case of the SNP, whilst there was no coercive element 
to speak of (although the leadership could, on occasions, suspend or 
expel individuals or branches) there were certainly many instances in 
which symbolic control was effected. Indeed, in virtually every 
communication from headquarters, whether oral or written, such control 
methods were employed. On the other hand, it is hard to see how 
'material' control could have been used. 
In applying 'symbolic' control the SNP's leadership had the 
advantage of being able to claim that, as the Party's administrators, 
they knew what was best for the Party in straight management terms. 
And beyond this, as its political leadership, they were likely to be 
followed anyway especially in the circumstances of growth (which they 
had done so much to achieve) which applied for most of the 196Os. Control 
for the SNP's leadership, was facilitated by the structural conditions 
of the Party between 1960 and 1974 (though we do not deny that there 
were also helpful external circumstances). Thereafter the intrusion of 
a parliamentary contingent changed the power structure and control 
mechanisms. 
In this chapter we have looked at the central concepts which 
affect any study in organisation: 'leadership'and 'power'. We have 
attempted to define these terms for use in this thesis, and to specify 
what conditions are liable to facilitate, and optimise, successful 
organisational leadership. 
In the chapters which follow we shall seek to plot the series of 
circumstances which led to an increase in power for the central 
leadership, at the expense of the members, and to relate these events 
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to other studies in organisational analysis. 
In the next chapter we shall be looking at the organisation and 
power structure of the SNP in the 1950s and early 1960s; how effective 
was the organisation of those years, and what was the internal 
distribution of power? Such an analysis is vital in order to 
highlight the degree to which the Party changed after 1962, and it will 
allow us to implement a more rigorous comparison between the two, very 
distinct, periods. 
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Chapter Three 
The Organisation and Power Strtitture of the SNP,1948~1962 
This chapter will examine the SNP in the years between 1948 and 
1962. This specific period is chosen because it represents a demarcation 
between an era of virtually uninterrupted growth, starting around 1962, 
and an earlier period in which the SNP was on the periphery of Scottish 
politics, with an exceedingly small membership, and an almost total 
absence of political or organisational success (organisational success 
is defined as membership and branch growth, as well as considerable 
improvements in Party finances, and the amount of attention given to 
the SNP by the national media). 
This chapter is necessary so that we may better appreciate the 
remarkable developments which occurred within the SNP after 1962, and 
in this respect it should be instructive in both organisational and 
power analysis terms. Nothing is so illustrative of the changes which 
overtook the SNP in the 1960s, than an understanding of the condition 
of the Party as it was in the 1950s. 
The first section will look at the organisational evolution in the 
fourteen years between 1948 and 1962. These years do not represent a 
complete whole, in so far as there were no variations in the Party's 
fortunes. However, it is true to say that the SNP was not doing well, 
organisationally or electorally, until the last few years, that is, 
1961 and 1962. This section will plot the organisational path of the 
Nationalists through an era best seen as the SNP's nadir. 
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The second section will concentrate on the internal power structure 
of the SNP between 1948 and 1962. Our view is that during this period 
the SNP was more devolved, and much less oligarchic, than in the years 
after 1962. That is to say, as the demands placed upon the leadership 
from organisational expansion (see previous chapter) intensified, so 
there occurred, as we would expect, an increasing tendency to centralise 
power in the hands of a comparatively small group at the apex of the 
Party. 
However, throughout the 1950s the Party was so weak and unstructured 
that there was an absence of direction and control. As a result of 
these weaknesses, and lack of leadership personnel, the existing Party 
principals would have welcomed qualitative additions to their ranks -
if only to carry some of the burden - had only such people been 
available. 
Besides from supplying evidence in support of this case, we shall 
also engage in some theorising as to why an Oligarchy was unlikely to 
have existed within the SNP in the 1950s. 
One final, and general point. We are not suggesting a crisp, 
clean break between these periods. Rarely, if at all, could one 
reasonably expect to find such a division. Rather, we believe, that 
there occurred a slow but marked improvement in the condition of the 
SNP's organisation starting around 1958-59, with a more spectacular 
spurt between 1963-64. Nor are we suggesting that power was wholly 
devolved to the membership in the 1950s, with the leaders merely 
following their instructions. What we are describing was a climate of 
opinion which favoured a much greater role for the membership in 
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decision-making than subsequently became the case as the Party grew in 
size. In other words, the exigencies of growth, which propel 
organisational leaders towards centralisation, had not yet begun to bear 
in upon the SNP's managers. The suggestion is that consultation with 
the membership on organisational matters, was much more common in the 
1950s (and the Party was less centralised), than in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Organisational Structure 
1948 was an important year for the SNP. It was in that year that 
the Party took the second of two decisions which left control of the 
organisation in the hands of fundamentalist Nationalists, those who 
believed in full-scale independence and nothing less, and who also 
believed that the SNP should have no truck with any other party. 
The first such influential decision was taken at the Party's 1942 
Conference, when the delegates voted for Douglas Young as Chairman, in 
preference to the candidate of the Home Rule faction led by John 
MacCormick. Although, as Jack Brand makes clear (1), Young was by no 
means a hard-line Nationalist, nevertheless this vote led to the 
devolutionists leaving the Party and forming the Scottish Convention. 
The next step towards ideological purity (as the 'Independence, 
nothing less' faction saw it) was the decision of the 1948 Conference 
to make membership of any other party incompatible with continued 
membership of the SNP. Previously, dual membership was permissible 
(the decision was not unanimous, indeed it caused Douglas Young to 
leave the party). On the face of it this decision was hardly surprising, 
or unfair; the SNP could not hope to be a credible electoral force if 
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sections of its membership, perhaps even the leadership, had their 
loyalty divided between two parties. After all, how could the 
Nationalists have been certain that confidential decisions were not, 
even inadvertently, being .leaked? Equally important, how could a 
political party reasonably ask for the support of electors in preference 
to another party, if some of their own members, perhaps even candidates, 
were themselves members of that other Party? 
In any case, the 1948 decision was the final act in a drama which 
saw the SNP being transformed from a mere movement into the form, if 
not the substance, of a mass political party. 
By the end of the 1940s the SNP had some reason to feel pleased 
with its progress: it was free of its dissident elements, it had, 
albeit briefly, elected its first member to Parliament, and of its 1949 
Conference, the Party newspaper the Scots Ind~endent, claimed that it 
had proved that the Party had 'come of age' (2) In the 1949 local 
elections the SNP contested an unprecedented number of seats, and, 
finally, the Party had adopted a new Constitution which reflected its 
new found ideological predilections. 
At a policy conference held in November 1949, the SNP laid, once 
and for all (or so it was thought), the Home Rule ghost: the delegates 
voted by 57 votes to 9 to reject a resolution which called for a 
plebiscite to be held on Home Rule. And just to endorse this stance the 
same conference voted overwhelmingly against a proposal to form a 
congress of representatives from the trade unions, MPs and local 
authorities to secure a measure of Home Rule (3) (As a matter of 
interest that same conference also recorded more delegates from more 
-----
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branches than had ever before been seen at such an affair) . 
In the previous month, October, the Party Chairman, Dr. Robert 
McIntyre, claimed at a press conference (4) that over 40 candidates 
were available to contest elections, providing that £40,000 could be 
raised by appeal, a not inconsequential caveat. Furthermore, he 
asserted that membership had multiplied four or five times since 1945, 
and as an example he reported that four new branches had been formed 
in one Dundee constituency alone. 
Whilst one must treat such claims, in the absence of documentary 
proof, with some scept]:Em, there is some reason to believe that if the 
SNP was not exactly prospering, then neither was it in the state of 
disrepair that it would later fall into. At the Conference of 1949, the 
Publications Committee reported (5) that by the year ending March 1949 
a total of 73,000 new leaflets had been sold. These covered issues as 
diverse as housing,ernigration, local government, and another leaflet 
which set out the Party's aims and objectives. By the standards of the 
more established parties these figures were modest, but, as we shall 
see, they were very impressive when compared to what was achieved in 
the 1950s. 
Other evidence also suggests that the Party was much stronger in 
the late 1940s than in later years: it had a full-time office manager 
who had one full-time and one part-time assistant; the Party's monthly 
newsletter to the branches had a section which was devoted to 
organisational matters; and although finances were in decline, they 
were nonetheless in a better state than they would be again for many 
years. 
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But all was not well with the SNP even then. There is sufficient 
data to suggest that the health of the Party was beginning to wane. We 
have already mentioned falling finances. At the beginning of the 1949 
Conference, the Party Treasurer resigned because he felt that the low 
return in branch quotas (6) was tantamount to a vote of 'no confidence' 
in him. He also reported that £1,000 in bequests had to be realised to 
finance the running of the organisation. Something called the Party 
Upkeep Fund (an appeal to supporters which was used to pay for running 
costs) achieved £1,600 out of a target of £2,000, and of this figure 
only £600 came from the branches. It was also reported that 
affiliation fees, paid by the branches to headquarters, had not risen 
in the same proportion as the number of new branches. 
In retrospect we can see that 1949 represented a turning-point in 
what came to be a critical downward cycle. However, in such matters as 
organisational and/or electoral decline one can never be certain as to 
the exact reason, or reasons, for the deterioration. They are usually 
many and complicated, embracing internal and external events. It is 
likely that some mistakes could have been avoided. But, given the 
fallibility of human beings, errors will occur, often with harsh 
consequences. 
Perhaps the SNP's recession was a result of general societal 
changes which occurred in the late 1940s, such as a sharpening of social 
tensions which polarised the electorate between the two major parties. 
Even if this was the case, we must also remember that the SNP had never 
been a serious electoral force, and therefore it is hardly surprising 
if the strain of failure at the ballot-box affected the organisational 
capacities to function effectively. Presumably lack of success must 
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have dented morale, as well as public confidence in the electoral 
vitality of the SNP. Why waste a vote, or cash, on a Party which was 
obviously never going to succeed electorally? 
For the most part these factors can be classified as 'exogenous' 
that is, they were events going on at a social level rather than 
organisational matters. But the line which divides these from the 
'endogenous' can be very fine indeed. A good example of this is the 
ambiguity which surrounds the decline in the Party's finances between 
the late 1940s and the early 1950s. Did the organisational difficulties 
cause a fall-off in financial support., or was it that financial problems 
led to an inability to carry on an efficient organisation? Either way 
these appear to be 'endogenous' problems, soluble within the context of 
the Party. The reality probably was that the problems were symbiotic, 
and in feeding off each other worsened the situation. MOreover, both 
could equally have been caused by external factors too complex to 
understand. 
In any event the SNP was beset by financial problems which prevented 
the Party from carrying on the sort of propaganda activities vital for 
electoral success. This included everything from the ability to pay 
office staff, to the capacity to print leaflets. 
The estimated income of the SNP centrally in 1948 was £2,650. Of 
this £150 came from branch affiliation fees, £100 was in membership 
subscriptions (individuals who joined the Party directly at headquarters, 
rather than through a branch), £1,000 came from the Party's Upkeep 
Fund, and £150 was in the form of bequests. Significantly, in the 
light of what was to occur in the 1950s, the total expenditure on 
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organisation, propaganda and publications was £1,350, and a further 
£1,300 was spent on financing the running of Party headquarters. The 
deficit between income and expenditure was to be raised via a levy 
on the branches in proportion to their total members. (7) 
In his report to the 1951 Annual Conference, the Party Treasurer 
proclaimed that: 
A FINANCIAL CRISIS OF UNUSUAL MAGNITIJDE FACES THE NEW NATIONAL 
COUNCIL BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER. (8) 
The reason for the SNP fielding only four and two candidates, respectively, 
at the General Elections of 1950 and 1951, was quite simply a lack of 
cash both locally and nationally. The Scots Independent, in its 
November 1951 edition noted that: 
The decision of the Scottish National Party to contest 
only two constituencies in the 1951 General Election was 
based on reasons of policy and finance. 
The latter needs little explanation. Not enough people 
in Scotland are yet sufficiently convinced of the need 
for Scottish National candidates to provide money to 
finance them. (9) 
If we compare the figures given above for 1948 with those for 
1953, we can see the extent of the Party's financial plight. Income 
was £623, and of this, £172 came from branch affiliation fees. 
Donations amounted to £161, the letting of Party headquarters realised 
£145, and a further £52 came from membership fees. The Party Upkeep 
Fund, mentioned above, appears to have totally disappeared. 
In the following year, 1954, the Publications Committee was bound 
over by National Council not to exceed a subsidy of £100 in the 
production of publications. Furthermore, at no time were they to 
pledge the Party to a sum greater than £200 without specific authority. 
By 1956 the income situation had improved (it is not clear why) 
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so that in that year the Party received £1,884 from branch dues, 
donations, the letting of premises, and a legacy. But despite this 
the overall figure was still below that for 1948. 
The deepening organisational crisis of the 1950s can be seen in 
other ways: membership in 1950 appears to have been well under 1,000. 
An advertisement in the Scots IndeEend~n~ of August 1950 announced 
that a weekend school would be held at Stirling, and there would be no 
limit to the number of branch members entitled to attend. The 
advertisement also indicated that the venue had a maximum capacity of 
six hundred. 
When the office manager resigned in 1951, he was replaced by a 
part-time, unpaid volunteer. In the same year a summer school failed 
through lack of support. After the 1952 Conference, the Scots 
Independent of May 1952 proclaimed: 
Quite frankly and quite obviously, the SNP is not 
getting anything like adequate financial support. (10) 
In a reference to the Party's dependence on its branches, the paper 
noted: 
The branches of the SNP have done a magnificent job •.• 
for many years ••. Undoubtedly they would be in a stronger 
position locally if they had not had to carry such a big 
share of the national job as well. (11) 
In 1954, National Council had decided that the Party was not in a 
position to contest by-elections in East Edinburgh and MOtherwell. And 
in the same year the Organisation Committee reported that a mere six 
candidates had stood for the Party in the local elections of that 
year. 
Thus it would seem that by 1955 the SNP had well and truly lost 
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direction, and its leadership had utterly failed to devise any methods 
to rescue the Party from the impasse into which it had become stuck. 
Such a sense of hopelessness gave rise, among certain members to 
frustration and in turn this bred rebellion - rather a cornmon sequence 
of events. These rebels called themselves the '1955 Group', and they 
strenuously asserted that the Party had fallen into a state of 
administrative chaos. They claimed that the NEC, amongst a catalogue 
of other crimes, had run up an overdraft of £1,140, no small matter to 
a party with the limited means of the SNP. They also attacked the 
leadership for setting up eleven branches in an attempt to ensure their 
own re-election (this, of course indicates, if true, just how small the 
SNP membership must have been. If eleven new branches were enough to 
guarantee the re-election of the leaders then that could denote a 
branch list of under thirty). The '1955 Group' propaganda went on 
to claim that: 
Certain Party Officials have ;B.een Abusing Official 
Positions By . 
canvassnig Party members and branches and spreading lies 
in a smear campaign designed to show: 
(a) there is a conspiracy in the Party. 
(b) fascism is prevalent in the Party. 
(c) unauthorised statements have been made to the press. 
(d) there has been a sabotage of the Party's electoral 
effort. (12) 
At the National Council meeting of June 1955, the Party Treasurer, 
David Rollo, announced his resignation. This was a direct result of the 
foregoing claims, which he dismissed as pure fabrication. He produced 
evidence to show that the overdraft was in fact £408. In the end the 
Group neither retracted not apologised, yet Rollo withdrew his 
resignation. 
Aside from any internal problems, it is likely that the dissidents, 
73 
who numbered many young Party members in their ranks, were angered by 
the SNP's continuing failure to make any headway electorally, and for 
the pathetic apologia which followed the Election of 1955. In the 
General Election of that year the Nationalists fielded only two 
candidates, who between them achieved a mere 12,112 votes (13). Despite 
this lacklustre performance the Scots Independent managed to persuade 
itself that, 'The Election was no SNP Failure' (14) It is fair to 
say that it is doubtful if this view was widely shared within the Party, 
or elsewhere. Nonetheless, undaunted, the paper continued in the same 
vein in its inside pages where it proclaimed that 'Nationalism Proudly 
Advances' . 
Large sections of the membership did, in all probability, treat 
such claims with a measure of incredulity. Nevertheless, the members 
stayed loyal. At the June meeting of National Council (which, 
interestingly enough, was attended by fifty-eight delegates and 
observers, whereas the normal attendance was around thirty - a measure 
of its importance) there were several resolutions dealing with the 
'1955 Group! One concerned itself with the accusations listed above, 
and the Group was asked to withdraw them (15). The vote went twenty-
seven to eighteen for the resolution. Next, Dr. Robert McIntyre moved 
that the '1955 Group' publication, The Free Scotsman, and a Group 
Information sheet, cease evulgation forthwith. This was also carried 
by a substantial majority. The leadership had asserted itself, and 
the rebels were consigned to the wilderness. 
The '1955 Group', which included James Glendinning, an ex-editor 
of the Scots Independent and a member of the NEC, as well as Douglas 
Henderson, a future SNP M.P., was composed, in the main, of younger 
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members unhappy with the moderate, staid image of the Party. In the 
end they formed their own Party. And, according tdT£eScotsman 
newspaper (16), the new Party, The Nationalist Party of Scotland, had 
over 400 members. James Glendinning was chosen as its first President. 
It was now quite obvious that the SNP was in a state of 
organisational and electoral paralysis. Indeed, it largely existed in 
name only: membership was probably under 500, press releases, themselves 
infrequent, were rarely, if ever, carried in the national media, and 
the Party did little in the way of doorstep propagandising. 
Yet in retrospect one might mark the years 1956/57 as the point at 
which the Nationalists began to take hold of themselves, and institute 
the beginnings of a recovery. 
National Council, at its December 1958 meeting, gave its approval 
to a suggestion made by the Organisation Committee, to copy Aberdeen 
Branch's Reply Card Scheme (BRC). This card had a section on it which 
allowed for it to be returned post-paid to the sender if the receiver 
wished to either join or have more information about the SNP. The 
response rate was approximately 18 per 1,000 distributed. (17) 
The BRC scheme signified a commitment to innovation and the 
recognition that the SNP had to haul itself up by its own efforts. The 
small membership, moreover, were unlikely to have opposed the leaders 
in a suggestion that was at least an attempt at reversing the decline. 
Although according to one senior Party figure of the time, James 
Halliday (18), it was the changing political climate of the late 1950s 
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which stimulated interest in the SNP. One must also remember that 
besides the BRC scheme the SNP was implementing other organisational 
novelties in an attempt to improve Party fortunes. 
In 1959 the Annual Conference (19) was presented with a series of 
recommendations from Malcolm Shaw (20), Convener of the Organisation 
Committee. These included the formation of a Publicity Committee to 
handle all aspects of public relations, a clearer definition of the 
responsibilities of committees, and a more intensive effort amongst 
branches to plan all activities towards contesting parliamentary 
elections. 
Nor did the innovations end there. Arthur Donaldson (21) proposed 
altering the style of the Party's leaflets in an effort to make them 
more eyecatching. Moreover, they were to be distributed free of charge 
to the branches in an effort to ensure that the latter actually delivered 
them to the electorate. National Council accepted these suggestions. 
It is unlikely that these changes in themselves had any real and 
immediate impact upon the fortunes of the SNP. But cumulatively they 
represented a change towards organisational action and innovation, and 
the realisation that improved organisation was an essential ingredient 
of electoral success. It is also noteworthy that the ideas were coming 
from the leadership group, a pattern that would become more firmly 
established in the 1960s. 
The 1959 General Election was a modest success for the SNP given 
the previously low standards of the Party. There were five National 
Party candidates, and the SNP vote increased in every seat which had 
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previously been fought. In this way, therefore, we can see that 
organisational changes did appear to have some impact at the electoral 
level. Even so, this was against a background of static membership 
for the preceding four years (22) James Halliday has estimated that 
nationwide membership of the Party at this time was only around 200 (23) 
It was to the question of how to increase membership that Malcolm 
Shaw addressed himself at the 1960 Conference. As the shape of things 
to come, Shaw presented to that Conference (24) a 'Five-Year Plan' to 
increase membership. The minimum objective was to increase membership 
and have ten well-organised constituencies. He also revealed that a 
detailed review of all 71 Scottish constituencies was under way, with 
the intention of highlighting areas of weakness and strength, etc. 
Finally, he announced that there were eight constituencies ready to 
fight an election should this prove necessary, and that regular bulletins 
were going out to the branches. 
But it was Donaldson's report as Convener of the Publications 
Committee which truly emphasised the importance of 1959/1960. In 
excess of 300,000 leaflets had been distributed over the preceding 
twelve months. This statistic appears to have vindicated his 
recommendation to allocate, gratis, leaflets to the branches. 
To recapitulate: whilst external forces may have aided the 
Party in the late 1950s, there is also reason to believe that by its 
own efforts the SNP assisted whatever 'exogenous' factors which may 
have been working in its favour. For example, Gordon Wilson gives 
the following reasons in explanation for the revival of Party fortunes (25), 
The first reason would be that in 1959 the Party started 
a recruitment campaign ". which showed, I think, that 
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there was a greater determination within the National 
Party to achieve change, or to achieve a more effective 
political campaigning method. And that was exemplified 
in 1961, when, over a long summer, a small group of 
people did a systematic canvass. 
The SNP was beginning to take the sort of managerial decisions 
which were vital in the climb from obscurity. Individuals, including 
new members like Ian Macdonald and Alan Niven had begun to realise 
that the only alternative to advance was disintegration. 
Over the years the personalities comprising the Executive had 
changed little: Dr. Robert McIntyre, James Halliday, Arthur Donaldson, 
David Rollo, George Leask, Malcolm Shaw, John Smart, Mrs. Gibson, 
T.H. Gibson, W.S. Orr and Bruce Cockie. Together they comprised well 
over half the NEC, and they had served on the Executive for years. 
Of the few newer members it is interesting to note that two, Alan 
Niven and Ian Macdonald, were e~mely interested in organisational 
matters. This committee began the advances which were to continue 
for most of the 1960s. MOreover, five of the above remained at the 
centre of the decision-making process for most of the next fourteen 
years. Gordon Wilson confirms this view (26): 
From about 1961 onwards the composition of people 
(i.e., on the NEC) began to change, and you got 
different personalities come up, who, in fact, shared 
power with some of the 1950s people. 
During 1960 and 1961 such devices as weekend schools to train 
activists were begun, and unlike previous attempts, these appeared to 
have been well attended. 
An important, if revised, edition of a pamphlet, Starting a Branch, 
was published, and six parliamentary candidates were adopted. 
These events, together with those of the late 1950s, put the SNP 
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in a stronger organisational position than had been the case for the 
preceding twelve years. By coincidence the Party was soon to have an 
opportunity to test its newly developed muscle. A by-election was 
called in the safe Labour seat of Bridgeton, in Glasgow. 
Bridgeton had neither an SNP branch, nor constituency association, 
and as a consequence it was left to the Organisation Committee to decide 
on the viability of contesting the seat. The Committee's minutes 
record: 
From an organisational point of view the constituency 
can be contested. As the Glasgow branches cannot finance 
the by-election a financial report will have to come from 
the Finance Committee. (27) 
Since Bridgeton did not even have the rudiments of an organisation, 
people had to be drafted in from other parts of the city. By September 
1961, National Council was being told (28) that 7,000 BRCs had been 
distributed throughout the constituency, leaflets were to go out during 
the last week of October, and a special edition of the §Sots Independent 
would be published. 
By previous Nationalist standards this was a superlative effort, 
far surpassing any other election activity. Yet the entire operation 
cost a mere £255, only 10 per cent of the constituency was canvassed, 
the total number of canvassers was sixty, and the most in one night 
was twelve. 
The candidate Ian Macdonald, received just under 19 per cent of 
the vote, but was so enthused by the possibilities of effective 
organisation that he offered himself as full-time National Organiser 
with the proviso that Me kept a percentage of the increase in earnings 
he achieved for the Party. His offer was accepted. 
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When one considers how the SNP had previously desisted from even 
contesting by-elections~ then Bridgeton was, to be sure, an organisational 
triumph, and the Party had turned an electoral corner. Soon, thereafter, 
fortune would smile on the Nationalists in the form of a by-election in 
West-Lothian. 
Unlike Bridgeton, West Lothian had a good organisational base (in 
relative terms). The candidate, William Wolfe, was young, interested 
in organisation, and was known in the connnunity as a local employer and 
Church elder. Mbreover~ the Labour candidate, Tam Dalyell, was 
something of an aristocrat, in a constituency with a sizable mining 
population, and where the closure of local shale works was high on the 
political agenda. 
It was a vigorous and intensely fought battle, with particular 
emphasis on socio-economic issues - at Wolfe's insistence. The SNP 
slogan was Put Scotland First, and some 23 per cent of the electorate 
responded. The Nationalists had achieved an electoral breakthrough 
which had a thoroughly beneficial effect on morale, membership and 
public credibility. 
Both Bridgeton and West Lothian can be seen as points of take-off 
for the next stage in the history of the SNP. The Party appeared now 
to have the organisational muscle to challenge the established political 
parties of Scotland. Yet despite these successes at least some members 
of the Party were still unhappy with the course of events within the 
organisation. 
Gordon Boyd, a member of Perth and East Perthshire constituency 
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association, complained in a letter to Donaldson that less than £200 
had been taken in branch dues in 1961, and he charged that there was a 
lack of direction from the leadership. MOreover, if there was, to be an 
increase in the number of constituencies fought at the next election there 
must also, he claimed, be more centralisation. (29) 
Boyd's complaints were prophetic. By the end of 1962 the SNP had 
suffered a setback. This time it was in the constituency of Woodside 
in Glasgow. 
A by-election was to be held in the seat, and once again the SNP 
had little or no organisation in the constituency. But unlike Bridgeton 
there was to be no happy ending. The Nationalists achieved only 12 per 
cent of the vote, lost their deposit, and ran up an alarming deficit 
of £709. This compared to deficits of £131 and £51 for West Lothian 
and Bridgeton respectively. The exact reasons for the defeat are not 
known. It might have been certain inadequacies in organisation. The 
Party does not appear to have carried out an investigation into the causes 
of defeat. 
Yet, despite the defeat, by the end of 1962 the SNP was making 
considerable organisational progressQ The Party had a full-time 
National Organiser, and a rapidly growing branch base. (30) It had 
achieved nationwide publicity following the West Lothian election, and 
it was evolving new organisational techniques in its drive for members. 
The latter would radically alter the face of Scottish politics. 
In the next section we will examine the nature of power relations 
within the Party between 1948 and 1962. Our view is that during this 
81 
period the SNP had a fairly devolved structure, where the membership 
had easy access to the leaders? and where most of the ~portant decisions 
were taken in genuine consultation with the membership at National 
Council. 
Power Structure 
Jack Brand believes (31) that after the departure of MacCorrnick 
et.al. in 1942, control of the Party was no longer held so tightly by 
a small group of people, so typical of the time when the former was the 
leader of the Nationalists. According to Brand: 
It might be small and weak but the SNP was not run by 
a clique meeting daily in a Glasgow coffee-room as had 
been the case before 1939. (32) 
This was a direct reference to the contrasting power of MacCormick, and 
the group, described by Brand, as the oligarchy (33) of the 1950s. In 
so saying he appears to contradict himself, thus: 
from 1942 until the end of the 1950s power was still 
fairly concentrated. (34) 
His position seems to be one whereby he sees power becoming more and 
more devolved as the years passed, so that by the 1960s the SNP was the 
highly devolved Party described by so many writers in the first chapter. 
Our first point of criticism of this that it is difficult to 
measure just how much difference in power there actually was between 
MacCormick and a few others taking decisions, and the oligarchy, which 
was apparently composed of five people, taking most of the important 
decisions in a later period. In fact, at least one member of the 
supposed oligarchy, James Halliday, disputes Brand's view that a few 
members in the leadership 1'Jere taking most of the important decisions 
which governed the Party in the 1950s. In a reference to the leadership 
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of the period, Halliday recalls (35): 
We did not keep anybody out. On the contrary we 
were pathetically anxious to bring strangers in ... 
Our role was to find any sympathisers and enlist 
him (sic). Thereafter he was relied upon to work 
his area. I suppose that made for devolution. 
In Halliday's view there was never any deliberate attempt to foster 
either a centralised or a devolved approach, whatever there was, simply 
evolved. 
Yet another supposed oligarch, Tom Gibson (36), to some extent 
confirms the view that the SNP suffered from a lack of direction during 
the 1950s. In a memo to Dr. Robert McIntyre, James Halliday, and John 
Smart, Gibson claimed (37) that one of the Party's weaknesses was 
c~~dby: 
Ignorance of the essentials of the set-up and 
organisation of the National Party, by branches, 
by members, by area councils and even office-bearers. 
This tends to suggest a somewhat uncoordinated approach which left 
branches free to work away in comparative ignorance of the Party 
structure. 
One other feature of the period which points to an openness in 
decision-making is the distribution of executive minutes to National 
Council delegates. Throughout the 1950s attendance at Council was 
around 30 delegates and observers out of a total membership of under 
1,000. This meant that Executive minutes could easily have found their 
way into the hands of the majority of Party members. As such it must 
have represented a disincentive to any would-be Oligarch, since it 
allowed the rank-and-file to allocate responsibility to any NEC 
member who attempted to usurp the constitutional guidelines of the 
Party. 
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Robert Michels' view of oligarchy, in respect of the size of a 
political party's membership and the latter's relationship to democracy, 
is instructive when it comes to analysing the SNP of the 1950s. He 
suggests (38) that the likelihood of oligarchy increases somewhere in 
the interval of 1,000 to 10~000 of the number of members in a political 
party. This is because: 
The regular holding of deliberative assemblies of a 
thousand members encounters the gravest difficulties 
in respect of room and distance; while from a topographical 
point of view such an assembly would become altogether 
impossible if the members numbered ten thousand. (39) 
To some extent Michels' reservations about the potential for 
democracy among such a number are rendered null and void by advances in 
technology in the years since he wrote Political Parties. However, if 
we are right in our estimation that the SNP's membership in the 1950s 
was under 1,000, then by Michels' standards Brand's view of the SNP 
in the 1950s, as being dominated by an oligarchy, is suspect. In fact, 
throughout the 1950s the membership could have turned up at any, or 
virtually any, Party gathering if they had so wished. Indeed the 
practice of non-delegate observers continues to this day at both 
Council and Conference. 
We believe that from the point of view of numbers the SNP of the 
1950s does not qualify as being oligarchical in type, and other 
evidence supports this view. As early as 1949 the Scots Independent 
highlighted (40) the degree of autonomy within the SNP. In 1949 the 
paper reported a meeting held at Stirling in February 1949, of SNP 
councillors and prospective councillors: 
Although elected as Scottish Nationalists each member 
would be free to vote and to act according to his own 
judgement. 
Later in the year Annual Conference re-affirmed this autonomy, 
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when a proposal to make the SNP's local councillors' act as a political 
party' was rejected in favour of continuing with conscience of the 
individual. C4l) Later in its life, as the SNP grew in size, such 
individual discretion was not only discouraged, but councillors were 
supposed to adhere to Party policy wherever possible, and to obey the 
whip. 
This same Conference is worth noting for another reason. In 
contrast to the initiatives taken on financial matters by the leadership 
in the 1960s, the 1949 Conference passed a resolution from Motherwell 
branch which altered the way branch levies were collected. Alterations 
in the levy system would, in later years, almost always come from the 
leadership. Even trivial decisions, which later would be taken by the 
NEC, for most of the 1950s, placed before the National Council for 
affirmation or rejection. In fact, the constitutional mechanisms used 
in the 1950s were legitimate. Whilst the practice of the 1960s was, 
for the most part, outwith the parameters laid down in the Party's 
Constitution. 
An example of the constitutional formality of the 1950s occurred 
in 1952. Dundee East Branch asked to be released from payment of their 
quota in 1952, because of extra expenditure incurred fighting the 
by-election. The NEC only agreed to recommend acceptance to Council. 
The sum involved was £15. 
There is other evidence which strongly suggests that the centre 
not only did not control events within the Party, but also had little 
contact with the relatively few branches which existed. An example of 
such appeared in the Scots ~ndependent of August 1952. That edition 
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carried a notice of a meeting of all members interested in local 
elections, it included the following paragraph: 
Branches, groups, and individual members are asked to 
attend, or to supply information concerning local 
conditions. (42) 
This is hardly reflective of a leadership with its finger on the pulse 
of local activities. Rather it would seem that information about the 
condition of what, after all, was a Party of less than 1,000 members, 
and 20 branches, was scant, with planning uncoordinated and haphazard. 
National Council's determination to be informed about all aspects 
of Party life can be seen from a resolution contained in Council minutes 
of February 1954 (43) This called for all reports of committees to 
be sent to the Council members in writing, together with the agenda of 
the next Council. Another illustration of the power of the membership 
to take decisions on some of the most amazingly insignificant matters 
includes the time when Arthur Donaldson asked Council's permission to 
publish a booklet on the state of the Union after 250 years. The 
entire cost was to be £200. 
Council was the obvious forum through which the leadership could 
have been expected to dominate the membership. It met quarterly, and 
theoretically could comprise the entire membership of the Party if one 
includes observers as well as delegates. When one examines Council 
minutes for the 1950s, one finds attendances averaging around thirty, 
and it is to be supposed that this caucus comprised that most active 
elements of the Party. In fact one finds that throughout the 1950s, 
and on into the early 1960s, National Council attenders comprised 10 
per cent of the entire membership. In that sense it was much more 
democratic and representative than it would later become in the mid-
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1960s and beyond, when Council attendance would be roughly 0.3 per cent 
of the entire membership. 
Even as late as April 1963, when centralisation was increasing, 
the Convener of the Organisation Committee was attempting to assess 
the condition band size of the Party's membership. In his Report to 
the Annual Conference) he wrote: 
Only a minority of branches remitted membership lists 
as required, which makes it very difficult to assess 
Party membership. (44) 
During the 1950s, and on until the Party expanded and 
professionalised, communications between the centre and peripheral areas 
were just not good enough to allow any significant centralisation. This 
is reflected in an observation made by the then National Secretary, 
Gordon Wilson, in his important report on the state of the Party's 
organisation (45) of 1963. He noted that: 
There is a long history of conflict between headquarters 
and the branches of the National Party. The exact causes 
of this are lost in the frustrations of past years when 
the Party stagnated and achieved little ..• The old 
branches nurse a distrust of Headquarters interference 
and mismanagement. The new branches feel that they 
have not received adequate advice and direction. (46) 
This would appear to indicate that the Party leaders were unable or 
unwilling to exert their authority in theperiod before the Wilson 
Report. This view would appear to be confirmed later in the Report. 
In an extremely instructive comment Wilson went on: 
If headquarters or central direction are inadequate, 
it can be for two reasons. 
The first was bad organisation and leadership. The second was that 
the branches preferred that state of affairs (he seems here to ignore 
the wishes of the new branches). He leaves the first as understood 
and concentrates on the second. It was born of hostility by the 
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branches to central control, because of it: 
the executive cannot give directions requiring positive 
action by branches with any assurance that they will be 
carried out. Even innocent enquiries for information are 
ignored. (47) 
We shall discuss Wilson's report in greater detail later in the 
thesis. In the meantime it is worth noting that after taking evidence 
from throughout the Party he was in little doubt that hitherto there 
was not centralised control. But for that matter neither was control 
effectively exercised by Council, rather it was this absence of 
direction which plagued the SNP in the post-war period. The formal 
leadership was prevented by the Council from being too assertive, but 
the Council itself was unwilling, or unable, to direct events, and the 
result was organisational ineffectiveness. Wilson's report was 
instrumental in instituting the necessary centralisation. 
As we shall argue later, the centralisation which, we believe, 
became the norm in the 1960s and 1970s was missing in the 1950s because 
the Party did not have anything which resembled a national organisational 
structure. The centre had the gravest difficulties in eliciting 
information about the branches, their numbers, financial strength, 
and organisational status. Given this situation it seems, as Halliday 
stated (48), the tendency was for local branches to beaver away on 
their own unaided by the centre. 
Theoretically at least, a rational organisational structure tends 
to become ever more hierarchical as the organisation expands (49). The 
SNP in the 1950s had no need to develop such an elaborate mechanism 
simply because there was no growth. It was only the realisation among 
certain leaders of the Party, in the late 1950s, that the SNP had either 
to initiate change of face possible disintegration that gave rise to 
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greater sophistication in the Party structure. Later as expansion 
began, came the need to develop a structured hierarchy to cope with 
this expansion. William Wolfe concedes that out of this growth came 
a group which directed the affairs of the Party: 
Gordon (Wilson) was concerned with management as a 
principle .•. In the Executive we decided things, 
we put forward to be done (sic), and then the four 
of us (Wolfe, Douglas Drysdale, Gordon Wilson and 
Ian Macdonald) more than anybody else - I guess -
actually saw that the Executive decisions were 
carried out. (50) 
In the 1950s had there been a desire on the part of the members 
to contact one of the leaders, it would have been easy to do so. The 
latter were not high powered politicos divorced from the masses. But 
rather people who would gratefully have received any requests for 
information, of help. This is evident from the Arthur Donaldson Papers 
in the National Library of Scotland. The collection is full of hand-
written letters from, and to, Party members and others, discussing 
everything from macro-economics to fetes. 
On the other hand, downwardly vertical communication was diff icul t. 
This was because the leaders had only scant information on branches, and 
this made communication troublesome; they might not even have known 
the branch secretary's name. A central communication system was one 
of the hallmarks of the SNP in the 1960s. 
Finally, a comment on the potential impact of media coverage on 
intra-party relations. 
In the 1950s, Nationalist leaders were considered eccentric, or 
at least fringe characters, by the media. Consequently the SNP's 
case was rarely, if ever, presented on the radio, television, or the 
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press. Instead they had to rely upon the pages of the Scots Independent. 
Yet even there the ordinary members could also find a space. Therefore, 
they did not become the media personalities which some would become in 
the 1970s. Since the media, particularly television, very often bestows 
charisma on people, it can also have the effect of increasing their 
power within the party as a result of regular appearances. Duverger 
points to something similar when he wrote: 
MOdern techniques of propaganda make it possible to 
invest him (the leader) with extraordinary ubiquity. (51) 
We believe that as the amount of media coverage on the SNP increased, 
and as the SNP leaders made more regular appearances, so was their 
individual and collective power increasing. In such circumstances 
ordinary Party members would perceive the organisation, of which they 
were a part, to be becoming more important in proportion to the amount 
of time the devoted to coverage of it. It seems likely then that they 
would have a growing respect for the leaders who were apparently 
responsible for making this possible. 
In this section we have sought to demonstrate that the SNP between 
1948 and 1962 was typified by a devolved decision-making system. One 
where the formal leadership did not exert much authority, and where 
members, if they had so chosen, could have had access to the leadership 
group. In this sense the Party, of the period, could be described as 
"open". It was the events of these years which were responsible for 
the most popular view about the SNP's organisational structure (see 
Chapter One). 
Organisationally the SNP existed in little more than name only over 
the fourteen years between 1948 and 1962. However, towards the end of 
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the 1950s more attention was paid to organisational concerns, and from 
this grew the advances of the 1960s. 
Finally, that whilst a part may have been played by 'exogenous' 
factors, 'endogenous' elements also helped fashion the changes within 
the SNP. That is to say, the Party had some part to play in shaping 
its own destiny. As we noted in the previous chapter, if the SNP were 
to survive the electoral failures of the 1950s, then it had to find 
sources of support through a programme of expansion. Once the latter 
was under way then management specialisation, a hierarchy and power 
centralisation, became inevitable. 
Central to the problems confronting the SNP was the dearth of 
money to finance its projects and campaigns. And it is how this 
difficulty was solved that we devote the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
The Financing of the SNP, 1963-1974 
As we have already observed in the previous chapter, one of the 
most seriously inhibiting factors for the SNP up until 1962 was the 
lack of money necessary for the financing of Party activities. The 
shortage of cash prevented the SNP from establishing an aggressive 
political marketing strategy. This meant that essential features of 
political life in a pluralist system such as posters, literature, 
pamphlets, advertising, and even election deposits, were often beyond 
the Nationalists' ability to pay. Again and again, internal Party memos 
and minutes blamed financial scarcity for the SNP's failure to make an 
electoral breakthrough. 
This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will 
concentrate on the theoretical issues behind the funding of a political 
party, and how the latter can influence the policy output of a party. 
The second section will record the financial history of the SNP 
between 1963 and 1974, and the final section will return to our hypothesis 
concerning the nature of decision-making within the Party. In the 
context of the chapter, it will focus on the sources of financial 
innovation and direction, in this same period. 
The Implications for Jolitical Parties of the Sources of their Funds 
At the most obvious level, political parties in any type of polity 
could not endure without some form of financial base. In an advanced 
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pluralist democracy, financial support, whilst not perhaps at the heart 
of a party, nonetheless represents a crucial element in its life. 
We would contest that financial support is even more important for 
a small party endeavouring to establish itself as a natural part of the 
political landscape (1) For the larger parties there is the usual 
flow of free publicity via the media. And in most constituencies a 
party label is enough to get a candidate elected, almost irrespective 
of the propaganda and the campaign in general. But for a party such as 
the SNP as it was in the 1950s there is no such good fortune. In its 
early stages of development there is practically no free publicity for 
a minor party, nor can it rely upon traditional support. Rather it must 
pay for advertising, and go without the benefits of projection on 
television. MOney is a crucial variable in this battle to establish 
the political legitimacy of a rising party. 
With this in mind, what do we know about the financing of political 
parties, and how might this knowledge increase our understanding of the 
SNP? 
Maurice Duverger is the most obvious and important starting-point 
in any discussion on this subject. In Political Par~ies (2) he 
distinguishes between 'cadre' and 'mass' parties, in one respect 
according to the methods of financing the party. The 'mass' party 
spreads the burden of financing the party over a large section of the 
electorate. Whilst the 'cadre' party depends upon a grouping of notables 
for money. It is interesting to note that, according to Duverger: 
Cadre parties correspond to the caucus parties, 
decentralised and weakly knit; mass parties to 
parties based on branches, more centralised and 
more firmly knit. (3) 
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Richard Rose in his book, The Problem of Patty Go.ve.rrtment (4), 
- ~ - .. 
devotes an entire chapter to the funding of the Labour and Conservative 
parties. He writes: 
Money does not have the same significance in politics 
as in profit-making organisations. It is a means to 
an end rather than an end in itself. Unlike business 
firms, parties are not expected to raise funds by selling 
goods and services. (5) 
He then goes on to describe the SNP as exceptional because in an 
advertisement placed after the February 1974 General Election it 
actually offered a return of £9 in tax reductions after independence, 
in return for £1 given to the Party now (it might be argued that all 
parties offer some material inducement to the electorate in exchange 
for their votes. The SNP advertisement was merely a novel way of 
seeking to influence the voters). 
Rose correctly points out that the source and method of raising 
money are as important as the amount. He goes on: 
The process of transferring funds within a party 
reflects power relationships as well as assumptions about 
economic effectiveness. (6) 
Rose believes that the methods by which the Labour and Conservative 
parties raise their income is typical of 'the limited organisational 
cohesion of British Parties' (7) We shall seek to demonstrate that 
this was not true of the SNP. On the contrary, the SNP's approach to 
party finance demonstrates how it sought, and achieved, a cohesive 
response to what was (and remains) a perennial problem. 
However, two writers who have both examined the SNP finances, 
Mansbach (8), and Brand (9), believe that even in this sphere we can 
see clear evidence of decentralisation. 
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Richard Mansbach (10) in line with his general views about the 
polyarchical structure of the SNP, argued that its branches are: 
financially independent and tend to promote policies 
and employ tactics which exploit local concerns and 
conditions but which are fundamentally parochial. (11) 
In a further reference to their independence, Mansbach writes: 
The local organisations are responsible for their 
own financing. The party had three major sources 
of income - membership dues, branch social activities 
and the Alba Pools (established in 1965) - all of 
which were controlled at the branch level. (12) 
He reinforces this view a little later in his article: 
Branch leaders saw an advantage in reserving a 
major proportion of their income at the branch 
level. Indeed, there was little movement of 
financial resources either horizontally, that 
is, from branch to branch or constituency association 
to constituency association, or vertically, between 
the local organisations and the central organs. (13) 
Jack Brand's view of the SNP as a devolved, decentralised, party, 
is confirmed, in his view, by the methods in which the Party raises 
money. These illustrate the 'importance of grass-roots organisations 
in the SNP' (14) He draws several important conclusions from the 
distribution of financial power within the Party: 
and, 
One of the most striking is the unwillingness of the 
branches to commit money to build up party headquarters. (15) 
Another indication is that, if there is a need for money, 
the party leaders must carry along the branches by 
persuading them that it is necessary. (16) 
Mansbach appears to share a broadly similar view of the SNP's 
financial base which is indicative of a party leadership dependent upon 
the membership for revenue, and therefore a party in which the rank-
and-file carry considerable weight in the formation of decisions by 
virtue of their pivotal economic role. We shall question these 
assumptions later in the chapter. In the meantime it is important to 
discuss more generally the theoretical implications for internal party 
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power of the methods of financing the organisation. 
As we indicated at the outset, all political parties need cash 
to operate. Even the Conservative and Labour parties, with their big 
sectional backers, must raise additional cash from amongst the 
membership. According to Finer (17) one-third of Tory headquarters' 
funds come from the constituencies. But for the Labour Party, in 
1977, only around 11 per cent of its total central income came from the 
constituencies (18) The major parties are obviously heavily reliant 
upon interest groups for financial survival. But for the SNP survival 
depended (much more) on their own internal resources since no interest 
groups supported the Party. On the face of it this should have given 
the branches great power within the organisation. However, the problem 
for them was that for most of the post-war years their very autonomy 
was sufficient to prevent either the centre from getting money out of 
the branches, through effective revenue-raising schemes, or the branches 
coming together to devise schemes for themselves. In the end a 
financial stalemate came about. This was recognised by Gordon Wilson 
in his 1963 report on organisation, when he observed: 
With relations between the branches and H.Q. as they 
are at present it is difficult to see the branches 
voluntarily renouncing their financial independence 
and to remit much of their hard earned funds to 
the central account. (19) 
This view confirms the branch autonomy we pointed out as being typical 
of the SNP prior to 1963. 
The problem for the leadership stemmed from the fact that the 
Party had a firm tradition of branch domination. It could not impose 
from above schemes which would raise the overall amount of cash 
available without diminishing branch power as a by-product. Yet the 
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branches themselves were unwilling, or incapable, of taking united 
action in thepursui t of increased cash flow-. 
In the end, it was the imposition of a coordinated approach which 
improved the financial health of the Party. And transformed the branches 
into agents of revenue collection, not only for their own purposes but 
also for the centre as well. 
It is axiomatic that if the centre mushroomed in the 1960s (defined 
by staffing, office-space, literature production, etc.), then the money 
to pay for this expansion had to come from somewhere. Since, in the 
main, there were no outside agencies responsible for the increase in 
income, the latter had to come from within the Party itself. Unless it 
can be shown that the branches themselves devised schemes whereby greater 
cash was raised and passed on to headquarters, then we must conclude 
that in fact the branches were responding to centrally directed schemes. 
This was indeed the case; coordination replaced the haphazard approach 
typical of the 1940s and 1950s. 
Although one might be able to demonstrate that the centre directed 
the financial schemes within the SNP, nevertheless it was still the 
branches which implemented them, and whence the money came. What 
implications for Party power might we draw from this fact? 
There seems little doubt that this should have led to an increase 
in the power of the branches. After all, if headquarters depended upon 
them for funding then the branches should have been able to dictate to 
the centre what they would or would not accept, especially regarding 
the spending of their cash. In fact, this did not occur. Why? The 
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main reason follows from the organisational structure, branch dispersal. 
Unlike the Labour Party, the focal unit of the Nationalists is not 
the constituency, but the branch. By the late 1960s there were over 
400 of these throughout Scotland, but their geographical spread meant 
that they had to be held together by the centre. Information about 
Party activity carne from a variety of sources: consti tuency meetings, 
National Councils, the Scots Ind!j?endent. But for the most part 
intelligence input carne from the monthly communiques from headquarters. 
The periphery was then reliant upon the centre for information reports. 
The power that this data control gave the centre was reinforced by the 
sheer effectiveness of the revenue-raising schemes, particularly the 
Alba Pools (see below). 
In short, interventionism in branch affairs was seen to work. It 
also made it more likely that the branches would be willing to accept 
direction in other aspects of their lives. Moreover, the branches by 
themselves could not hope to develop a programmatic approach, either 
as innovators, or as critics of the centre, by virtue of their 
comparative isolation from one another. And because many of them were 
composed of political novices for whom direction was essential. 
Theoretically, one can draw rather obvious conclusions from the 
type of sources funding upon which a political party is dependent. 
Obviously, a party would be unlikely to pursue pOlicies which will so 
alienate its main benefactors that it endangers the flow of 
contributions. Furthermore, wherever politically possible one is 
likely to find a policy portfolio which is, at least in part, 
sympathetic to the payrnaster(s). 
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Was this true of the SNP between 1963 and 19747 1Vhi1st the SNP's 
policies, taken as a whole, might arguably have been described as 
vaguely left of centre, there is one consistent thread running through 
them all: decentralisation of government functions, and the suspicion 
of central bureaucracy. One might summarise this approach as 'community 
politics' . 
There seems little doubt that there was a connection between Party 
policy and the funding of the SNP, in so far as policy was orientated 
towards community power and, formally, the Party was based upon the 
branches. The latter were certainly the principal revenue sources. 
There was also an absence of any bias towards either the trade unions 
or business. 
One can only speculate as to the consequences for membership 
loyalty, if the leadership of the Party had attempted to take an 
overtly pre-union or pro-business stance. It seems likely that this 
would have damaged the SNP with sections of its activists-depending 
upon their ideological outlook. Since Party policy (as distinct from 
organisational considerations) was formulated by delegates from the 
branches and associations, it is not surprising that this reflected the 
ideological pre-dispositions of the mass base (as we saw in the 
Introduction, there is substantial evidence to show that the activists 
were drawn from across the political spectrum. But the majority were 
not previously Labour or Conservative identifiers, nor were they c1ass-
conscious). Recognising this, the leadership would also have had to 
devise revenue schemes which reflected these tendencies, and/or made a 
virtue out of necessity, that is, funding the centre from the branches. 
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Given all of this, it might be assumed that the membership had 
much greater powers than our hypothesis supposes, In fact, as we shall 
illustrate in the final section of this chapter, the leadership had 
little difficulty in extracting cash from the members. Even so, policy 
output was, and remains, a reflection of the main sources of Party 
funds. The leadership of the SNP did not have to look over its 
shoulder to ensure that what the members decided at Conference was not 
giving offence to unions, the Church, business, etc. - save for the 
political impact. This left the leaders free to run the Party 
unencumbered by external forces. In this sense then, the source of 
the SNP's funds may actually have maximised Party autonomy; and 
allowed it to aim for the widest possible political audience. If this 
was the case it is at least also possible that the leadership had a 
vested interest in restricting funding to the membership, rather than 
extending it to include groupings which might have led to policies being 
tailored to suit the new paymasters. Therefore political centrism, as 
developed in the SNP, probably grew out of leadership preference, 
membership ideological orientation, (20) and financial realities. 
Given the source of its funding between 1963 and 1974, the SNP 
qualifies as a classic mass membership party. MOreover, the leadership 
did not encounter a growing unwillingness, at least in the 1960s, on 
the part of the membership to part with cash, which Heidenheimer suggests 
(21) was typical of the period. He also gives what he admits to be a 
rather strict way of identifying a party as mass membership based, in 
terms of its financial foundations. He restricts the label to those 
which: 
are able to cover at least two-thirds of their normal 
non-election year expenses from membership dues. (22) 
He examined eight countries and found that only the SPD in West 
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Germany met this criterion. However, if one extends this to include 
membership contributions as well as dues, then the SNP also qualified 
in this period as a true mass membership party. 
Thus prior to the February election of 1974 the SNP, although a 
major Scottish party, was without funding from thestate(to be sure 
neither did the other British parties, but it does occur in some 
European countries), unions, business, or contributions from a 
parliamentary group. The vast bulk of the SNP' s money came from the 
membership as a whole. However, there were, on occasions, very large 
contributions from individual businessmen sympathetic to the Party.(Seer
"
5). 
Given much of the above discussion it is not hard to understand 
why Brand and Mansbach concluded that the SNP's financial position 
led to branch domination of the machine. In fact, it did not. But 
before we attempt to prove this assertion, we shall first trace the 
development of the financing of the SNP from 1963 to 1974. 
Par!y Income, 1963 t~ 1974 
The income of the Scottish National Party in this period was, 
for the most part, dominated by a fund-raising scheme known as Alba 
Pools. This highlighted both the enthusiasm of the membership and 
the Nationalists' dependence upon their own resources for funding. 
It would be neither unfair nor hyperbolic to suggest that Alba was 
the single most important financial innovation to occur within the 
SNP, and it allowed the Party to develop a competitive organisational 
base from which to launch a challenge to the other parties in 
Scotland. 
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Prior to 1963 internal Party reports frequently made reference to 
the supposed fact that inadequate financing was retarding the SNP's 
growth. It prevented the launching of membership drives, increasing 
the number of constituencies fought during general elections, and had 
an overall depressing effect upon activity. In retrospect, 1963 may be 
seen as the cut-off point between financial scarcity and, if not 
abundance, then certainly adequate capital-creating programmes. 
At the beginning of 1963 a survey of branches undertaken by the 
Party (23) showed that finances were still low, and it was reported 
that a dearth of cash was impeding the Party's progress. At the years' 
end the Party Treasurer reported to National Council (24) that in order 
to finance forthcoming parliamentary by-elections, the Party would have 
to realise £2,500 from its financial assets (British Assets Trust, 
Scottish Investment Trust and the British Investment Trust) . 
At around the same time the National Organiser was, in line with 
his job remit, endeavouring to stimulate revenue-raising activity 
among the branches by circulating a memo among them which went to 
considerable lengths in detailing how cash could be obtained from door-
to-door canvassing for donations. This included how much they could 
expect to raise: 15/- per hour! 
Ian Macdonald's job as National Organiser went beyond merely 
encouraging the formation of branches and thereby a growth in member-
ship, it was also to raise money for the Party. It seems, however, 
that although the SNP was to get an increasing proportion of its revenue 
from membership dues as the 1960s wore on, by themselves these would 
have been inadequate to meet the ambitious plans of the leadership. 
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This can be seen quite clearly if one considers that between 1962 and 
1964 the SNP's membership grew from 2,000 to 8,000 and yet in the 
Chairman's Report to National Council in November 1964 (25), Arthur 
Donaldson noted that, yet again, lack of finance was limiting the 
Party's growth. Mbreover, throughout 1964 regular monthly newsletters 
replete with suggestions on fund-raising, were sent to branches, and 
yet there was no appreciable impact on the financial condition of the 
Party. 
It is against this background that we must consider the arrival of 
Alba Pools. This scheme was a mixture of bingo and lucky numbers, and 
was featured on cards which were then sold throughout Scotland. It 
was the idea of the Party's printer,Angus McGillvery. He had 
considerable experience as a fund-raiser, although not always on the 
behalf of the SNP. As William Wolfe observed (26), he brought to the 
task of Alba Pools promotion skills gained in other fields (he had 
raised money for local organisations). The idea for the pools was 
endorsed by a unanimous resloution of the Executive, and details of it 
were sent to the branches in November 1964. 
The overwhelming acceptance of the proposals was made more likely 
by the fact that the SNP was in a serious financial crisis. It was in 
excess of its allowable overdraft by £200, and this threatened to go 
over by £700. For an organisation with the limited means of the SNP 
this was considered a great deal of money. 
The scheme operated through the branches, with members taking a 
number of Pool tickets. It seems likely that a large number of non-
Party members were also purchasing them. However, it is a striking 
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testimony to the enthusiasm of the members that they sold tickets in 
such large numbers, with the concomitantly beneficial spin-off on 
finances: 
Table 1 
ALBA POOLS RECORD (n 1965-1968 
Total Branches ~. 
1965 21,867 10,933 3,751 
1966 47,804 23,902 6,353 
1967 87,250 43,625 8,125 
1968 118,195 55,474 18,700 
(27) 
To put these figures in perspective one need only compare them to 
the income for 1962. In total this amounted to £6,219, of which 
£2,500 came from the realisation of assets. Thus, in fact, in 1965 
Alba in its first full year of operation, brought in virtually the 
same amount as was available to Headquarters from all sources, 
excluding assets, in 1962. Recognition of the invaluable contribution 
of Alba to the Party came from the Treasurer in his Report to the 
1966 Annual Conference: 
Undoubtedly the most important single factor in the 
growth of our resources has been the successful promotion 
of Angus McGillvery (sic.) (28) 
Enthusiasm for the Pools continued until the end of the decade. 
William Wolfe, then Party Chairman, had the following to say to the 
December 1969 National Council: 
There is a close correlation between intelligent use of 
Alba Pools, and political success in getting people elected 
for the Scottish National Party. That is a fact. (29) 
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Whether or not it was a fact seems a debatable proposition, yet it 
was one which was widely believed within the SNP itself. 
By June 1972, it was calculated that from the beginning of its 
operation in January 1965, Alba brought in £65,000 to headquarters, 
and a very great deal more, probably around £120,000, to the branches. 
Quite simply, Alba transformed the SNP, and for a number of years 
it demonstrated that it was possible for a political party to finance 
a political and organisational expansion without sectional backing. 
It was also ample evidence of the sheer enthusiasm of SNP members. In 
1968 individual sales of Alba amounted to one-third of the total 
membership of the SNP. Gordon Wilson remarked of the Alba Pools scheme, 
that it was probably just as important from the point of view of Party 
morale: 
When income rises the morale of the Executive rises, 
and also it feels it can spend. One of the problems of 
the SNP over the years is that it has been very impoverished 
It (Alba) allowed us to upgrade the salary of the National 
Organiser ... it allowed us to appoint a Press Officer - which 
was probably the first major breakthrough. Then there was the 
Research Officer which was even more important. (30) 
Nevertheless, by the early 1970s sales were very clearly in 
decline. Evidence of this decline was apparent even in 1969, and the 
fall-off corresponded to a general retardation in Nationalist support 
in Scotland - more of this below. 
The other vital area of financial support was the sale of membership 
cards. This corresponded to what Duverger called the 'subscription 
system' (31), that is to say, the money was collected annually in a 
single amount. However, given the commitment to Alba Pools, there 
seems to be no reason to suppose that this method of collecting funds 
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represented a degree of commitment to the Party any less than one 
might expect to find in working-class parties. After all, although it 
was a gamble, it still required volunteer agents to collect the ticket 
money. This would be done out of commitment to the Party. 
Duverger distinguished between the annual collection of funds, and 
another method where there is both annual and monthly contribution 
systems (32). This latter system is the one used by the Communists, and 
involved financial sacrifice. The SNP used the annual method primarily 
for logistical reasons - it was a more reliable method than going to 
doors every month, with the ever present possibility that the volunteer 
might forget to call. In any case, the SNP got money from the mernber-
ship in other ways: raffles, collections, dances, etc. But, most 
important of all, the membership was expected to fund the running of 
their branch, and in its turn the branch paid quarterly dues to both 
Headquarters and its constituency association. MOreover, branches had 
to buy the membership card from H.Q. (the cards cost 50 per cent of 
their face value). 
The amount taken by the Party as a whole in membership fees kept 
growing right up until 1968. Thereafter, there was a steady decline 
in the overall membership of the SNP (as a matter of interest, the 
membership fees of the Party had not increased since 1951, and a 
decision to raise them was not taken until National Council, September 
1971). Although we can legitimately question the official membership 
figures (they were often inflated, or inaccurately assessed), never-
theless, it was probably the case that the membership of the SNP in 
1965 was around 18,000 (33). Commenting on the increased activity of 
the Party during that year, the Chairman, Arthur Donaldson, reported 
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to National Council that a most notable gain had been made in the 
Party's position (34) 
There was a clear correlation between increasing funds through 
membership growth, and the expansion of Alba Pools: the SNP was in a 
state of enlargement, morale was high and there was a great deal of 
branch activism. The signing of new members and the selling of Pools 
tickets appear to have been related to each other. Thus when member-
ship began to decline in 1969, so also did the sales of Alba Pools. 
Individual personalities had an important part to play in this 
new found financial self-confidence. We have already mentioned Angus 
McGillvery. Another influential figure was Douglas Drysdale, who was 
a small businessman (he owned an engineering works) and was extremely 
interested in the organisational aspects of the Party's work. When he 
became Finance Convener in 1964 he set about a re-ordering of the 
Party's financial structure. And it was he who highlighted the extent 
of the financial crisis facing the Party in 1964. His commitment to 
financial innovation, and testimony to the SNP's willingness to 
experiment with organisational change, can be ascertained from 
approaches made by him to a team of professional fund-raisers. 
In the United States it is very common for politicians to finance 
their campaigns partly with the aid of professional fund-raisers. In 
Britain this rarely happens (although the Social Democratic Party may 
make greater use of this technique). In fact, it might be looked upon 
with suspicion by the electorate. Drysdale proposed that the Party 
commission a feasibility study be the Wells Organisation, an American 
company, to test the potential for raising £50,000. In the end the 
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NEC rejected the move. This is in itself interesting since, as far as 
we can establish,the proposal was never discussed by Council which is 
indicative of the amount of power the Executive was now exerting within 
the Party. 
However, Drysdale's efforts on behalf of the Party were acknowledged 
by the Party Treasurer, who noted, in his Report to the 1965 Conference: 
The large increase in donations in 1964 is due mainly 
to the enthusiasm and drive of MY. Drysdale. (35) 
Drysdale's middle-class status was shared by the great majority of 
the NEC, and it is not surprising that this should manifest itself in 
approaches to financing. 
The SNP always appears to have had investments, however small, in 
capitalist enterprises, but this tendency became more marked in the 
1960s. As we have already shown the Party Report (36), given to the 
National Council in February 1964, they still had £3,500 worth of 
securities lodged with the Royal Bank of Scotland. They added to this 
portfolio in December 1965 by purchasing 350 units of stock in the 
Investors Company Ltd. for £498. A year later they spent another 
£500 when they bought share in Portland Cement. 
This external interest in shares had its internal equivalent, 
which also appears to reflect a leadership with a business orientation. 
In March 1968 the National Treasurer, George Gibson, made a plea for 
money to help finance the running of Headquarters - made necessary by 
the pressure of business following the by-election success of Winifred 
Ewing. Gibson had the following to say: 
Loans to Headquarters from Branches and Constituency 
Associations are increasing in numbers and are welcome 
by us. It is a safe way of investing your excess funds 
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(devaluation notwithstanding). We have now been 
able to reinvest sums lent to us (the amounts were 
unspecified) in the best securities available in 
the Market, and the rate of interest we receive 
aids us to cover the amount of interest due by H.Q. 
to leaders. The scheme operated by H.Q. accepting 
sums large and small (sic) the loans can be interest 
free or not. Interest can be calculated at 5% per 
annum. (37) 
We would argue that the ethos implicit in this quote goes beyond 
merely good financial housekeeping; it reflects a middle-class bias, 
or at least a business orientation, amongst the leadership of the SNP 
of this period, which had profound implications for the nature of both 
leadership and political strategy. 
This interest in shareholding continued, and very often the sums 
invested were quite substantial indeed. On other occasions there were 
profound moral dilennnas, with more than an undercurrent of irony. The 
February 1968 meeting of the National Executive was advised by the 
Treasurer that the Party had been reconnnended to buy £2,450 in short 
term 6! year Exchequer stock. It was, upon reflection, decided that 
the SNP would not invest in British government stock. 
Some years later, in February 1972, the General Business Connnittee 
resolved to invest up to £2,000 in each of the following:Lyle Shipping 
Ltd., Glasgow; British Bank of Connnerce Ltd.; Thomson T-Line Caravans. 
But the investments did not stop there. In June of the same year they 
invested £829 in I.C.I., £1,059 in Scottish and Newcastle Breweries, 
and £1,000 in Burmah Oil. The National Treasurer, Michael Murgatroyd, 
an accountant, also bought £500 worth of Grangemouth Town eouncil stock, 
and a further £12~000 was invested in the same council in the middle 
of 1974. (38) 
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Two things stand out from this examination of the Nationalists' 
activities in the stock market. The first is that in some cases the 
sums involved were quite large, as in the case of Grangemouth which 
was almost double Headquarters' income for 1962 which emphasises the 
progress made over the years. The second element we have already 
mentioned. The fact is that the leadership appeared not to consider 
any political embarrassment which might have occurred as a consequence 
of investing in capitalist enterprises. This would appear 10 be 
indicative of an attitude whereby such investments were se6n as normal 
practice and in no way harmful. It would also appear 1:0 lend some 
credence to suggestions that the SNP was a bourgeois Party. 
The history of the SNP's finances is not one of unending su:cess. 
Towards the end of the 1960s cash-flow began to dry up and indeed it 
seemed to parallel a decline in the electoral fortunes of the Party. 
In 1967 the SNP's Headquarters' income was £23,455, an astonishing 
amount compared to the experience prior to the early 1960s (we believe 
that this sum was greater in total than th~ entire income for H.Q. for 
the decade of the 1950s) (39) . 
1968 was an even greater success in income terms. £31,901 was 
realised in that year in Headquarters' income, and it is interesting 
to note where this money came from. Alba was worth £8,125 in 1967, 
but £18,700 in 1968; branch dues rose from £1,408 in 1967 to £2,438 
in 1968, whilst the sale of publications climbed from £1,602 in 1967 
to £2,202 in 1968 (40) The remainder was divided between the sale 
of membership cards, donations, inves tment income, St. Andrews Day 
Draw appeals. 
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But 1968 was the zenith of the fund-raising effort. The Party 
was inundated with membership requests following upon Winifred Ewing's 
by-election triumph at Hamilton in 1967, and branches grew throughout 
Scotland. In April 1968, Dr. James Lees (Vice-Chairman for Organisation), 
insisted that it was essential for the Party to have paid regional 
organisers. By the end of the year three had been appointed. 
In 1968 the SNP made 103 gains at the MUnicipal Elections (41) 
But in the following year the Party made only 20 gains, and its vote 
fell from 30 per cent in 1968 to 22 per cent in 1969 (42). The years 
between 1970 and 1972 continued to be tough for the SNP electorally. 
However, it must be said that there was no great reversal but rather 
a slowing up, or in some cases a retreat, from the advances of the 
late 1960s. These years were also, significantly, bad years financially. 
After the 1970 General Elections two field organisers were made 
redundant, and the third followed shortly thereafter. William Wolfe 
reported to National Council in 1970, that: 
One of the most serious aspects of the H.Q. financial 
situation is that of unevenness of support by branches 
and constituency associations. (43) 
Unpaid branch dues for 1970 totalled £3,000, 23 constituency associations 
had not paid a by-election levy for South Ayrshire (held prior to the 
1970 General Election), and there had been a decline in Alba Pools 
sales as well. 
In order to compensate for this loss of income, Winifred Ewing 
organised a covenant of approximately 1,000 members. This saved the 
Party financially in 1970, when it raised £6,000. But symptoms of 
disease remained evident. In early 1971, the Press Officer, Douglas 
114 
Crawford, recognising the Party's difficult financial position, 
recommended to the Executive to hire him on a consultancy basis (he 
had recently set up his own company), and this was accepted. In the 
same year the Glasgow office was closed, and contributions from Alba 
continued to decline - they were down by one-third on 1970s takings. 
This fall-off accelerated. By early 1972, it was yielding only £100 
per month in income to Headquarters. Towards the end of the year, 
James Lees, in a memo to the NEC, August 1972 (44), calculated that 
Headquarters' income was declining steadily at a rate of between 10 
to 20 per cent per annum. 
Given what we have said about the relationships between membership 
and income/Alba Pools sales, we should not be surprised to find a 
rapidly declining membership. Remembering the caveats we mentioned 
about membership returns there still appears to have been a haemorrage 
of members in the late 1960s: in 1968 official membership was 120,000, 
yet at a General Business Committee meeting of March 1971 it was 
reported (46) that at the end of 1970 membership was down to 30,250. 
Branches were going defunct at such an alarming rate that Scotland 
was sub-divided into regions, each of which had an NEC member assigned 
to it in order to establish the precise number of branches that had 
actually ceased to operateo 
By the end of 1972 things appeared to have bottomed out: by April 
1973, it was reported to the GBC that Alba Pools sales were once again 
increasing (46) and in the same year the SNP's electoral fortunes also 
improved - they took 35 per cent of the vote in Dundee East, and won 
Govan, in respective by-elections. 
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By the beginning of 1974 there was a financial recovery of sorts. 
So much so that the GBC was budgeting for the employment of an assistant 
to the National Organiser, and the banking of £6,000 to be used in 
elections. (47) 
The cost of fighting elections in 1974 (there were two General 
Elections) was greatly aided by a very substantial donation from an 
anonymous source (the sum involved was £10:000). Other external 
sources of income came from 'a trust of businessmen, merchant bankers 
and PR firms who had offered assistance to the Party' (48). This 
group was headed by Sir Hugh Fraser, a well known Scots financier. 
This latter source was, perhaps, the major factor in the increased 
income flow for that year. Income at the end of April 1974 amounted 
to £2,240 (49) It was just after the end of April that the £10,000 
was received, and it seems likely that the money came from a member 
of the group. 
But there were other reasons for the improving financial status 
of the Party. For example, National Council was told in 1973 (50) 
that the sale of membership cards 'was now a very significant source 
of income for H.Q.'. Though the amount is unspecified, there was also 
an increased flow of donations coming from both members and sympathisers 
following upon the two elections of 1974. 
Why membership should have recovered in this way is probably 
related directly to the Party's standing in the country. Within the 
SNP it was believed that it was a by-product of the 'oil campaign' 
when over one million leaflets were distributed throughout Scotland, 
a subj ect we shall return to in a later chapter. 
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In the next section we shall analyse the impact of financial 
management upon internal Party power. 
PartyFinancialOperatidns and Interrtal PbwerRelations 
At the beginning of this chapter we quoted from Brand and Mansbach. 
These writers had little doubt that the financial importance of the 
branches within the Party gave them considerable power within the 
organisation. Brand's and Mansbach's views coincide in so far as they 
outline a Party not only concentrated at the grass-roots, but one in 
which it appeared difficult for the leadership to tap branch financial 
resources. 
In line with our hypothesis we shall contest these views, and 
present evidence which, we believe, is indicative of a Party tightly 
controlled by the centre, and one where movement of capital in a 
vertically upward direction was the norm. 
Our methodology follows closely upon that of the other chapters. 
We detail the most important elements in the financial history of the 
Party during the period under observation. Such elements are defined 
by their impact upon the financial status of the Party. Next, we locate 
the source(s) of these changes (who or what was responsible for the 
idea in the first place). Finally, how much resistance and/or change 
was there to these suggestions, and from where did this come? 
If our hypothesis is correct we should expect to find the great 
bulk of innovations emanating from a group within the leadership, with 
very little resistance from the rank-and-file. 
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The financial management of any organisation is usually a highly 
complex business involving particular skills which are restricted to a 
comparatively few individuals. When an organisation is small, as was 
the SNP prior to the 1960s, it is easier for the mass to both monitor 
and advise the guardians of finance. But as it expands the potential 
for overview declines, and there is a tendency for decision-making to 
move beyond the ability of the members to exercise serious influence. 
In terms of financial management this means that whilst the membership 
was consulted on macro-economic questions, such as the setting of 
membership fees, micro-economic matters, such as investments, were 
decided without any reference to the mass membership, or to be more 
precise, the delegates to Council or Conference. As such this 
represented a breach of the Constitution (see below) . 
However, at the beginning of the period which interests us, the 
traditions of branch autonomy were sufficiently strong for the 
membership to oppose a wholesale breru( with past practice as recommended 
in the crucial Wilson Report of 1963 (51) 
Wilson tried to go too quickly towards wholesale financial 
centralisation. A proposal on financial change represented a sea-shift 
towards total central control, with the absolute extraction of all 
cash from the branches: 
Ultimately to build up a reserve at H.Q. sufficient 
to guarantee all branch (approved) expenditure, and 
reverse the existing situation whereby branches are 
responsible for their own finances; thus branches 
and individuals would have the single idea that all 
finances raised should go to H.Q., i.e. the Party as 
a whole. (52) 
This was really quite an extraordinary idea since, if implemented, it 
would have meant that the centre collected all brandl cash, a complete 
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break with tradition, and in a stroke would have eliminated any 
pretensions branches might have had to autonomy. But it does seem to 
be indicative of the firm intention Wilson had to improve Party 
management efficiency through centralisation. National Council rejected 
this part of the report. 
However, another idea which came from the leadership had greater 
success: Angus McGillvery's (53) Alba Pools. Apart from the fact that 
this was not an attempt to deprive the membership of financial autonomy, 
it also had the virtue of supplying an answer to the question of cash 
shortage. But again the initiative came from one person on the 
Executive, and although the branches sold the tickets, indeed did almost 
all the leg work, they still handed over around one-third of their 
takings to Headquarterso This does not signify a Party in which 
movement of capital was sluggish, or one where the leadership had 
difficulty in convincing the members of the virtues of a new scheme. 
At around the same time as Alba was being introduced, Douglas 
Drysdale took over as Finance Convener. The manner of his accession 
to that post is illuminating in so far as it tells us about the 
developing nature of Party power. 
Gordon Wilson, then National Secretary, sent a letter to the 
Party Chairman, Arthur Donaldson, indicating to him that he (Wilson) 
had managed to persuade Drysdale to take over the vacant post of 
Finance Convener. Now, in terms of the Constitution, Drysdale should 
have first been elected onto the NEC, which he was not. In the letter 
Wilson asked Donaldson, 'How to (sic) we go about getting him elected,(53). 
Donaldson replied that the best way was first to coopt him on to the 
Executive, thereafter, presumably, election would have followed at a 
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convenient time. 
Perhaps of even greater significance than this incident was the 
manner in which the leadership appeared to invest capital in companies 
without reference to the membership. This seems particularly striking 
since it involved potentially damaging, or embarrassing, political 
consequences, for example, investing in a company that was a major 
contributor to the Conservative Party, or one which closed a factory 
in Scotland. 
One can accept that, having decided to commit capital in this way 
there were only a few people competent enough to advise as to the best 
location of such investment. Even so, one finds it more difficult to 
believe that the decisions themselves were typical of a Party with a 
marked degree of decision-making decentralisation, the more so when one 
remembers that the Party Constitution made National Council as a whole 
responsible for investments (see below). 
However, perhaps the best example of the Executive's power lies in 
a series of decisions which increased the amounts paid by the branches 
in dues and membership fees. 
Brand tells us that the branches were unwilling to 'commit money to 
build up party headquarters' (54) Mansbach does not disagree. 
In order to finance the Hamilton by-election the NEC decided to 
place a levy on the branches and the constituencies. This was in accord 
with past practice (55) What is of interest is the way it was introduced 
to the membership. At the September 1967 National Council meeting (56) 
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Arthur Donaldson announced that a £5 levy per branch, and £25 for 
constituencies with five or more branches, would be placed to finance 
the by-election. This, he claimed, was in accordance with a previous 
agreement between Council and the Executive. He then went on to 
state that failure to meet the levy would affect the branch's right to 
representation at Conference. 
In 1971 the NEC decided that it was time for branch dues and 
membership fees to be increased. When proposals were presented to the 
National Council the parts of the resolution concerning branch dues 
and publicity levies were overwhelmingly carried. An NEC proposal 
concerning the period in which subscriptions should cover, was narrowly 
carried. Finally, the Executive's recommendation to raise membership 
fees, though slightly reduced by amendment, was likewise carried (57) 
In 1972, National Council agreed to an NEC resolution which gave 
the Executive total discretion as to which year the levy for the Dundee 
East by-election would be payable in (58) Though not a matter of great 
importance it was typical of the relationship between the leadership 
and membership in matters of finance. 
In 1973, NEC resolutions to raise branch dues and publicity levies 
were overwhelmingly carried, despite the fact that there was a note from 
the Treasurer to the effect that these rises did not represent an overall 
. (59) Increase This same Council endorsed an NEC recommendation to take 
£1,000 from the Party's General Election Publicity Fund and spend it on 
the 'oil campaign'. 
As the National Treasurer reported to the December meeting of Council 
in 1973: 
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As already stated 1973 was a year in which branches 
have been requested to pay two extra levies (£10 
total) over and above the normal dues and publicity 
fund levy (£18 total). (60) 
There is no evidence that the centre had any difficulty in 
extracting this cash from the branches. 
Finally, in 1974, in line with yet another NEC recommendation, 
Council agreed to raise Branch dues from £18 to £24. Moreover, the 
purchase price of membership cards from Headquarters by branches was 
to be raised by 25 pence per card to 50 pence. 
One of Mansbach's central criticisms was the absence of capital 
movement, either vertically or horizontally, within the Party (61). 
To some extent we have already demonstrated just how much cash the 
centre managed to extract from the branches. If the latter had objected 
to the amount taken by Headquarters from, for example, Alba - which 
was roughly 30 per cent in 1968 - they could have moved a resolution 
reducing the amount. This never happened, and, as we have just seen 
attempts to prevent increased levies were also unsuccessful. The 
point is that Headquarters did very little work for their share of the 
income. They issued instructions and collected the cash. 
But there is an even more striking piece of evidence to be found 
in the minutes of the General Business Committee (62) It was estimated 
that in 1972 branch income would amount to £11,850. Headguarters' share£kn ~~,I~O~~~fJ!. tc 1.1~ 
of this was to be £7 ,500, leaving the branches with £3,OOO~f Now, 
whilst it is true to say that in a bad year, given that branch dues do 
not alter in relation to falling branch membership, one would expect 
the centre to take proportionately more out of the branches than in a 
good year. Nevertheless, the evidence does not point to an absence of 
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capital flow. On the contrary, the centre appeared to be very adept 
in extracting cash from the branches during the period 1963 to 1974. 
The Constitution of the Party also gave the centre formal powers 
which enabled it to exert a degree to financial control of the 
periphery. According to the Constitution, branches and constituency 
associations are supposed to send to Headquarters, every year, a list 
of their members and a summary of their financial situation (64) In 
fact, it would appear that only around 20 per cent ever sent completed 
lists of members and finances to the centre (65) Clause 51 of the 
Constitution of the Party gives further de jure power to the leadership: 
No money shall be collected in the name of any Branch 
of the Party, nor shall the name of the Party be used 
for the collection of money, and no payments shall be 
made from the funds of any Branch, except for purposes 
covered by the Constitution. (66) 
These formal controls did not mean all that much in practice, although 
under certain circumstances the centre was not slow to disenfrancllise 
branches which had not paid their levies. The point is that the 
Constitution could have been used by the leadership if it had been 
found necessary to extract information and/or money from the periphery. 
In this sense it was a 'fail-safe' device. The fact that the 
Constitution (67) was rarely activated was probably because the centre, 
for the most part, got the finances it requested, or found necessary. 
After all, for so long as Headquarters' received enough money for 
running expenses and to pay for its schemes why should the centre have 
needed to know how much cash the branches actually had? Finally, 
estimates of the size of branch membership were made by Headquarters 
on the basis of the sale of membership cards, which was a reasonable 
indication as to the strength of the branches. 
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Aside from the decisions themselves, one also needs to know just 
who were taking the decisions which had so much impact on the Party's 
finances. 
In December 1967, the General Business Committee of the Party was 
established and given a mandate to cover administration, finance, 
fund-raising and staffing, indeed every non-political aspect of the 
Party's work. It was composed of the Senior Vice-Chairman, the four 
Executive Vice-Chairmen, the National Secretary, the National Treasurer 
and any others the NEC might have considered useful. The Committee 
was, in Party terms, extremely elitist (it embraced two committees 
previously responsible for staffing and Party administration, the 
General Business Committee, and the Finance Committee). The coming 
together of these committees served only to accentuate the power of 
their members. But in any case prior to amalgamation they were powerful 
bodies, for example, the Finance Committee had a Vice-Chairman of the 
Party as its Convener, as did the Administration Committee. 
A committee of this power presents a formidable phalanx for either 
individuals or even groups within the Party who might seek to oppose 
it. Apart from the expertise of its members, they also had the prestige 
derived from their undoubtedly high status (they were, after all, the 
most senior elected members of the Party). The Committee's power was 
further enhanced since when it went to the NEC, for endorsement of its 
recommendations, it was likely to get it by virtue of the fact that 
the GBC's members were also members of the NEC. In this respect the 
GBC might be compared to an 'inner-cabinet', at least so far as 
financial policy-making is concerned. 
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The fact that the powers assumed by the Executive and its 
financial sub-committees went well beyond those envisaged in the 
Constitution is not hard to establish. The SNP devotes ten paragraphs 
of its Constitution (68) to the topic of finance. As we have shown, 
the SNP's finances were controlled by a comparatively small group of 
people who sat on the sub-committees of the Executive. Not only did 
they formulate recommendations for alteration of the fees, and in some 
cases the financial structure of the Party, but they also controlled 
investment decisions concerning the size and source of such purchases. 
They did this in spite of clearly laid down procedures as set out in 
the Party's Constitution. Paragraph 20 gives to National Council 
(except under certain circumstances where Conference might have the 
power) the right of: 
control over all monies, funds, property, investments and 
securities of whatever kind and description belonging to 
the Party. (69) 
But through circumstances prevailing in the mid to late 1960s, 
financial control carne to rest in the hands of a comparatively small 
group of people on the NEC. We could find no evidence to suggest 
that National Council seriously questioned (and certainly did not 
instruct) the GEC on matters connected with Party finance (the extent 
of the GECs power was, or so it seems, taken as a given). MOreover, 
as we have shown, it was not Council but the NEC (acting upon its 
financial sub-committee's recommendations) which proposed innovations 
in matters relating to the economic status of the Party, despite the 
fact that Paragraph 21 of the Constitution, gives Council the: 
power to invest monies and funds of the Party in stocks 
and shares of public companies, bank deposit receipts, 
Savings or Deposit Accounts, bonds and debentures with 
or without security, heritable property or otherwise in 
any manner or way as it in its uncontrolled discretion 
thinks fit. (70) 
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Council never asserted itself in this way. That is, it never 
took control of the investment decisions of the Party. In any case 
the idea of its having 'uncontrolled discretion' was unrealistic since 
it ignored the power, influence and orientation of the NEC. Council 
was dependent upon the Finance Committee, and later the GBC, for advice 
and guidance. It was unlikely that these bodies would have allowed 
ultimate financial control to rest in the inexperienced hands of 
National Council without a struggle. In fact, this proved unnecessary. 
The reason for the opposition of the NEC, or its representatives 
stems not only from the potential weakness they might have perceived 
in allowing a body as large as National Council to control such 
decisions, but also as a consequence of the legal ramifications of 
the Constitution: 
No member of National Council shall be personally 
liable in respect of the depreciation of any investments 
made on behalf of the Party. (71) 
and, later: 
The title to any heritable property or real estate 
belonging to the Party shall be taken in the name 
of the Chairman, the National Secretary and the 
National Treasurer .. o or their successors in 
office as Trustees for behoof of the Party. (72) 
Thus, although National Council delegates have considerable formal 
powers, they are, nonetheless, without financial liabilities in so 
far as these powers are concerned. In such circumstances it is not 
surprising that the officers of the Party who do have legal liability 
are extremely vigilant in ensuring that the delegates' use of such 
powers is severely circumscribedo 
The parts of the Constitution which deal with financial matters 
gives to Council the right to decide the amount of affiliation fees 
paid by the branches, constituency associations and affiliated 
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organisations. Furthermore, it was Council which was to determine 
the standard rate of membership subscription (73). In fact, as we 
have seen for the most part Council merely endorsed, or in a very 
few cases amended, recommendations emanating from the NEC, in respect 
of membership fees, etc. Its role here, as in other matters of finance, 
was reactive. 
The Constitutional provisions for finance describe an 'ideal-type' 
situation in which formal power rests with Council delegates, whilst 
actual power was, and is, in the hands of the NEC, or its sub-committees. 
All of the evidence presented in this section, we believe, strongly 
suggests that in the vital area of finance the SNP was dominated by 
comparatively few people. The most important innovations of this period 
came from a small number of people on the Finance and/or the General 
Business committees. We could find no evidence of successful (or 
even marked) resistance to those schemes, and in the main there 
appeared to be enthusiastic responses. Far from there being a sluggish 
movement of cash from the branches, there appears to have been a great 
deal of fluidity with the centre successful in extracting cash from the 
periphery. Finally, the fact that by-elections were funded by a levy 
on branches suggests that there was cash flow horizontally as well. 
That is, branches and constituencies were asked to finance parliamentary 
elections elsewhere in the country. 
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Chapter Five 
The YilsonandNivenReports 
This chapter will deal with two reports which led to the reform 
of the organisational power structure of the SNP. In the case of the 
Wilson Report this amounted to the single most important change in 
the management history of the Party. Indeed, the Wilson Report can 
be seen as a formal recognition that the SNP's organisational mechanisms 
were utterly unsuited to the tasks confronting it, which may go a long 
way to explaining why, despite the radical nature of the Report, it 
was accepted, practically without alteration, by the delegates to 
National Council. 
The Wilson Report 
In 1963 the SNP was confronted by a classic management conundrum: 
the Party was, in relative terms, growing very rapidly and much of the 
change this growth brought in its wake was outwith the control of the 
leadership. Whilst the latter welcomed this expansion, they could not 
have allowed it to go on undirected or unstructured since, in the end, 
peripheral anarchy would have ensued and there would have been a 
potantial for damaging political spin-offs. The author of the Report, 
Gordon Wilson recognised this: 
The motive behind the Report lay in the fact that the 
Party itself was changing. That you had, into what 
had been a moribund structure, the appearance of new 
people, new ideas~ And a certain degree of optimism 
and hope that the Party had a chance of gaining more 
political support ... The existing institutions were 
obviously failing. (1) 
Management theorists recognise the problems that a rapidly 
132 
changing organisation can lead tQ; 
The greatest of all problems for the manager is rapid 
change ..•. (2) 
And, later: 
Change, to be successful, must be carefully planned. Such 
planning must also include the likely human effects of 
the change and what can be done to ease adjustment to 
them. (3) 
Thus, whilst organisational self-realisation, that is, growth 
leading to greater political viability and credibility, was intended, 
there remained the potential for membership-leadership interaction 
problems unless the leaders took hold and directed the growth. 
Growth brings new members into the organisation. They 
come in at all levels and with a variety of experience, 
expertise, motivations and desires for the organisation 
and themselves. An immediate consequence of their arrival 
is that they upset the existing patterns of interaction 
communication .. , For the veteran members of the organisation 
is somewhat threatening, since the former power arrangements 
are now distorted and new alignments emerge. (4) 
As we shall now see there was cognisance in both reports of this 
growth, and a recognition that it would have to be taken in hand. 
This realisation led the centre to conclude that the Party would have 
to be more closely directed if the leadership was to have any meaningful 
role to play; hence the Wilson and Niven reports. 
Thus whilst the ostensible cause of the 1Vilson Report was a by-
election disaster at Kinross and West Perthshire (the Party Chairman, 
Arthur Donaldson, managed only 7.3 per cent of the vote in November 
1963; this was down from 15 per cent on the 1959 General Election (51, 
the essential reason was a growing agitation in the Executive about 
superstructural problems within the Party as a consequence of its growth. 
The Wilson Report is, including its appendices, some 14,000 words 
long. It was ml unprecedented attempt by the leadership of the SNP to 
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address itsel;£ to the dilemmas we have just discussed, As a report it 
is both concise and clear1 and it set in train a variety of profound 
changes which still affect the SNP to this day. Wilson was connnissioned 
to write it at a meeting of the Party's NEC in November 1963 (6). He 
was to investigate the overall organisation of the Party. He did this 
with a vengeance. 
Arthur Donaldson was so disturbed about the state of the organisation 
that he wrote a memo to Gordon Wilson prior to the writing of the Report, 
expressing his concern. He wanted a clarification of the respective 
roles of the NEC and Council. MOre significantly he suggested that 
perhaps there was a need to allow the Chairman to act on behalf of 
either of these bodies. He went on to express "no confidence" in aspects 
of the Party's financial record, and declared that the Headquarters 
office was inefficient (7). In a supplementary memo on organisation (8) 
Donaldson suggested that the existing Vice-Chairmanship posts were 
'largely ornaments and it is only by good luck we get anyone in these 
jobs who proves really useful'. By this he meant that the office-
holders failed to fulfil management functions. The posts, therefore, 
were merely honorific. In their stead Donaldson suggested a Senior 
Vice-Chairman, with two Vice-Chairmen in charge of Organisation and 
Publicity/Development (prior to the Report there were two Vice-
Chairmen, but the two posts carried little functional responsibility. 
In fact, all their occupants did was to Chair meetings in the absence 
of the Party Chairman). 
These reconnnendations were included in the Report, and were 
eventually implemented. They represented significant centralising 
factors, and helped in the creation of a distinctive and prescribed 
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management hierarchy within the SNP. O;E his remit? Wilson said the 
following: 
The Report at the end of the day took a much more substantial 
shape than I think the Executive had intended when it asked 
me to carry out the survey. 
I was first of all concerned that the major organisational 
apparatus of the Party had not been working. That is, a lot 
of the committees had failed to meet, and there didn't seem 
to be any kind of overall coordination or supervision. 
The second thing I noticed was that the role of the Executive 
was limited by the fact that it was treated as a sub.,..committee 
of National Council. The Executive Committee had, in fact, 
to submit its minutes to the National Council for approval, 
and that meant that any decision - in practical terms - which 
was taken over a three month period could be capable (sic) of 
being overturned. To my mind this was a piece of nonsense. 
And, of course, as the Party was developing it also meant 
news of the Executive's work, and all the organisational 
disputes which occur, would be made available to other people, 
not just members of the Party, perhaps, but to other political 
parties. 
So one of the changes I suggested in the Report was to upgrade 
the position of the National Executive, vis a vis the National 
Council, to give it authority to take decisions - subject to a 
system of reports which would replace the production of the 
minutes. 
The third thing that I felt was necessary was to make the 
office-bearers more effective by giving them Executive 
responsibility, and making them more personally responsible 
and democratically accountable for functions. This led to 
a definition of the various office-bearers. (9) 
We have given such a lengthy quote because it is iIll1?ortant to recognise 
that Wilson himself perceived his task as being extremely radical and 
far reaching. He was doing nothing less than completely altering 
established organisational relationships. It is also clear that 
Wilson was firmly resolved to inject a serious managerial element into 
the Party's formal structure. 
His methodolOgy, given the limited time in which he had to write 
the Report, was quite simple: he isolated the major aspects of the 
remit, for example, the NEC, National Council, office-bearers, etc., 
and subjected them to a fmctional analysis (10) in order to understand 
their responsibilities and authority. These were then related to actual 
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practice and their intra.,-organisational status. He did this through 
the medium o;f interviews ~ written or oral ~ with the organisational 
principals. By the end of his investigation he had spoken to everyone 
of authority within the Party machine. 
In the Introduction to the Report, 1~ilson observed that in the past 
the Party had been controlled by the branches (11); the frustration 
which the centre felt at this state of affairs can be gauged from the 
following: 
Until it can be assumed that the branches will accept 
guidance and direction from the centre, then it may-
be difficult to dislodge the sense of futility that 
comes with continual juggling with scanty resources, 
recalcitrant members, and paper organisation. (12) 
Even in the Introduction the leadership's yearning for organisational 
control is evident. Wilson wrote of the need for 'bold' and 'wise' 
leadership, and that the leaders recognised the direction in which the 
Party should be led. In the pages following upon the Introduction there 
is the cumulative effect of recommendations contributing to the moulding 
of an organisational apparatus which was to become thoroughly centralised. 
National Council. This met quarterly (the Report did not change 
the frequency of its meetings), and it was composed of branch and 
constituency delegates. It was the inter-Conference, formal decision-
making body of the Party. Wilson accepted the organisation-chart 
definition of its powers in the Party: 
... there is no question of caucus control by the 
Executive since it is elected by and can be controlled 
by the votes of delegates from the branches and other 
bodies entitled to representation. (13) 
Despite giving adejure description of its powers and responsibilities, 
Wilson was not blind to the reality behind the constitutional mask. An 
effective organisation cannot have all the major management decisions 
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taken by a body a.s large as Natiqnal COlllCil. This led him to his 
;Eirst major recomnendation; the transfer of all organisational administration 
to the National Executive. 
This represented a comprehensive change in the formal set-up of 
the Party. Even so, Wilson was still concerned to assure the delegates 
that they were not being stripped of their rightful powers: 
But it should not be looked upon as a plan to concentrate 
and centralise powers in the hands of the few. (14) 
Yet such a striking loss in management power had to be recompensed 
in some way or other. After all, National Council was being deprived 
of a pivotal role in the running of the Party. If this did not exactly 
amount to emasculation, it was at least a perceptible loss of the 
administrative powers of the delegates. Wilson devised an ingenious 
compromise: in compensation for this loss, National Council was to 
become the forum for policy discussion. This change was depicted as 
being of net benefit to the Council since it would allow it to 
concentrate its collective attention on the broad areas of policy-making, 
rather than waste time and energy on the mundane tasks of administrative 
nitty-gritty. The logic behind this analysis led Wilson to recommend 
another major structural change which would add one more brick to the 
wall of power being erected by the centre: the creation of the 
Executive Vice-Chairmen. These would be 'part-time' (see below for the 
amount of time devoted to their tasks) and unpaid. They would be 
elected by National Council and also serve on the NEC. 
As we have already seen, this was a recommendation made initially 
by Donaldson whose obvious concern was to create more effective central 
control. Wilson argued, reasonably enough, that even the Executive 
could not be expected to be responsible for the day~to-day running of 
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an expanding political party. There:f;ore 1 SO)1leon~ had to take executive 
control o;f organisation and pub1ic:i,ty/deve1oJ?ment~ hence the two Vice,... 
Chairmen. " Eripas5ant, Wi1son noted that the distribution o:f Executive 
Committee minutes to National Council might give a less than comprehensive 
picture of the proceedings of that body; thus the recommendation that 
this practice should cease and be replaced with written reports by the 
Chairman and Vice-Chairmen. 
The effect of these two changes cannot be over exaggerated. The 
creation of two specialist posts, each of which would carry per diem 
control of the most important areas of Party life, in one stroke vastly 
increased the power of the centre. The cessation of the distribution 
of Executive minutes had an equally important effect; it meant that 
potential centra1isers would be freer to speak openly and propose 
their views at the Party's 4e, facto power centre. On top of this it 
closed off from the investigative gaze of the membership the deliberations 
of the Party's Cabinet. 
There were other changes recommended regarding the status and 
functions of National Council, but those listed above were the most 
important. We contend that they represented a major shift in emphasis 
towards greater centralisation, and also a change in the climate of 
the Party towards a recognition that devolved, open structures, however 
desirable, may not be the most efficient way of doing business or 
achieving goals. The creation of the two Executive posts highlighted 
an acknowledgement of the need for a specialist management style in 
order to increase organisational effectiveness. 
National 'Executbre'Comnrlttee. Wilson next turned his attention 
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to the Party's Cab:inet) in its power centre? the National Executive 
Committee. In an illuminating passage he argues that even the NEC should 
not have its time wasted on matters of adm:inistrative control? and he 
foresaw the task of adm:inistration being carried out by the new Vice~ 
Chainren (and also the National Secretary): 
It seems quite obvious to me that far too much time at 
the executive meetings is directed to adm:inistrative 
control. This may be caused bY' the breakdown of the 
committee system. But there is certainly no justification 
for bringing busy members of the Party from allover the 
country to discuss things which could and should be under-
taken and decided by one or two persons. ' (IS) 
He perceived the NEC as having several important fmctions: the 
coordinating centre, that is, overseeing, of committee work and deciding 
Which recommendations from the Publicity/Development Committee should go 
forward to Council. Finally, it should be staffed by those regarded as 
the leaders of the Party, and be concerned with future strategy and 
. (16) tachcs. 
For Wilson, hitherto the Party 'had drifted along, waiting and 
hoping for something to turn up' (17) He was concerned to turn the 
Executive into a grand decision-making forum - so far as organisational 
questions were concerned. That is, it would give the 'yea' or 'nay' 
to recommendations of its sub-committees on the most important 
orgnjsational aspects of Party life. Its most senior members, Chairman, 
National Secretary, and the two Vice-Chairmen, would be its most 
important members since they would also be responsible for the control 
of the minutiae of the Party's administrative activities, aside from 
their role as executive members. Therefore, it is likely that their 
opinions, at least in so far as internal Party matters were concerned, 
would be very influential. 
139 
Wilson's proposals would give rise to a rarty controlled by the 
most senior elected o£'£t.erals, with an Executive/Cabinet monitoring their 
activities, and affirming or rej ecting the ir act ions. Branch delegate s ~ 
for their part, woUld debate but leave the conception and implementation 
of broad administrative matters to the NEC, or its most senior members. 
This view of Party life appears to be confirmed when we examine 
Wilson's description of the role of the Party Chairman and the other 
senior office-bearers. 
The President. This was seen as primarily a dignified, or formal, 
post awarded to the most illustrious servant of the Party. Wilson 
suggested little change in this regard. It was open to annual election. 
Chairman. This figure (elected annually) was the accepted political 
head of the Party. Again, there was to be very little change in the 
functions of the Chairman save in two respects. He was to be delegated 
the right to suspend individuals or branches if he considered their 
activities were inimical to the interests of the Party. This power was 
given, pending a meeting of the NEC. This was not an insignificant 
weapon. The individual or branch might have their case prejudiced if 
they had been suspended by the Chairman prior to an NEC meeting. The 
latter would be under pressure to endorse the Chairman's decision, since 
any reversal could easily have been interpreted as a vote of "no 
confidence" in the Chairman. To be sure, it would also depend upon the 
Chairman not abusing the power. Even so~ it was another step along 
the road to central control. 
The other major recommendation gave the Chairman the right to 
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define a political partf for the purposes of suspension. That is~ if 
a person was a member of another organisation, then the Chairman could 
detennine whether or not it was a political party, and therefore 
incompatible with membership of the SNP (National Council now has the 
right to decide which organisations can be described as pOlitical 
parties). 
ExecutiveVice~Chairmen. The creation of these annually elected 
posts truly represented the major advance towards a centralised structure. 
One was to be in charge of l):)velopment and Publicity. This placed him 
in control (he was formally responsible to the National Council) of 
policy, publications and public relations, as well as demonstrations 
and campaigns. The holder of the post was to have a public relations 
officer as his assistant. In the first instance, this was unsalaried 
(although a full-time P.R.O. would be appointed in later years) . 
The other Vice-Chairman (Organisation) was to have a remit which 
would cover branch formation and operation, the supervision of 
parliamentary and local elections, the organisation of meetings, elections, 
and the formation of tactics. There were to be sub-committees, 
responsible to the Vice-Chairman, to cover these very broad areas with 
conveners appointed by him. These bodies would undertake work in fields 
designated by the Vice-Chairman, and function in a manner determined by 
him. 
These new posts represented a step towards real administrative 
expertise within the SNP. They gave considerable power to the holder 
and started the bureaucratisation of the machine, Al though the Vice-
Chairmen were not salaried, they nonetheless gave considerable amounts 
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of time and energy to the task1 and were widely perceived as having a 
great deal of expeTtise in the;ir respective :fields. 
The first two Vice~hairmen were William WOlfe and Douglas Drysdale. 
Wolfe has said o;f their relationship and tasks: 
.•• we used to meet nearly every day and discuss things 
of immediate importance~ also things concerned with 
planning and constitutional matters •.. we worked very 
closely together. (18) 
In reference to the amount of time the Vice-Chairmanship took up, Wolfe 
noted: 
I gave up my job (he was self-employed) in April 1964, and 
I worked full-time for the Party from the middle of April 
1964 until the Election which was at the end of October. 
In 1964/65, it (the Party position) took up a great deal 
of my time ..• it would have been taking at least forty 
hours a week, put it that way. (19) 
Gordon Wilson, who became National Secretary in 1964, also gave a great 
deal of time to the job. In fact, he acted very much like a full-time 
bureaucrat: 
I virtually didn't do any public meetings (that is, speak 
at meetings held for the general public) •.. I considered 
my job as trying to create some order amongst the chaos, 
and trying to provide some degree of political coordination 
as well as administrative discipline. (20) 
National Secreta~. Wilson who held down a full-time job outside 
the SNP, recognised what a potentially powerful figure the Secretary 
could become if he had the will to do so: 
it is the Secretary who by dint of normal secretarial 
duties is the pivot on which the Qrganisation turns. (21) 
The job specification (it was an annually elected post) points to 
the extent of these powers: the investigation of inef:ficiency and 
dereliction o:f duty by other office-bearers, the reception and management 
o:f complaints from the public and members of the Party, and ensuring 
that instructions from Council, Conference and the NEC were implemented. 
He was also responsible for office administration. 
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This extensive functional range could, if the office-holder 
desired it, place the Secretary in a position of enormous pOlitical 
influence and power. It was also in step with the overall trend of 
the Report. What is perhaps more surprising is that it was accepted 
without amendment by the delegates to Council. 
National Treasurer. Wilson took a fiscally conservative view 
of the duties of the Party's Treasurer: 
Unless we have better budgeting control and fast, 
we shall join the Gadarene swine in a headlong 
rush to liquidation. (22) 
He listed six recommendations in respect of this post, but almost all 
of them are of an administratively specific type with no appreciable 
effect upon internal power relations. This was an annually elected 
post. 
He next goes on to discuss the committee system which, according 
to informants was not working. He proposed that the new Vice-Chairmen 
should be left to divide their functions amongst committees as they 
savvfit (these committees serviced the Vice-Chairmen, see above). In 
this respect a certain amount of latitude was to be left to them until 
the new system had time to run in. 
The rest of the Report was concerned with proposals for a we11-
functioning administration, replete with suggestions for better 
financial control within the Headquarters, correcting spelling errors, 
and even the necessity of a reasonable desk for the National Organiser. 
The very detail of the Report might have been enough to persuade 
even the most sceptical that it was a serious attempt to rationalise 
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and improve the organisational structure of the Party. It was well-
planned and careful to cover every area of interest. As such, even 
if members had suspected that it would lead to marked centralisation, 
they might have hesitated before rejecting it. As it was there was 
not even the most desultory attempt to veto it. At National Council 
of August, 1964, (23) the Report was presented and discussed. Despite 
its sheer size and its potential impact, only two alterations were 
effected by the delegates. 
The first covered a paragraph headed 'Additional Minor Recommendations 
affecting National Council'. This embraced the timing of Council 
meetings, the filling of vacancies amongst senior-office bearers 
resulting from resignation or death, and several other lesser matters. 
These proposals were not agreed to. 
The other alteration was covered in the last chapter, it was the 
rejection of the move to totally centralise the Party's finances. 
Thus, out of a total of 115 paragraphs only one paragraph and one 
sub-paragraph were not agreed to. 
Four months later Wilson reported (24) to Council that: 
although the election of the new Executive Vice-Chairmen 
would signal the beginning of the new administrative 
structure it was proposed to elect Conveners of Committees 
as to keep the existing system working until the Vice-
Chairman felt able to make innovations. The tenure of 
the Committee conveners would be at the pleasure of the 
Vice-Chairmen. 
The previous practice was for National Council to elect Committee 
Conveners. The first two Vice-Chairmen were Douglas Drysdale, Public 
Relations/Policy, and William Wolfe for Organisation. 
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The Party which emerged from these changes was quite different in 
structure from that which predated the innovations. The precepts which 
governed the alterations were doubtless, as suggested, measured by the 
need to improve organisation, which they certainly did, but the end 
result was a triumph for centralisation. National Council retained its 
formally defined constitutional roles. But in fact, it became a forum 
for vociferous enquiry and suggestion and was now thoroughly reactive. 
Even the National Executive had its role sufficiently delineated so as 
to ensure that whilst it remained the power source of the Party, it 
was still dependent upon a sub-group of its own membership for 
guidance and direction. 
As we shall see in our section on the theory of organisational 
growth, whilst it was always likely that change would overtake the 
SNP as it grew. The type of change, the administrative detail, was 
largely the responsibility of one man, Gordon Wilson. He was the 
avant-courier, the herald of innovation. He put together an impressive 
package of proposals; but what is even more striking is the fact that 
he did this after speaking to just 20 people from the top most echelons 
of the Party. The Report was written without any attempt to canvass 
the opinions of the mass of the membership, only senior Party figures 
were interveiwed. The fact is that Wilson recognised the necessity 
of functional responsibility. As William Wolfe says of Wilson's 
efforts: 
What Gordon Wilson saw very closely ... was that there was 
nobody elected or appointed to carry out as an executive, 
decisions made by the National Executive Committee or 
National Council. (25) 
Moreover, Wilson clearly believes that however radical a departure the 
new system was it has been vindicated: 
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..• the changes that were introduced in 'sixty-three', 
'sixty-four', anticipated some of the organisational 
pressures which came with growth, and latterly with 
retrenchment because the basic structure has lasted 
eighteen years .•. During the 'sixties' and 'seventies' 
the structure which was envisaged, of having persons 
responsible for administration of certain functions, 
(functional responsibility vested in persons rather 
than in committees), I think was the major change, 
and that system by and large worked. (26) 
The publication of the Report was quickly followed by the General 
Election of 1964. The SNP had 15 candidates standing compared with 
five in 1959. They gained a total of 64,044 votes, or 2.4 per cent 
of Scottish poll (27). Party membership was between 6,000 to 8,000 
and the number of branches was around 80 (28) 
The Niven Report 
It was against this encouraging background that the Niven Report 
on the Review of the Constituencies (29) was presented to the November 
1964 National Council. The Review was by no means as influential, and 
certainly not as important, as the Wilson Report (in fact, it was 
largely created by the latter since the Organisation Committee, which 
was responsible for the Review, was reconstituted in January 1964 as a 
consequence of the Wilson Report). Even so, we include an analysis of 
it because it contained important suggestions for change which were 
also centralising in their orientation. 
Niven observed that much of the expansion of the Party had been 
unplanned, but it was now time for the Organisation Committee 'with 
the aid of the local branches, to take a more active part in the 
formation of branches,(30). He analyses the condition of each 
constituency, and what is immediately evident was the lamentable state 
of the Party in Glasgow and Edinburgh. 
The former was without organisation in ten seats. In Edinburgh 
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there was only one branch, Edinburgh North, and this had responsibility 
for seven constituencies. As for Scotland as a whole. The Party was 
strongest in the north, and parts of east Scotland, in the Dundee area, 
and parts of the central belt. 
Niven recommended a specific approach in the cause of remedying 
these deficiencies. He considered it vital for the Organisation 
Committee to take a more active part in the formation of branches; 
this led to a suggestion that any burgh with a population in excess 
of 5,000 should be able to support a branch. Forty burghs were 
included in that category. Next followed an exhaustive account as 
to how best to organise the towns. The Review tried to introduce a 
concept which apart from being unquestionably centralising was also 
alien to the traditions of the SNP. The constituency association 
was to be the basic unit of the Party: 
We feel that the basic organisational unit of the 
Party should be the constituency association. (31) 
In the end, however, this did not become the basic unit. Nevertheless, 
their development did occur and, in fact, for parliamentary purposes, 
at least, the association was elevated to the status of principal 
organisational component. 
The most salient thing about Niven's Review was the particular 
detail he gave to all aspects of the organisation of branches in the 
areas highlighted as growth points. Costing for the distribution of 
business reply cards was undertaken, as well as estimates for 
advertising and other incidentals. There was also an analysis of 
the situation in each constituency under discussion. 
In contrast to the circumstances existing prior to this, the 
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SNP leadership now had at its disposal the most rigorous account of the 
nationwide strength and weaknesses of the organisation. In this way 
the Review acted as an aid to centralisation since it gave the 
leadership something which is critical to any organisational managers, 
a monopoly of intelligence concerning the institution. 
However, the growth of the constituency associations was, without 
doubt, slow. By September 1966 there were still only 14 in the whole 
of Scotland: 
A constituency association is a sign of intent that 
a serious effort will be made to fight the next 
parliamentary election, and it is the first and 
necessary move to that end. Branches should not 
wait till they are sure that they can put forward 
a candidate in thei~nstituency before getting 
together with other branches - and every constituency 
in Scotland should ~tend to fight the next election. (32) 
In the next chapter we shall cover in detail in full the growth 
of the Party which followed in the wake of these reports. In the 
meantime, what can we learn about the SNP from these internal documents? 
To put them into proper perspective one must recognise that whilst 
the Wilson Report was almost immediately influential, the Niven Review, 
though much less significant, nevertheless was following upon a new 
growth in awareness about the need to coordinate and centralise 
operations. Thus whilst they differed greatly in size and weight, 
they were still branches of the same tree. 
Prior to the Wilson Report, the SNP, even during the growth of 
1962 and 1963, was organisationally non-complex: there were the 
branches and the delegates to Council/Conference, and the NEC which 
tended to examine all organisational concerns, both great and small. 
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In the post-Wilson era~ specialisation was introduced with 
individuals having specific responsibilities, a functioning specialist 
committee system was resurrected and organisational control was twice 
removed, that is, from Council to the Executive and from there to a 
few individuals who performed the managerial roles. 
Such developments are in accordance with certain empirical studies 
undertaken on organisations: 
The argument 'in favour' of size are quite compelling. 
Marshall Meyer found that size is positively correlated 
with both number of levels (hierarchical differentiation) 
and number of divisions (horizontal or functional 
differentiation). Large organisations are thus more 
structurally complex than small ones. (33) 
Need this greater complexity be related to leadership domination 
as in our hypothesis? Is it not possible that, differentiation 
notwithstanding, the membership still had a vital role to play in 
decision-making? 
We believe that the evidence presented in this chapter is strongly 
suggestive of a crucial leadership role, both as an innovative source 
and as a central decision-maker. Although there is not much evidence 
about the effect top leaders have on an organisation (34), what data 
does exist suggests that: 
. .. Given the important .leadershi 
otential forleadersni ~ to -alfect 
One source 0 t e varlatlon ill tee ect is un ou tedly 
in the degree to which the organisation is already structured 
and the extent to whicn this structure is subject to 
moditication. (35) 
The point is that if the membership can be quite quickly brought to 
accept a new mode of organisation (which in the case of the SNP, they 
certainly were), the leadership can have a vital role to play in 
decision-making. This was, of course, precisely what occurred within 
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the SNP during the short period between the conce~tion and implementation 
of the Wilson Plan. The local activists who were the people most 
likely to oppose the innovations did not. In itself this is both a 
compliment to the quality of the reforms, and the recognition among 
the members of the need for improved management. 
In the next chapter we will examine the organisational growth of 
the SNP in the years following upon the Wilson Report. 
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Chapter Six 
Organisatibna1Growth an<:i Party Power, 1963-1970 
As we saw in the last chapter, the effect of the Wilson Report 
was to lead to a centralisation of the SNP's organisational and 
decision-making structure. Its medium-term impact upon the Party's 
attitudes was one whereby centralisation was perceived by the managers 
as either beneficial and/or inevitable. 
The seven years between 1963 and 1970 were the high-water mark 
of the SNP's organisational strength as measured by the sheer numbers 
of members and branches. However, its electoral health, especially 
between 1967-68, failed to match the robustness of the Party's 
organisation. 
We shall now examine both offuese factors. Given the fact that 
the effect of the Wilson Report was to greatly increase the centre's 
power within the SNP, we would expect evidence of this new found 
power to emerge in tile years following 1963. How true is this 
hypothesis? 
Organi_sati0n.al Gr()~th, 1963-1970 
Between 1963 and December 1966 the SNP's membership grew from 
4,000 to 42,000. The National Organiser claimed that by the end of 
1966 approximately one person in every 300 in the cities was an SNP 
member, and one in every 60 or 70 in the counties held a membership 
card (1) At this point the Party had over 190 branches. In other 
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words the SNP's organisational strength was increasing rapidly, and 
thousands of new members were being sucked into the machine. 
In the 1964 General Election the SNP gained 64,044 votes with 15 
candidates. Although this was an advance on 1959 (2) it was modest 
enough bearing in mind the great strides the Party was beginning to 
make in organisational growth. 
However, the 1966 General Election was a happier event. Because 
even though the number of candidates increased by only eight, the 
number of votes achieved doubled to 128,474, five per cent of the 
Scottish poll (3). More significantly, perhaps, was the fact that 
16 of the candidates saved their deposits, and the average share of 
the vote in each seat was 14.5 per cent. Here at last was evidence 
that the electoral fortunes of the Party were beginning to match its 
organisational strength. 
In a report to the NEC, the Convener of the Organisation Committee, 
J. Russell Thomson (4), commented: 
The achievement of over 120,000 votes was in itself 
a very good result, but with better organisation it 
could have been improved. (5) 
It is fair to say that Thomson presented little evidence in support of 
his claim. But it was, in all probability, widely believed within 
the Party because constituency reports to him suggested that the SNP 
did better where they had active groups and branches, and badly where 
they had no such base. 
The above begs a fairly obvious question. Which came first, 
the good organisation leading to an increase of sympathy for the 
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Party in an area, or the existing sympathy giving rise to an organisation? 
Thomson did not address himself to the point. 
In any event, following upon the experiences of 1966, several 
changes were recommended by Thomson in anticipation of the next General 
Election (6) These included the proposition that all constituency 
associations must be self-supporting with no outside help, and that 
all burgh/constituency branches should increase their membership and 
thereafter divide, so that each municipal ward had a branch. 
Interestingly, the 1966 Election illustrated the dominance of the 
middle-class within the SNP, not only in the leadership, but also as 
candidates. Of the 23 parliamentary candidates, 18 had middle-class 
occupational status) including four schoolteachers, two doctors, one 
veterinary surgeon, one lawyer and two chartered accountants (7). This 
might be reflective of middle-class expertise in an organisation not 
yet fully matured and with little organisational experience. On the 
other hand, it might have been nothing more significant than the fact 
that only this group of people could afford the time off work. 
The next important electoral event for the S~W was a by-election 
held in the Glasgow constituency of Pollok. 
Glasgow had never been a fertile field for the SNP as measured by 
the number of votes gained, or the strength of the Party's organisation. 
However, spurred on by the new found self-confidence and the successes 
of the 1966 Election, the Party had little choice but to contest Pollok. 
To begin Witll, a by-election committee was set up by the NEe (8) 
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Like so much else the committee was dominated by a few leading Party 
figures. Its members were George Leslie, the candidate; Ian 
Macdonald, the National Organiser; and Gordon Wilson, the National 
Secretary. 
The election was to be funded, in the main, by the usual method 
of a levy on the constituencies and branches of the Party. By the middle 
of April 1966 no less than 116 branches, out of a possible 214, had 
met this financial commitment, and by the end of the campaign all of 
the expenditure incurred had been paid for by this method. 
The SNP fought the election on a highly structured format: the 
constituency was divided into seven areas. Each area was allocated 
an organiser, and it was the latter's job to ensure his district was 
properly canvassed and leafleted. There were workers in the field 
prior to the issuing of the writ, so that by the time it had been 
moved the constituency had been almost completely canvassed. In the 
end 60 per cent of the Pollok electorate had been canvassed twice. 
The net result was considered a success. TIle SNP achieved 28.2 
per cent of the vote, a sufficiently large enough share to give the 
seat to the Conservatives (it had previously been a Labour-held seat). 
In total the SNP picked up 10,oe~votes (9), and although the 
Party came third it greatly reduced the Labour Party's share of the 
vote. The contest was considered a great organisational achievement 
for the SNP. 
The campaign was the most professional ever mounted by the 
Nationalists. It was this election in which the Party perfected its 
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famous razzamatazz approach of songs, car cavalcades, ;flags and 
colourful lapel stickers, etc. In a post-election analysis, it was 
observed that: 
as West Lothian in 1962 marks the renaessance (sic) 
of the SNP, Pollok in 1967 marks our graduation to 
a new professionalism. (10) 
One piece of evidence in support of this claim was that on polling 
day itself all the 'FOR' voters (as marked on canvass cards) were 
contacted, and all claimed to have voted. 
The next test of Nationalist strength came in the local elections 
held in May 1967. In these the SNP took 16 per cent of the national 
vote, and won 7 seats in the burghs, and 42 in the counties, collecting 
a total of 200,000 votes, only 20,000 fewer than the Labour Party (11) 
Given this background, it is understandable that the SNP approached 
the by-election in Hamilton in November 1967 with considerable 
confidence. Electoral success was paralleled by organisational advance 
as evidenced by the growth in constituency associations - a long-held 
aim of the leadership. In a report on the state of the constituency 
associations, written in 1967 (12), it was discovered that there were 
four main categories of constituency: Poor those with a small 
active membership; Moderate - a number of good people, but with an 
inactive membership and an incomplete coverage of the constituency; 
Good - a fairly large number of good people, with membership over 500 
and the constituency virtually covered by branches; Excellent-
membership over 1,000, with many activists and near complete coverage 
by branches. 
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The numbers included in each category were as follows: 
NumberbfConstituencies 
Poor 
MJderate 
Good 
Excellent 
. ~ 
10 
36 
22 
3 
71 
Bearing in mind the constituency strength outlined in the Niven 
Review, one can see the remarkable advance in the Party's constituency 
coverage in the three years since that report was written. 
The degree of advance achieved under the leadership since 1963 
led to a leadership-mass consonance. There is no evidence (see next 
section) to suggest that there was any disquiet among the members in 
respect of the direction in which they were being led. At this stage 
in the Party's development the very success of the leadership in 
"delivering the goods" was having the effect of increasing their 
power vis-a-vis the rank-and-file. In any case opposition from the 
latter would have been pointless. For despite the increasing evidence 
of leadership control of the machine, there was insufficient grounds 
for seeking to end this trend since it was so manifestly successful 
in terms of organisational and electoral results. 
The stunning SNP by-election victory at Hamilton was just one 
more piece of evidence that the leadership really were taking the 
Party towards the goal of independence. Such a success must have 
boosted the overall standing of the leadership, and may even have 
aided centralisation. 
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The SNP won Hamilton in November 1967 with 46 per cent of the vote. 
Labour's share fell from 71.2 per cent in the 1966 General Election, to 
41.5 per cent in the by-election (13) 
The SNP candidate, Mrs. Winifred Ewing, was a Glasgow lawyer and an 
aggressive campaigner. Even so, her victory was still a considerable 
achievement for the SNP, and it led to a flood of new members for the 
Nationalists. Moreover, there was a flurry of media attention and the 
demands on the centre grew alarmingly. 
By January 1968 the SNP had 90,000 members (some estimates put it 
higher) and new branches were increasing in numbers all the time. This 
growth led the Vice-Chairman (Organisation), Dr. James Lees, to send a 
memo (14) to the NEC, calling for the appointment of paid regional 
organisers to coordinate activities and expansion. 
The momentum was carried on through the local elections of May 1968, 
when the SNP gained some 30 per cent of the national vote (15) and in 
net terms gained 100 seats. They even managed to win 13 seats in 
normally hostile Glasgow. 
Minutes of the Organisation Committee of the period record (16) 
that the Party had, by October 1968, 483 branches and 22 parliamentary 
candidates. Two months later three regional organisers were appointed 
and were based in Glasgow, Aberdeen and Edinburgh respectively. Another 
leadership idea, not for the first or last time, was implemented. The 
force of management reality continued to bear in on the Party. 
However, organisational change did not end there. Ian Macdonald 
~~---
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resigned as National Organiser (ostensibly because he wanted to become 
a parliamentary candidate. But in reality he was unhappy with an 
internal organisational change, which, he believed, demoted him in the 
staff hierarchy). He was replaced by Winifred Ewing's Election Agent, 
John McAteer. 
In 1968 it must have seemed to many activists that the SNP could 
only continue to go from strength to strength. However, in the following 
year the first signs of decline became evident. There is no evidence 
to suggest which carne first, organisational or electoral, and it seems 
more than probable that they were mutually reinforcing. 
The first obvious indication of regress came in the local government 
elections of May. The SNP's national share of the vote fell to 22 per 
cent, down 8 per cent on the previous year. 
Upon examination of their performance, the Party's Organisation 
Committee concluded (17) that there were four main reasons for the set-
back: too much detailed policy, and not enough emphasis on the basic 
aim of independence; not enough canvass ing; a bad national image; 
and, the overall quality of the Party's candidates was poor. 
Whilst the first two seem highly impressionistic, and may reflect 
personal bias, the fourth reason may have some merit: the expansion of 
the SNP in the late 1960s led to many people joining who were without 
much political experience. I.S. McLean (18) outlines a study undertaken 
at the University of Strathclyde in 1968 of 81 SNP candidates standing 
in the local elections of that year. This found that 83 per cent had 
joined the Party within the preceding five years, 38 per cent had 
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jo:ined sometime in the previous twelve months. Only 13.5 per cent had 
ever been in one of the other parties, and of these the vast majority 
were non-activists :in those parties. 
Political :inexperience and the sheer numbers stand:ing, led to a 
lack of direction and coordination (evidence here of peripheral anarchy?). 
The end result appears to have damaged the credibility of the SNP, a 
view endorsed by Brand (19) 
Another election set-back occurred in Glasgow, Gorbals, in 
October 1969. The SNP had established a committee to coordinate the 
campaign as early as June. This was dominated by a majority of notables, 
and was typical of the approach taken by the leadership to such 
elections. No question here of a management role for activists, that 
is to say~ the activists merely carried out the programme and direction 
of the Committee. The latter's members were: Dr. Robert :McIntyre 
M.P., 
(Party President), Winifred Ew:in~ David Rollo (past Party Treasurer), 
William Wolfe (Senior Vice-President), Alex Ew:ing, a cartoonist, and 
Gordon Baird. 
The candidate was a Glasgow councillor, Tom Brady. He was a Roman 
Catholic, and this was not a co:incidence in a constituency with a large 
Catholic vote. The SNP had a history of difficulties in attract:ing 
Catholic voters, although the exact reason(s) have never fully been 
expla:ined. 
In the end the SNP achieved a disappo:inting 26 per cent of the 
vote. This occurred despite the fact that the Party claimed to have 
had five times the number of canvassers of each of the other parties (20) 
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Also an opinion poll was undertaken by the Party's Research Department (21), 
and no less than five leaflets (one of which dealt with the local issue 
of rat infestation) were distributed during the course of the campaign. 
In other words this was a well-fought and coordinated campaign. 
Yet the SNP did not do well. This would seem to suggest that the SNP 
was in trouble nationally. There is other evidence which confirms this 
view. 
Two further electoral failures followed upon the Gorba1s' result. 
The Party managed to achieve only 20 per cent of the poll at a by-
election held in South Ayrshire in 1970 and in the May local elections 
of the same year the SNP's share of the national vote was a mere 12.6 
per cent (22) It was against this extremely disappointing background 
that the Party entered the 1970 General Election. 
Despite almost trebling the number of candidates as compared to 
1966, 65 as compared to 23, the SNP managed to increase its share of 
the vote by only 6.5 per cent; from 5 per cent to 11.4 per cent (the 
overall vote rose from 128,474 to 306,802). And although a seat was 
gained in the Western Isles, Hamilton was lost (23) 
The 1970 Election might in retrospect be seen as a partial recovery 
after the reverses of 1969; compared to the 1966 General Election the 
Party had, after all, increased its share of the vote, and at least 
it did retain a presence in Parliament. 
Actual organisational decline continued for another year or so 
with both finances and membership falling off. But by the end of 
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1971 the situation had begun to stabilise. We shall return to these 
developments in the next chapter. In the meantime we shall seek to 
analyse the internal power structure of the SNP for the period just 
looked at. 
The Internal Power Struc~ure, 1963 to 1970 
This period was the most organisationally climactic in the entire 
history of the SNP. The advance from political inconsequence to 
political significance was so fast, we contend, it encouraged and/or 
led to the leadership in a direction of oligarchy. The seven years or 
so separating the SNP from its position in the wings of politics to 
centre-stage, also demarcated the Party of the 1950s from the centralised 
machine of the mid to late 1960s. 
However, many within the SNP's leadership were still ideologically 
attached to a concept of the Party as a decentralised organisation, which 
is suggestive of the fact that circumstances drove the Party towards 
centralism against the predispositions of some of its leaders who had 
a tradition of belief in the value of membership participation. Dr. 
James Lees was one of the best examples of this app~oach among the 
leadership group. Yet one can also detect the ambivalent attitude 
towards centralised command in the observations made by William Wolfe, 
upon returning from a Convention of Welsh, Scottish and Breton 
nationalist students in March 1965: 
Effective political leadership cannot be trammelled 
with having to consult too many people before taking 
action, yet elected representatives cannot be given 
an unrestricted free hand without obligations to 
consult others. (24) 
As we argue in our hypothesis, Wolfe was finding that the demands 
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of organisation were sufficient to push the Party towards centripetal ism; 
they had to adjust or face organisational anarchy. 
What Wolfe was discovering as an individual was typical of the 
leadership as a whole. On this theme Gordon Wilson observed that 
organisational alterations to coordinate Party activities were inevitable 
as new members joined in the early 1960s: 
Some other changes would have taken place. They would 
have been created by the requirements of changing 
acti vi ty . As the Party continued to grow then the 
institutions would have been forced to change. If they 
hadn't been changed they would break-down and then would 
have to be reconstituted. (25) 
Even in 1963 the demands of central leadership, and the need to 
assert control over a growing Party were illustrated in a dispute 
between Dundee West constituency and Headquarters. The constituency 
was on the lookout for a candidate for a forthcoming parliamentary 
by-election to be held in November 1963. Headquarters suggested that 
Dr. James Lees should be the candidate. However, Dundee rejected him 
on the grounds that he was soft on the central issue of 'independence'. 
The Party Chairman informed the constituency that the NEe would not 
impose a candidate on them against their wishes. In the end that is 
exactly what happened, and Lees fought the by-election for the SNP. 
This was not sheer autocracy, but rather indicative of a growing 
sense of the need to assert command among the leaders. This gave rise 
to Donaldson's Memo on Organisation (which we describe in the last 
chapter) and the subsequent Wilson Report. 
The specialisation which came in the wake of the Report encouraged 
the growth of a distinct hierarchy, a usual end-product of organisational 
expansion. The leadership soon recognised the net benefits of 
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organisational expertise and specialism. And 1 as the Party grew so 
the need for even more hierarchical division of labour emerged. Thus 
in March 1966 National Council was told by the Party Chairman (26) that 
a proposal would soon be placed before the forthcoming Party Conference 
to increase the number of Vice-Chairmen to four. This increasing 
bureaucratic division of labour is a common feature of expanding 
organisations. 
If the logic of circumstances was driving the leadership towards 
even more centra1isation 1 then as we have just seen it was not a who1e-
hearted commitment on the part of the NEC. We have already looked at 
some of Wolfe's reservations. Yet even Gordon Wilson 1 who initiated 
many of the changes which led to this increasing centralisation, had 
reservations on occasions about the unrestricted use of power by the 
Executive. His concern can be seen in a dispute between himself and 
Douglas Drysdale. The latter wanted an even firmer grip on the Party's 
operations with more central control. Thus in a memo to the NEC on the 
subject of 'Reorganisation; written at the end of 1965, Drysdale argued 
(27) that National Council was: 
virtually the embryonic Parliament of Scotland and 
must be in command of the conducting of its own affairs 
and, except mder the most musua1 circumstances, 
completely mder the control of the Executive, just 
in the same way as Parliament is under the control of 
the Cabinet. 
He went on: 
Matters must not be chucked out of the Executive to 
National Council because they are awkward and difficult 
to solve and under almost no circumstances should the 
Council be placed in the position where it can censure 
the Executive. This could well have happened at the last 
Comcil. 
(The last point was a reference to the National Council of December 
1965, when attempts were made to get Major F .A.C. Boothby and Oliver 
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Brown readmitted to the Party after years of expulsion. The Chairman, 
A. Donaldson, opposed this move, and reconnnended that the expulsion 
stand. This view was endorsed. In fact, it was overwhelmingly carried) . 
Drysdale's designs went even further. He insisted that the NEC 
should organise itself so that it dealt completely with problems 
presented to it. MJreover, it should do so in a way that precluded 
the possibility of these being overturned by Council. 
However, Drysdale's views were quickly opposed by Wilson. In a 
memo to Drysdale (28) he argued along the following lines: 
Why should the Council not criticise on censure the 
Executive? •.. I prefer to have the safeguard of the 
right to fight wrong decisions all the way to Conference. 
Cabinet responsibility is an English Constitutional 
doctrine for which I for one have very little sympathy. 
Wilson thought that National Council was dull because connnittee 
conveners worked too slowly. MOreover, he considered that Drysdale 
chose conveners who involved him in public wrangles. (Note Wilson's 
apparent concern to have conveners who would not argue with the leaders 
publically). He did, however, agree with a suggestion from Drysdale 
regarding the need for senior office-bearers to meet informally more 
often: 
Needless to say these should not trespass on the role 
of the Executive. Nor (sic) lead to the elitism which 
has caused so much trouble in England and Plaid Cymru. (29) 
It is of some interest to note that even in the midst of his 
defence of democracy and protestations about centralisation, Wilson 
still was not suggesting that the Council replace the legislative 
functions of the Executive. On the contrary it should criticise and/ 
or censure the NEC (which it never did). Finally, note that he is 
concerned not to usurp the role of the Executive, with no mention of 
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COl.lllcil, this despite the fact that the formal custodian of legislative 
power, between Conferences, was National Council, not NEC (see Appendix). 
However, the force of Drysdale's arguments regarding the weight 
of business and the need to expedite decision-making seems to have 
borne in on the NEC. In the Chairman's Report to Council (30) a few 
months after the exchange between Wilson and Drysdale, Donaldson said 
that: 
the Executive will require to take further steps to 
bring its business into manageable compass and this, 
it would seem, must involve delegation of its ordinary 
administrative functions to the National Office bearers, 
individually or as a sub-committee. 
Again and again one finds organisational realities importuning 
themselves upon the Party leadership. This management specialisation 
is a typical feature of the trend towards a dominant organisational 
form in which hierarchy and power centralisation are typical. 
According to one writer, Herbert Kaufman (31), organisational 
upheaval does tend to lead to centralisation of power. MOreover, 
subsequent periods of tranquility tend to diffuse it. The only time 
in recent history in which the SNP could be said to have enjoyed a 
period of prolonged tranquility - though not by choice - was in the 
1950s. We have already illustrated what this meant in power terms. 
But in the 1960s the Party was undergoing rapid growth and change. 
Therefore the organisational response was entirely predictable. 
Time and again, throughout the period 1963 to 1970, the SNP's 
leadership was forced to readjust itself, even abandon centrally held 
tenets, as it confronted management realities. 
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The four Executive Vice~Chairmen were elected at the June 1966 
meeting of National Council (32). Douglas Drysdale, Dr. James Lees, 
John Gair and James Braid, were the successful candidates out of the 
nine that stood. But whilst Council elected them, it left to the 
discretion of the NEC the right to divide up the functions between 
the new Vice-Chairmen. 
The latter began their informal meetings towards the end of the 
year (though Braid and Lees were not enthusiastic about the 
idea). 
The organisational momentum which was carrying the SNP towards 
even more specialisation and centralisation continued. In the 
Chairman's Report to Council (33) in February 1967, Donaldson reported 
on the need to streamline the administration due to the expansion of 
the Party: 
The steps which we have taken so far are in the direction 
of making the various sub-committees more responsible 
within the terms of their remit. Written minutes of 
their discussions are now distributed with the Executive 
agendas but are discussed only where new decisions require 
to be taken or where a member of the Executive believes it 
necessary to challenge or have elaborated the proceedings 
of the sub-committees. 
This represented an advance on the existing situation where any 
matter could be discussed at the NEC meetings regardless of sub-committees 
discussions. Thus even the Executive committee was becoming more remote 
from the actual taking of certain decisions concerning the life of 
the Party. Even someone like Dr. James Lees, who was committed to a 
thorough-going democracy, noted the needs of efficient administration. 
In a memo to the NEC, written in early 1967 (34), he reflected on the 
needs of Party organisation: 
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We are now telling one another that the Party Organisation 
must "professionalise". By this is meant "become more 
efficient". The essence ofprcifessiOrialism is Specialisation. 
He goes on to outline the current organisational structure of the SNP. 
Next he writes of the need for an Electoral Planning Committee which 
would be in charge of all by-elections, as well as the planning for 
the next General Election. Discussing the need for other committees 
as well, he notes: 
These committees will have to be interlocked and overlapped, 
many of us will be on the National Executive Committee. (35) 
Lees was very prescient when he noted the likelihood of overlapping 
committees (we shall return to this theme in a later chapter). He was 
merely coming to terms with organisational realities, specifically to 
the demands of professionalism and leadership. 
By July 1967 (36) it was recognised that the Executive Vice-
Chairmen should be meeting not less than once a month, and they were 
given full responsibility for the submission of minutes to the NEC, 
all routine administration, coordination of Party activity and Party 
discipline. MJreover, in cases of emergency (to be detennined by the 
Chairman or National Secretary), the Vice-Chairman could act on behalf 
of the NEC. Finally, they were also to be given the duty of preparing 
and editing all constitutional amendments on behalf of the NEC. 
This growing centralisation led to a certain disquiet among 
sections of the membership. This is not surprising since not all of 
the members could not have been expected to rest content whilst their 
role was relegated to that of an utterly supportive one. This sense 
of mease led to a move which attempted to make the NEC more 
representative of the rank-and-file. 
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At the 1967 Annual Conference it was decided (37) to enlarge the 
NEC so that it was composed of 100 members drawn territorially from 
across Scotland. This was certainly a massive reassertion of Party 
democracy and is testimony to the belief that the SNP had become too 
dominated by the leadership in the 1960s. 
A committee was set up by the NEC with the remit of finding the 
best mechanism for instituting Council's directive and enlarging the 
NEC. The committee was composed of Wolfe, Wilson and Archie Young. 
In a memo written by Young to the NEC, he noted that a number of: 
the present members of the Executive feel that the 
proposal for the 100 strong executive is a grave error 
in the post-Hamilton era ... 
The proposed 100 strong executive simply will not 
be an executive: it will be more like National 
Council as it was a few years ago and of similar 
efficiency. (38) 
Before the year was out doubts as to the efficiency of the proposed 
body gave rise to yet another report, this time from Wolfe and Wilson (39) 
After having implemented some proposals for changing the NEC, they 
decided that it was time to reverse the alterations. Hence the second 
report. This latter document stated that: 
The size of the new Executive, the frequency of its 
meetings and the tremendous volume of political and 
administrative work now borne with difficulty by the 
smaller Executive Committee all point to the need for 
a rational reappraisal and redistribution of Executive 
work ..• 
We have, therefore, decided to recommend that the new 
Executive be treated as a representative and consultative 
assembly responsible for polICY work, that it be termed 
the National Executive Assembly ... and that there also 
be a National Executive Committee responsible for 
administration, finance, organisation and immediate work 
rising between meetings of the National Executive Assembly. 
First of all the Council's intention to democratise the NEC had been 
completely ignored. Secondly, the 'Assembly' was limited to the 
discussion of policy, not organisational, questions. Surely here is 
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further evidence of what the leadership considered to be the most 
crucial area of Party life. Finally, the Assembly could recommend 
policies to Conference or Council (National Council was to continue to 
meet quarterly. It continued to receive reports from the office-bearers, 
but increasingly its time would be taken up in debating, accepting or 
rejecting, the policy matters sent to it by the new Assembly, or with 
'policy' resolutions from branches or C.A.s). But it had no formal 
powers. That is, it could not pass policy, only debate it (40) That 
the leadership saw the Assembly as a way of protecting their power in 
matters of management, and that the Assembly was little more than a 
convenience for them, may be ascertained from the following revelation 
from Gordon Wilson: 
We had to find some kind of way of protecting the NEC, so 
we created the National Executive Assembly. The aim of 
that (the Assembly) was not really to deal with policies, 
but to deal with others, to steer away some of the regionalist 
pressure. That decision was taken by a small sub-committee 
meeting in my house. (41) 
It is difficult to envisage a clearer declaration of elite power broking, 
or evidence that in crucial areas of Party life a relatively small group 
of individuals were controlling the Party. 
The full-time paid bureaucracy was increased in size during 1968, 
and even in this one sees the power of the central leadership. 
William Wolfe had long been lobbying for a full-time Research 
Officer. During the course of 1968 the NEC decided to appoint one. 
To begin with Wolfe took on the task, found it too much, and thereafter 
Donald Bain took over on a full-time basis. 
The next development in the growth of bureaucracy came with the 
appointment of the three regional organisers we mentioned in the first 
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section of this chapter. The hiring of these people was not without 
significance for Party power. 
The organiser for the North East of Scotland had his appointment opposed 
by the Chairman of MOray and Nairn, and South Angus constituencies, as 
well as the senior office-bearers of North and South Aberdeen. Thus 
there was a considerable degree of opposition from within the very 
constituencies the gentleman was supposed to service. Yet despite this 
antipathy the NEC decided that it could not be seen to reverse a 
decision in the face of popula~ disquiet, and the appointment was 
confirmed! 
During the course of the 1960s there was a continuing increase in 
the amount of power exercised by the centre. Again and again we have 
seen evidence of the willingness of the leadership to use it, sometimes 
surreptitously, as in the creation of the Assembly. On other occasions 
more openly, as in the confirmation of the organiser for the north-
east of Scotland. But whatever the circumstances applying at a moment 
in time, the overall direction taken was towards centralisation. The 
pressures engendered by change and growth led, almost inevitably, to 
increased leadership power. 
In the final section we shall explore the theoretical background 
to change in organisations, and discover that occurred within the SNP 
during the 1960s was not at all surprising. 
Although pressures were bearing in on the Party in the early 1960s, 
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the changes which came in their wake had to be instituted by individuals 
acting in response to these pressures. 
One writer, Herbert Kaufman, lists (42) several ways change can be 
implemented in practical terms: (1) ImpdrtirtgResdurces from other 
organisations; (2) Cortcentra!ingResotirces in one area rather than 
another, this, of course, is a classic dilemma; (3) Avoid Sunk Costs, 
this can occur if resources are limited by being committed to other 
areas. These 'sunk costs', therefore, inhibit, freedom of action; 
(4) Lifting Official Constraints, the most limiting factor to change 
are the rules and regulations which govern action and behaviour. One 
important way in which to by-pass systematic obstacles to change is, 
of course, to (5) Reorganise. This involves the redistribution of 
influence and the emphasis of different values. This serves to break-
down old established lines of access and conduct. Reorganisation, then, 
is a way in which the proponents of change: 
who run up against the deep-rooted, customary modes of 
behaviour can overcome them. (43) 
Kaufman also notes: 
After an organisation has been changed even a little, 
it begins to freeze Into Its new pattern almost at 
once ••. All the tendencies which inhibited change 
in the prior configuration promptly make themselves 
felt in the new one. (44) 
We shall discuss these ideas further below. However, it is worth 
bearing in mind that only one of the change factors listed could be 
reasonably applied to the SNP of the period: reorganisation. In the 
meantime let us concentrate on what elements can prevent change. What 
is it that encourages stasis? Once again we can turn to Kaufman for 
guidance. At the outset there is the momentum of conservatism: if 
someone wants to institute some new method of behaving within the 
organisation then they will have to demonstrate the necessity of it. 
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Why gamble with the unknown? Certain people will resist change if they 
derive benefits, of one kind or another, from the old order. Others 
may believe that the methods may lead to an erosion of standards, etc, 
Obstacles such as these, Kaufman refers to as 'Mental Blinders'. 
By their very nature they tend to operate internally, that is, within 
the organisation. But there are also external obstacles such as 'Resource 
Limitation' : 
Some. organisations would eagerly change their 
structure and behaviour but for the fact that 
change of this kind demands resources they are 
unable to mobilise. (45) 
Of the categories which stimulate and restrict change, there are 
really only two which are of direct relevance to the experience of the 
SNP in the 1960s. 
The first, and most obvious, is the internal stimulant referred to 
as Reorganisation. This was precisely the course of action undertaken 
in the Wilson Report. When it became manifestly obvious that the 
existing parameters for Executive action were too narrow they were 
expanded so as to allow the leadership greater freedom of manoeuvre. 
This served to redistribute influence in the direction of the NEC, and, 
as the Kaufman quote given above argues, thereafter the new realities 
quickly took over to prevent reversion to the old pattern. 
However, a major obstacle, as we saw in the chapter on Finance, 
was Resource Limitation. The lack of an adequate income was a major 
factor in preventing the SNP, in the early 1960s, from undertaking 
planned organisational growth. Now, whilst it is true to say that the 
Wilson Report preceded the improvements in the National Party's 
finances, it was ultimately concerned with internal changes and how 
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these could be achieved. The alteration in the SNP's financial position 
liberated the Party externally, and thereby not only encouraged, but 
was, in large part, responsible for system growth. 
Growth and change within the organisation usually embrace both 
internal and external elements if they are to be successful. Yet it 
has been the former which we have been dealing with thus far (we shall 
be examining the 'external' elements, primarily the SNP's approach to 
campaigning, later in the thesis). The changes which the Wilson Report 
and the other alterations in the management structure of the Party set 
in train were essential to the achievement of the organisational self-
realisation of the Party. Without them it is likely that the SNP could 
not have properly adapted to a growth in membership. 
But change itself might not be in the direction desired by its 
formulators; if so, then it is not successful change, and it is likely 
it will not achieve its major goals. There is, then, a difference 
betweenOrganisationa~ Qhange and Planned Organisational Change. The 
latter can be defined as: 
any planned program that results in significant 
alterations of the behaviour of individuals or 
groups within the organisation in a direction 
desired by management. Typically, planned 
organisational change programs and directed 
towards increasing some element of organisational 
effectiveness. (46) 
In our judgement, by this definition, the Wilson Report, and the 
subsequent organisational alterations, can be viewed as being successful. 
Certainly, the SNP, post-1963, can be said to have been organisationally 
effective as measured by growth and electoral performance. On top of 
this, since the role of the members in decision-making declined, there 
was also the effect of behaviour pattern alteration albeit on a minor 
level. 
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These changes towards organisational self-realisation can be 
tenned an Intervention Strategy (47) along a· Structural Approach Continuum, 
that is, the introduction of change via 'the manipulation of organisation 
structural elements ... ,(48) This would include the modification of 
organisational rules and procedures (this is the functional equivalent 
of Kaufman's R~2rganisation). 
The Wilson Report etc., can be collectively termed Structu~l 
Mbdifications since they involved the re-definition of organisational 
relationships. According to Short (49) tactics such as centralisation 
or decentralisation, altering spans of control, relocating decision-
making authority and communication channels, occur when current 
structural arrangements within the organisation are detrimental to goal 
achievement~ In other words there is no alternative if the organisation 
is to prosper. 
The I intervention strategy' used by the SNP management of the 1960s 
was structural, it did not involve the removal of personnel, the 
introduction of new technology or even - to any great extent - significant 
changes in the human relations element. The strategy implicitly 
recognised that the SNP could not effectively change the nature of the 
membership, even if it wished to do so, that it would make no difference 
to the organisational goal if new technologies were introduced, and 
that therefore what was required were alterations in hierarchical 
relationships, that is, structural modification. 
Finally, was this 'intervention strategy' introduced democratically 
or not? Did the membership have an important role to play in the 
structural alterations? 
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Short (50) believes that authority usage can be conceptualised 
along a power distribution continuum. On one end there is a unilateral 
authority usage, this amounts to a one-way announcement of change, for 
example, the modification of organisational structure. At the other 
end of the continuum there are 'delegated power methods which include 
such tactics as data presentation, and discussion and sensitivity 
training (51) In the middle of the continuum one finds 'shared power 
methods' which utilise group decisions. 
The SNP's leadership had to have, in most cases, the endorsement 
of the delegates (note, not the entire membership) for its decisions. 
But, in fact, there was a pronounced tendency to simply endorse the 
vast bulk of leadership inspired structural modif~cations. Therefore, 
on the authority continuum whilst not at the 'unilateral' end, neither 
could it be said that the decision-making methods allow us to place 
the SNP in the middle. Rather it would seem that one must place the 
SNP mid-way between application of unilateral authority and shared 
power. 
The SNP of the 1960s grew at an astonishing rate. In the course 
of this growth participatory ideals had to be sacrificed as the 
forces of change bore in on a system still geared to the easy-going 
methods of the 1950s when the SNP still languished in obscurity. The 
price to be paid for this efficiency, however, was an ever increasing 
centralisation of administrative power. 
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ChaJ2ter·Seven 
Organisational GrowthandPattyPower,197Q~1974 
This chapter will be divided into two main sections. The first 
will continue from our departure point in the previous chapter, that 
is, the growth of Party organisation between 1970 and October 1974, 
looking at this growth both historically and in power terms. The 
second section will be a case study of the most famous campaign ever 
fought by the SNP, and arguably, the most influential ever launched 
by a Scottish political party. The 'Scotland's Oil' campaign. We 
chose this particular 'crusade' because it is demonstrative of both 
the principal innovation source of the Party, and the campaigning 
zeal and skill of the Nationalists in the early 1970s. 
Organisational Growth and Internal Power,1970-l974 
The four years between 1970 and 1974 were even more spectacular 
for SNP than the preceding seven years: three General Elections 
occurred, and the Party's parliamentary representation grew from one 
to eleven: a further, and important, by-election victory was 
achieved in what had hitherto been a barren field for the SNP, Glasgow 
Govan. And in organisational terms, new and younger faces were 
introduced into the leadership. On the negative side, membership 
declined, and would never again reach the sort of levels enjoyed in 
the 1960s. 
1970 was the first full year of the Chairmanship of William 
Wolfe. He had been elected in preference to Arthur Donaldson, at 
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the Annual Conference in 1969. As Wolfe indicates in his political 
biography (1), there was no lobbying or even serious debate, and even 
after losing, Donaldson continued to serve on the National Executive 
Committee. 
Wolfe's attitude to the question of leadership style appears to 
have been always ambivalent (see last chapter). He was pulled towards 
the need for central control and direction, but philosophically he 
favoured an important role for the membership in decision-taking. This 
dualism can be detected in the Chairman's Report to National Council at 
the end of 1971 (2) In the Report he deals with the question of 
'leadership'. In it he reveals that the nature of leadership at the 
national level had, not unnaturally, been on his mind for some time, 
Therefore, he had submitted proposals to a Party Committee on the 
Constitution, dealing with the subject. He had no doubts that the 
members wanted 'vigorous leadership' at the national level. However, 
in his view, this had often been difficult because the elected 
leadership was sometimes subject to control (he gave no examples). 
Whilst claiming to have no quarrel with the concept of control, he 
does, nevertheless conceive that there were types of control which 
could not have worked in the context of the SNP: first, the 'military 
model,' which was typified by the unquestioned authority of the 
leaders by the led; secondly, the 'business model.' In this the NEC 
operated as a board of management but was too big to exercise effective 
control. Mbreover, in an efficient business organisation, people with 
executive responsibility have to carry it out or face exposure as 
incompetents. In Wolfe's view such a paradigm did not always operate 
within the SNP. 
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But, democratic motives notwithstanding, he still considered 
leadership vital and attacked the existing set~up on two counts: the 
NEC was too large to be effective (interesting that even this rather 
snaIl body was considered too large), and there was an insufficiency of 
full-time officials. He was leading up to an appeal for a full-scale 
bureaucratisation of the Party in the name of efficiency, which was, 
in many ways, the logical outcome of the pattern of the Party's 
evolution since the Wilson Report: 
The administration of a11 departments of the Party 
should be in the hands of full-time officials if the 
Party can afford it. This does not mean that there 
need not be appointed committees and conveners, or, 
in some cases, perhaps a convener alone to which or 
to whom the full-time staff member is responsible. 
I believe that it would be preferable to have such 
appointments made by the NEC, rather than by Conference, 
on the recommendation of the Chairman, possibly after 
prior consultation with office-bearers; such appointments 
being reported for approval at the first opportunity by 
National Council. 
Just over two years after his succession to the Chairmanship, 
Wolfe was assuming a mantle, albeit reluctantly, which Robert Michels 
forecast, party leaders were driven to wear: 
Like every centralising system, bureaucracy finds its 
justification in the fact that a certain administrative 
unity is essential to the rapid and efficient conduct of 
affairs. (4) 
The more Wolfe was confronted by the tasks and demands of 
leadership, the more it seemed he came to believe in the inefficiency 
of the existing system; this despite the creation, in earlier years, 
of executive responsibility through the Vice-Chairmen. Later in the 
Report he advocated a reduction in the size of the NEC. On top of 
this he suggested the abolition of the posts of the National Secretary, 
Treasurer and Executive Vice-Chairmen, and their replacement by full-
time staff. He concluded with an appeal for a full-time Chairman: 
My experience as Chairman has strengthened my belief 
in that need (that is, for a full-time Chairman) ..• 
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The calls for decision-making and leadership are now 
so consistent, so pressing that the need for the 
Chairman to spend time trying to earn a living means 
that self-government is probably being delayed .•. 
He lamented that he could not give more time to Party business (he 
was spending over twenty hours per week as it was), and suggested a 
salary and expense sheet equal to that of an M.P. would be sufficient 
for the task. He went on: 
Streamlining the NEC and giving more responsibility 
to the NEC and the Chairman in making appo in tmen ts 
to some of the key posts in the team would certainly 
help to provide more effective leadership, but I 
believe that a further logical step towards being a 
more effective political movement would be to have 
a full-time Chairman. (5) 
These recommendations were not pursued further, but they are a 
striking piece of evidence in support of our view that the SNP had 
grown into an organisation where demands for efficiency and good 
business management were of paramount importance. It is virtually 
inconceivable that the Chairman of the Party in 1962 could have 
recommended to Council that it abolish the National Secretary and 
Treasurer's posts, and indeed half of the NEC, only to be replaced 
by a thorough-going bureaucracy. It would seem that as much as with 
Wilson and Donaldson, Wolfe's exposure to the exigencies of leader-
ship led him to put a premium on efficiency, a leitmotiv of 
bureaucratisation: 
In order to increase the organisation's efficiency, 
the mandator usually appoints an administrative 
cadre, i.e., an executive which is entrusted with 
the responsibility of working for the goals and 
interests of the mandator. (6) 
The essential thing to bear in mind is that the organisation, in 
other words the membership as a whole, did not resist the leadership 
as the latter's power increased. Despite this, it could not be said 
that the membership lost their commitment to the prevailing myth of 
the Party: openness of decision-making with full-scale participation 
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in the formulation and implementation of decisions. In other words, 
the members, through their delegates, formed an executive-legislative 
forum. The actual loss of this function was caused through a series 
of compromises beginning 1 most obviously with the Wilson Report, 
although the appointment of Ian Macdonald as a full-time official 
might be also said to have been the start of a sequence of concessions 
made in the name of efficiency. 1qith each succeeding step a process 
of erosion was under way, although the presumptions about Party 
democracy remained: 
When the power to give orders in the organisation 
is transferred to the administrative system, the 
mandator loses the possibility of exerting direct, 
continuous control over the organisation. (7) 
This was precisely the occurrence within the SNP. Upon delegatiIDn 
the administrative system (8) does not operate as a pliant instrument 
under the control of the members who have bestowed power. On the 
contrary, it may pursue lines of action which suit its purposes 
rather than those of the mandator. 'Moreover, unless there is continuous 
control, that is, constant monitoring and virtually every decisions of 
the administration examined, then the administration gradually 
strengthens i ts position until it becomes the organisation I s ruling 
group, the holder of power - at least in the administrative context. 
We saw previously how in the 1960s the Party came to be dominated 
by the Executive's concern for administrative efficiency. This pattern 
is repeated at the beginning of the 1970s when Wolfe was concerned to 
transform the Party machine into one which was dominated by I full·-
time' officials - again in the cause of efficiency (evidently he 
believed that the amount of time given over to Party tasks by the 
Executive members was inadequate). 
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This concentration of power at the apex was being duplicated at 
a more humble level of the Party, the branch. In a report by the 
National Organiser _ to the National Organisation 
Committee in mid-1970 (9). he deals with the subject of branCh 
executives. In many cases these had all but eliminated paTticipation 
in branch decision-making by ordinary members. Instead executive 
meetings were being substituted for full branch gatherings. M::>reover, 
these executives tended to attract, amongst others: 
the dogmatic and the power hungry with the result 
that some committees have come to regard themselves 
as masters of, rather than servants to the branches 
The National Organiser, John MCAteer, did not quantify the number 
of branChes involved, but we can take it (since he saw fit to raise 
the matter at a national committee) that the practice must have been 
fairly widespread. 
However, the period between 1970 to 1974 was not as dramatic in 
terms of organisational growth, or power concentration, as in the years 
between 1963 to 1969. The drama was restricted to the electoral arena, 
and organisational developments tended to be about consolidation. It 
was rather the oil campaign which best typifies power and organisational 
abilities of the centre during this four-year period, and once again it 
was Gordon Wilson who initiated, and largely directed, the whole 
operation. 
Before we examine the campaign in detail we shall delineate the 
other aspects of organisational progress between 1970 and 1974. 
The period between 1970 and 1972 was unspectacular - at least by 
the standards of the 1960s. Rather it was dominated by attempts to 
halt the membership decline and the overall organisational malaise. 
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1972 itself was the year in which the Party committed itself to 
one of the most adventurous and innovative campaigns in post",:,war 
Scottish politics. There is little doubt that this stimulated a great 
deal of activity within the Party and in that sense alone justified 
the importance attached to it by activists. 
Certainly by the end of 1972 membership had begun to rise once 
again - albeit from an extremely low level. In 1970 membership was 
approximately 30,000. By the middle of 1972 it had fallen to 20,000 
(as measured by the sale of membership cards). 
In a memo to the NEC (10) in late 1972, Wolfe lists three points 
which Gordon Wilson, in an earlier letter to Wolfe, thought helped to 
explain the decline in the SNP's organisational fortunes: (1) the 
irresponsible behaviour of councillors~ who involved the Party in 
damaging disputes (the latter were unspecified) ; (2) too much 
attention was focused on pOlicy questions, with inadequate heed being 
given to maintaining and re-establishing the Nationalists' base 
(there is no evidence to support this contention); (3) there were 
too few activists to maintain the momentum of organisational 
development. (This latter one, of course, begs the question; why 
were there so few activists?) 
Nevertheless, by the end of 1972, there were signs of growth. 
Since the beginning of the membership drive (see next section), lauFhed 
in October 1972, 200,000 business reply cards had been sold to the 
branches. MOreover, in the first ten weeks of the campaign 1,400 
replies had been received by Headquarters alone (11) (the 'oil 
campaign 1 was officially inaugurated at the National Council of 
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September 1972). Another indication of the increased activity of the 
Party was that the sale of membership cards for 1972 was running at 
twice the rate for 1971. 
Throughout 1973 the SNP's recovery became manifestly apparent. 
The NEC minutes of May 1973 (12) record that the SNP's own estimates 
of the Party's performance in the local elections of May 1973, together 
with a comparison for 1972, were as follows: 
National % 
Cities % 
Non-Cities % 
1972 
14 
9 
25 
1973 
21 
13.8 
32.7 
Whilst the bulk of branch, constituency and national Party effort 
in 1973 was directed towards the 'oil campaign', there were other 
organisational distractions in the shape of three by-elections. The 
first such contest occurred in the Dundee-East constituency in March 
1973. 
Gordon Wilson was the candidate and he took 30.2 per cent of the 
vote, coming within 1,141 votes of winning the seat (13). The SNP 
fought a vigorous campaign with a formidable array of manpower, 
literature and posters. For example, the average number of workers 
attending during weekdays was 60, rising to over 300 at the weekend. 
There was a complete canvass of the constituency, a prominent window 
campaign, a 60-car cavalcade, and on polling day there were over 300 
workers in the field (14). Moreover, the election was timeous in 
that it coincided with:-the national campaign being fought on the issue 
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of 'Scotland's Oil'. 
The Govan and North Edinburgh by-elections were held on the same 
day in November 1973. Whilst North Edinburgh was a superbly organised 
Constituency, Govan did not even have a constituency association. 
Nevertheless, the candidate, Margo MacDonald fought an aggressive 
campaign along class (the SNP would do more for the working class of 
Govan) and nationalist lines. And despite scanty resources she won 
the election with 41.9 per cent of the vote (15) 
As Govan was an electoral success so was Edinburgh North a 
disaster (16) The candidate was Party Chairman, William Wolfe, but 
his stature within the SNP was not enough to convince the electorate 
to vote SNP. Wolfe achieved a mere 18.9 per cent of the vote (in 1970 
the SNP did not contest the seat). 
In fairness however, it has to be said that North Edinburgh was 
considered to be one of the safest Conservative seats in Scotland, and 
in any case the disappointment was drowned by the euphoria surrounding 
the Govan victory. 
William Miller has argued (17) that the North Sea Oil campaign 
was not a cause of the SNP's electoral successes of 1974. Even so 
there was a strong feeling within the Party (18) that it had a serious 
part to play in the triumph of that year - although there is little 
evidence to support this, and an equally crucial role to play in the 
organisational successes as well. 
Following upon the Party's highly successful February 1974 General 
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Election campaign (see chapter 10), when the SNP won seven parliamentary 
seats and collected 683,180 votes, or 21.9 per cent of the vote (19), 
there was a flood of applicants to join the SNP. Ian ~~cdonald, Vice-
Chairman (Organisation) reported to the April 1974 National Council that 
Headquarters had difficulty in meeting the demand for membership cards, 
and that two extra secretaries would have to be taken on to assist 
with the growing demands on the staff. 
Hanby believes (20) that following upon the February General 
Election, the SNP was: 
devoted to the continuing strengthening of the Party 
machine at all levels, activity which, as it turned 
out, seemed to be rather a fortuitous choice from 
the viewpoint of October 1974. 
In October 1974 a massive publicity campaign on oil (see below) was 
launched, together with an equally impressive leaflet and poster drive. 
Hanby gives a quote from John McAteer: 
It had been non-stop action since the February election. 
We assumed that there would be a quick election again 
this year and we mounted a campaign throughout the 
constituencies to make sure we were not caught out. (21) 
Hanby accepts that by October 1974 the SNP had the necessary 
organisational base to fight effective campaigns. However, it was 
not the numerically large membership of the late 1960s, but rather a 
smaller but battle hardened, and expert, body of committee supporters 
numbering around 60,000. 
By 1970 Party power patterns had, to all intents and purposes, 
become set, with the leadership firmly in the driving seat of the Party 
machine. William Wolfe's attempts to extend this power through a 
thoroughgoing bureaucratisation were not followed through. They were 
never specifically rejected by any forum of the Party. Mr, \A/e'l ~€; 
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do"@s' no:t I'Q;Met4.~@.(' whj b"'e£i vJQ.I'<L'7dr.c>pi?·~. ' 
~ 1.. Yet there was still recognition that the NEC, or its 
representatives, must take charge of the ongoing management decisions 
so that efficiency maximisation could be achieved. Reflecting this 
reality, in his report to the September 1970 National Council, Wolfe 
announced as a matter of course that: 
With regard to all future b§-election campaigns, the 
National Executive Committee has resolved that it will 
assume full responsibility. (22) 
This was merely a re-statement of the de facto situation. This power 
had been assumed by the NEC for years. However, it had never been spelt 
out to the membership, and this decision did not ask for Council's 
sanction. Rather it boldly asserted that this would occur. This action 
would appear to have been unconstitutional. 
Earlier in the year April 1970 William Wolfe in another report (23) 
to Council, indicated that, in line with the NEC decision of March, 1970, 
constituency associations who had not paid their levy for the Gorbals 
by-election by late February 1970 would be disenfranchised so far as 
the 1970 Annual Conference was concerned (this was merely a restatement 
of the existing situation). Eleven associations were so affected, 
including six from Glasgow. Such suspension, or the threat thereof, 
from participation at the premier forum (to say nothing of it as a 
social occasion) of the Party, was not an inconsequential censure. 
As such it must have acted as a spur to activists to make sure that 
their constituencies met the prescribed obligations. 
The continuing development of Wolfe into a believer in strong 
leadership (whether he was a forceful practitioner was another matter) 
can be seen again in late 1971, when he announced to the 1971 National 
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Council that he had appointed Dr. Robert MacIntyre as the Party 
Spokesman on Oil. He did this despite the opposition of the Science 
and Technology Committee (none of whom were of the leadership cadre), 
which believed this task should have been assigned to a technologist. 
The NEC endorsed Wolfe's course of action. 
This expansion in Executive power was, as we outlined above, 
virtually an inevitable outgrowth of the need for organisational 
efficiency in the pursuit of achieving the party's goal. Thus it 
should not be viewed as surprising or unusual. But what is rather 
curious was the progression of leadership power to a condition where 
it could be stated (as opposed to informally understood) as being 
pre-eminent within the Party. 
In a memo (24) from William Wolfe to office-bearers and staff in 
mid-1973, he outlined the responsibilities of the former. The main 
responsibility for Executive action lay with the Vice-Chairmen and the 
other office-bearers. In itself this was merely a reaffirmation of 
the status-quo. However, it is when Wolfe moves on to state the 
responsibilities of the NEC that he clearly debunks the prevailing 
constitutional myths. 
The NEC was to be responsible for initiating action and approving 
proposals and plans to be carried out by individuals and committees, 
and for guiding and directing the Party. Yet according to Para. l5(a) 
of the Constitution, Council was to Inter-Conference governing body 
of the Party. (25) 
Moreover, the NEC was supposed to be dependent upon council for 
the delegation of its duties and powers (26) Thus the approval of 
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proposals and the initiation of plans should have rested with Council 
unless and until it delegated such powers to the NEC. 
Despite this, over the years, legislative and executive power 
(in organisational matters) had been combined in the NEC without former 
delegation and the delegates to Conference and Council were in the 
main, restricted to policy debate and questioning the leadership. 
In an earlier chapter we highlighted the fact that it was the 
custom in the 1950s, and early in the 1960s, for NEC minutes to be 
circulated to delegates to the National Council. This practice ceased 
in 1964, and by June 1974 a note was sent to all NEC members to the 
effect that all minutes, agendas and other papers relating to the NEC, 
discussions at NEC meetings, were confidential. MOreover, members 
wishing to raise points on the written material circulated prior to 
the meeting, could only do so by writing to the National Secretary 
stating their intention to discuss a specific point. The Executive 
Committee was itself, by now restricted by the bureaucratic growth of 
the Party; unexpected and/or unanticipated questions by executive 
members could embarrass office-holders and/or obstruct the efficient 
flow the NEC's business, consequently such variable conduct had to be 
minimised in the cause of rational and efficient procedure. 
By 1974 the NEC, or more specifically its senior members, had 
consolidated their power within the Party. This was achieved through 
a variety of processes, some of which were planned like the 1~ilson 
Report, others which evolved through organisational practice, like the 
writing of the Party's election manifesto in February 1974 by two 
people (Wolfe and Donald Bain, the Research Officer). There had been 
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no set rules for this~ that is, the Constitution has nothing to say on 
the matter. 
However, both paths to centralisation grew out of the demands 
placed upon the organisation by its growth and the need to effect 
efficiency. The pursuit of efficiency will almost invariably overturn 
the most democratically committed of individuals and organisations: 
the SNP was no exception. 
In the final section of this chapter we shall use the 'oil 
campaign! as a case study to demonstrate both the innovatory source(s) 
within the SNP, as well as the nature of power relationships as between 
leaders and the led. 
The Oil Campaign: A Case Study in PowerartdOrgartisation 
We are examining this particular campaign primarily because it is 
demonstrative of both the organisational capacities of the SNP, and the 
fact that it was entirely directed and planned by a group within the 
Party leadership. Moreover, since a great deal of publicity was given, 
both within the SNP, and externally, one might expect to find a 
significant input from the membership to this campaign, and in this way 
it could be viewed as illustrative of the 'openness' and participatory 
nature of the SNP, so often commented upon by other writers. However, 
we believe that the evidence refutes this assumption. 
As early as August 1971 Douglas Crawford, then Press Officer, 
reported to the National Executive Committee: 
I consider oil to be such an important issue that I 
did some of my own research here. (27) 
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Ten days later Gordon Wilson was presenting detailed proposals to the 
NEC (28) for a campaign on the oil issue. Wilson perceived the clear 
potential of oil to boost the fortunes of the SNP, not only in straight 
political terms, but also as a factor in strengthening the flagging 
organisational muscle of the Party: 
I reckoned that the emergence of oil was a new factor in 
Scottish politics, and covered a multitude of dimensions, 
not just political; economic, psychological and so forth. 
And the question then was whether the Party would just kick 
the ball about the park, or whether we would try and build 
up team-play on it. 
The important point about the 'oil campaign' was that it 
started in nineteen seventy-one, seventy-two, and got the 
SNP moving along structured lines, and it built up the 
Party's campaigning capability. The momentum it generated 
was to the Party's advantage in a General Election. 
The second thing is ... that the media saw it as an important 
issue, and it gave us relevance during the General Election 
campaign. 
The campaign included the organisation, via the branches, of 
local publicity highlighting the value of oil reserves; a sample 
letter was sent to the branches which in turn was to be forwarded to 
their local authorities, calling upon the latter to support the SNP -
controlled Cumbernauld Town Council's resolution to the Convention of 
Royal Burghs, regarding the importance of North Sea Oil to the economy 
of Scotland. This was a consciousness-raising exercise. A notice was 
to be sent to all the oil companies reminding them that contracts for 
North Sea Oil might have to be renegotiated after Scotland achieved 
independence. Donald Stewart M.P., was to introduce a Bill in the 
House of Connnons for the establishment of a Scottish Industrial 
Development Corporation, and following upon this, a letter was to be 
sent to all Scottish M.P.s asking them for support for the measure. If 
they did not, they were to be asked the reasons why. A joint statement 
was to be released from the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders' Joint Shop Stewards 
(the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders' workforce were in the midst of a widely 
publicised sit-in at this point) and the AssDciation of Scottish 
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Nationalist Trade Unionists, calling for oil revenues to be used to 
guarantee the future of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. 
Other aspects of the campaign included the appointment of an 'oil 
spokesman', and extensive production runs of poster and leaflets on the 
oil issue. Finally, a poster campaign was to be launched throughout 
Scotland. 
Wilson's extensive range of proposals were accepted in their 
entirety by the NEC. 
Harvie gives March 1973 (29) as the launching date for the 'oil 
campaign'. In fact, campaigning on the issue began, as we have seen, 
in 1971, and 1973 was simply a continuation of the previous years. Not 
surprisingly, in view of his previous prominence, once again we find 
Gordon Wilson playing a vital role in the formulation and organisation 
of the SNP's 'oil campaign'. 
In January 1972 Wilson once again presented plans to the NEC (30) 
which proposed the formation of a corrnnittee to generate ideas and 
coordinate an 'oil campaign'. He also argued that there was a need 
for a full-scale poster campaign on oil, and reinforced his contention 
that the local branches should be encouraged to write to their local 
press on the subject of oil. By February 1972 the National Secretary 
had reported to the NEC (31) that in line with the agreement of the 
previous year she had written to 37 oil companies, and the Prime 
Minister, requesting the appointment of a Minister of Industry for 
Scotland. This proposal was rejected by the Government. 
-----
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By mid-1972 oil was on the agenda of every NEC meeting. However, 
so far as we can establish, this attention was due to the efforts of a 
few people, particularly Gordon Wilson and the Research Officer, Donald 
Bain. It would seem that, at first, there were still those on the NEC 
who did not quite appreciate the importance of oil as a political 
issue. 
By June 1972 Wilson had put together an extremely detailed 
document (32)on a Projected Oil Campaign, 1972. This was presented to 
the NEC (and marked 'Private and Confidential') and it was divided into 
four sections: Explanatory Notes, Campaign Schedule, Expanded Statement 
on Literature and Expanded Statement on Posters. It was typically 
Wilsonian, thorough and detailed. At the outset he observed that this 
was to be the first shot in the General Election campaign - so specific 
were the proposals that he even asked NEC's approval to purchase a 
photo-litho machine for use in the campaign. Each phase was carefully 
plotted with individual speakers listed and dates given when they should 
give speeches or write to the press. Demonstrations and literature 
dispersal were planned; there was even to be a petition sent to the 
United Nations. The constituencies were to check points within their 
areas which were most appropriate for posters (this was about as much 
decentralised decision-making as there was), and a fund was established 
to pay for this massive effort, its principal source of revenue was a 
levy on the branches. 
By September 1972, 250,000 leaflets had been sold, 'oil press-
action packs', had been sent to the branches to be used in the local 
press, etc., and the first national press conference had been held, 
with another planned. The NEC minutes of November 1972 (33) record 
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that campaign activity was high everywhere, and that there was a great 
deal of press coverage; sales of the 'oil' leaflet had climbed to 
710,000; 144,000 lapel stickers had also been sold, and there had been 
1,356 requests for press action packs. 
The sheer momentum of the oil effort was spilling over into other 
areas. For example, membership had received a considerable boost from 
all this activity, and by the end of the year 200,000 business reply 
cards had been sold to the branches since the beginning of October. 
Gordon Wilson reported the following formidable array of facts to 
the March 1973 National Council: as at December 1972, 800,000 leaflets 
had been produced, and only 13,000 were left; 200 posters had been 
printed, with only four left; 2,500 Double Crown posters had been run 
off, with 678 left over; 210,300 lapel stickers along with 2,000 car 
banners and 2,000 window posters 'vere available (34) 
This amazing outpouring of visual propaganda had, not surprisingly, 
a political spin-off. Wilson reported that a National Opinion Poll 
survey (35) had shown that since the beginning of the campaign, support 
for the SNP had trebled (this contention may be supported by the SNP's 
performance at the Dundee East by-election). But, Wilson argued, there 
was 'still a lot of running to be made on the oil issue - over half the 
households in Scotland have yet to receive the leaflet "To London with 
Love". 
In the same month, April 1973, a second oil action pack was sent 
to the branches, and a booklet, The'RealityofScotlartd'sOil, was 
published and had been sent to all the Scottish local authorities and 
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other public bodies. 
The campaign continued throughout 1973, and in July of that year 
Wilson brought proposals for Autumn and Spring campaigns before the 
NEC. These were, once again, highly detailed and elaborate, and followed 
the pattern established in the first schedule. They also contained 
proposals for a programme in advance of an expected General Election. 
The pre-eminence of Wilson in the 'oil campaign' continued, it 
was he who coordinated and planned the activities. The branches had a 
very important role to play in so far as the vast distribution network 
was based on them. But the great bulk of the ideas, and certainly the 
drive, came from the top. We could find little evidence that branch 
delegates, and certainly not the mass membership, played any significant 
role in devising the campaign, or suggesting new schemes (save for 
Cumbernauld's Resolution), or publicity ploys. Yet the branches 
themselves were innundated with material concerning the oil issue. 
There was, therefore, no more opportune time for a serious input from 
the rank-and-file. National Councils during this period were presented 
with a series of reports and recommendations from Wilson, and others 
on the NEC, yet no Council rejected, suggested or inspired, major 
alternatives to the leadership's courses of action. 
By December 1973 Wilson was well pleased with the turn of events 
this far. He reported to National Council that: 
The Party's oil campaign is beginning to bite. This has 
been the grudging conclusion of the media in recent weeks. (36) 
Even so, he demanded that even more action and effort be forthcoming 
from the branches, and he listed eight action-points: 
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1. Seek countrywide distribution of the leaflet "England 
Expects ..• Scotland's Oil" (remarkably standing (sic) 
the success of To London 1~ith Love?, this leaflet has 
produced a higher percentage of returns) . 
2. Obtain countrywide identification of Scotland's Oil 
through use of the new Crown foolscap posters which are 
in production. 
3. Issue to each member with a car, a copy of the car banner. 
4. Detail work parties to issue oil stickers to children as 
they leave school. 
5. Take out at branch and constituency level billboard 
posters using the poster "England Expects ... Scotland's 
Oil" . 
6. Use "Scotland's Oil" rubber stamp. 
7. Supply support to selective demonstrations outside 
meetings or conferences where oil is being discussed. 
8. Use the action packs for press publicity. 
What immediately strikes one about these instructions is their 
specificity, they left the branches with little or no excuse for lack 
of action. It might even be said that they assume a staggering lack 
of imagination on the part of the activists; did branch secretaries 
really need to be told to stamp envelopes with the rubber stamp 
provided? But this thoroughness was typical of Wilson the manager, 
it was direct and detailed, and the members were expected to follow 
the lead of the centre. 
The latter point begs the question: why were the members so 
sequacious, so amenable to leadership command? 
We believe that the answer lies in the same area as that for the 
acquiescence we discovered over the Alba Pools management. That is, 
the membership needed some guidance in the early 1970s (just as they 
did in the mid-1960s) to reverse the downward cycle into which the 
Party had fallen. Just as in the past the members were dependent 
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upon the centre for ideas and coordination. In the 1960s financial 
solvency and membership expansion had been engineered by the leadership 
group. They had been extremely successful in both respects. The sheer 
detail of the 'oil campaign', and its relatively instant success, 
further encouraged belief in the competence of the Party leadership, 
and thereby made membership cooperation more likely. 
The 'oil campaign' was a prefect launching platform for the 
General Elections of 1974. It greased the wheels of the machine, 
boosted Party confidence, brought the SNP much needed national (and 
international) publicity, and put the other parties on the defensive: 
No party had any strategy about what could come after 
oil, but at least the SNP could promise that it could 
retain the revenue for industrial reconstruction. (37) 
MOreover, the campaign also demonstrated, as we have endeavoured 
to show, the degree to which an issue as potentially complex as oil 
will almost inevitably have to be handled by a few 'specialists' in 
directing the efforts of others. We mean this not in the policy sense 
(though that was complex enough), but rather as a logistical exercise: 
the planning of the poster campaign, the coordination of demonstrations, 
the use and type of advertising, and, of course, the slogans themselves. 
All of this was put together by a few people in Headquarters. As we 
have found in other areas of Party life the key to success lay in the 
centralisation of management. 
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. Chapter Eight 
ManagemerttCdmmitteesandParttPdwet,1963~1974 
In this chapter we will analyse the composition of the strategic 
management decision-making committees of the SNP between 1964 and 1974. 
The committees under scrutiny have been chosen on two main criteria: 
they were not concerned with the broader questions of policy-making, 
for example, industrial, agricultural or economic matters, but rather 
with internal organisational tasks - indeed they were the most important 
such committees in the Party; the second criterion was, quite simply, 
that we had access to a significant range of data concerning these 
committees. We were, therefore, better able to judge the validity of 
our arguments concerning the stability and critical position of certain 
leaders during years between 1963 and 1974 (1964 is the starting-point 
since this was the first year for which we had complete data for the 
NEC). 
Some Theoretical Considerations 
Our hypothesis is that throughout the period under investigations 
organisational power became centralised within the SNP. In the preceding 
chapters we endeavoured to demonstrate how the most critical decisions 
concerning the internal management of the Party were taken at the apex 
of the Party pyramid. Since most of these decisions emanated from the 
committees we are about to investigate, it is obviously important to 
establish the composition of the latter between 1963 and 1974. If 
we discover that the same people are constantly reappearing on the 
same committees, and are also found on the other strategic committees, 
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then we would have reason to believe that power might well indeed have 
been highly concentrated. That is to say, taken in concert with other 
data, glven in previous chapters, concern1ng the formation and 
lffiplementation of management decisions, the discovery of overlapping 
and inter-locking committee membership, WhlCh was also stable over time, 
would be vitally important in the understandlng of the Party power 
system. 
This, of course, brings us into confrontation with the critique 
of the elitist model of power. Dahl ll) was concerned witn how one 
recognised a ruling group, and he outllned the fOllowing definltion of 
it: 
(it) is a controlling group less than a majority in 
size that is not a pure artifact of democraTic rules. 
It is a mlnority of lndlviduals whose Fr~te.\'"!?t\<:..e'7:. 
regularly prevail in cases of differences in preterences 
on key issues. If we are to avoid an lnflnite regress 
of explanations, the composltion Ol the ruling ellte 
must be more of less definitely specified. l2) 
In delineating his approach to the establishment of a ruling elite, 
Dahl lists several criteria. However, before we come to these a word 
about the type of decision-making we shall be examining, would now be 
appropriate. 
Hitherto, we have been looking at decisions from the perspective 
of their functional origin together with the outcome. This is the 
perspective taken by the pluralists, and is known as the decisional 
approach (the participatory element is also part of this method). It 
is through this avenue that we have sought to arrive at an understanding 
of 'a series of concrete cases' (3) which Dahl demands of us. 
But there is also a need for at least a look at a variant of 
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another method known as thepositiortal approach. This examines the 
presence of certain people on the most important Party committees as 
defined by the committee's role in the internal management of the Party. 
Were such people by virtue of their position in the Party, tenure in 
office and place on important committees, in a powerful position to 
influence the planning and implementation of certain decisions? It is 
by examining the structure and continuity of pivotal management 
committees that we can best achieve an understanding of those people 
who were most likely to be in a position to form a ruling group within 
the Party. 
We hope, therefore, by the adoption of a positional method to 
understand better the overall power structure of the SNP, and to 
reinforce our hypothesis. Therefore, whilst we accept, in large part, 
Dahl's demand for empirical back-up in establishing claims about elite 
domination, nonetheless we also believe that there is also a place for 
the positional approach. After all, even if it is discovered that the 
most important decisions were being taken, for example, every year by 
the Executive, this need not mean that the latter constituted an elite. 
If the membership make-up of the NEC, and its management sub-committees 
was constantly changing, with new members continually being brought onto 
the committees, and more established members leaving, then we might 
conclude that such membership fluidity was indicative of a highly open 
structure. Such turnover is hardly the basis from which elites are made. 
This brings us back to Dahl's criteria which, he believes, must 
be present if the argument in favour of the existence of a ruling elite 
is to be confirmed: 1. the ruling elite should be a well defined 
group; 2. a fair sample of cases involving differences in preference 
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between the ruling group and the rest should be presented; 3. in such 
cases the elite's preferences habitually triumph (4) 
These criteria inunediately bring us face to face with a problem. 
The second criterion is troublesome in that many of the reconunendations 
of the leadership were accepted without serious conunent by the membership. 
Rather the latter were content to follow the lead of the NEC (it is true 
that in other cases, such as the proposals to raise subscriptions, noted 
in the chapter on finance, there was some opposition. But the latter 
almost always resulted in the NEC's preferences prevailing). Dahl 
actually deals with this dilemma when he distinguishes between 
a system in which a small group dominates over another 
that is opposed to it, and one in which a group dominates 
over an indifferent mass. (5) 
He suggests that the test for the second, weaker, system of elite rule 
should be a modification of the first case: 
It would again require an examination of a series of cases 
showing uniformly that when the 'word' was authoritatively 
passed down from the designated elite, the hitherto indifferent 
majority fell into ready compliance with an alternative that 
had nothing else to reconunend it intrinsically. (6) 
However, one could not accurately describe the delegates to Council 
or Conference as 'indifferent', their very presence at these gatherings 
suggests that they did care about the Party and its operations. 
Rather than indifference we would suggest that their acquiescence was 
born of a widely held belief among delegates that the leadership knew 
what it was doing and they were prepared to follow the leaders. William 
Wolfe explained the delegates' attitude in the following way: 
I would say it was because a very large number of activists 
in the Party, and people who were becoming active, were 
totally new. (7) 
In other words, faith in the leadership was related to their own sense 
of inexperience, as well as trust that the leaders had the necessary 
207 
experience. 
However, there were instances when significant opposition did 
exist on the floor of Council; the best example being the outright 
rejection of the proposals, contained in the Wilson Report, to totally 
centralise Party finances at a stroke. But this was the only example, 
which we could find (albeit an important one), of a key issue in which 
leadership preference failed to prevail in the face of opposition from 
elements from the rank-and-file. 
Whatever system one cares to choose, the weaker or stronger, the 
empirical evidence still points clearly towards elite rule within the 
SNP, in that the leadership repeatedly saw their preferences triumph. 
This leaves us with the first of Dahl's criteria: that of the well-
defined group. 
It is in order to establish the presence or absence of such a 
group that we now turn to an examination of the committee system. This 
chapter may be said, therefore, to be concerned with the presence or 
absence of a well-defined ruling group within the SNP during the years 
1963 to 1974. 
Decision-making in most organisations is achieved through 
committees or groups of one kind or another. There is a growth in the 
necessity for specialists in particular fields as the organisation 
itself expands. This phenomenon grows out of the sheer complexity of 
organisational problems (8). But specialists gather on committees not 
only out of some democratic motive, but also because this facilitates 
rational decision-making. This would appear to be for five main 
reasons 
(9). 
. 
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1. In establishing objectives groups are preferable to 
individuals because of the greater amount of knowledge 
available. 
2. ~iderttifying alternatives individual efforts of group 
members are necessary to ensure a broad search in the 
various functional areas of the organisation. 
3. In evaluating alternatives the collective judgement of the 
group, with its wider range of viewpoints, seems superior 
to that of the individual decision~maker. 
4. In choosing an alternative it has been shown that group 
interaction and achievement of consensus usually results 
in groups accepting more uncertainty (risk) than an 
individual decision-maker. In any event, the decision 
is more likely to be accepted as a result of the 
participation of those affected by its consequences. 
5. Implementation of a decision, whether or not it is made by 
a group, usually is accomplished by individual managers. 
Thus since a group cannot be held responsible, responsibility 
necessarily rests with the individual manager. 
Committees exist because they maximise the individual skills and 
expertise which may exist within the organisation. Their creation in the 
SNP followed this general direction. They can also increase democratic 
decision-making by removing it from an individual, or they can decrease 
democracy by removing decision-making from larger forums, like National 
Council. 
The committees we shall be examining embrace the most important 
management councils of the Party: the NEC, the Finance Committee (FC), 
the General Business Committee (GEC) , the Electoral Planning Committee 
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(EPC), the Election Committee (EC) and the Organisation Committee (OC). 
Our concern will be to establish the membership of these bodies, the 
number of years individuals sat on them, and, finally, if overlapping, 
interlocking membership was uncommon or the norm. In short, was there 
a well defined group which was clearly dominant in these forums? We 
shall look at each committee in turn for evidence of regularity of 
individual representation across committees and through time. 
Management Committee Structure, 1963-1974 
The National Executive Committee. This was (and remains) the principal 
committee of National Council with responsibility for inter-Council 
decision-making. Its members, who are elected annually, are considered 
to be the leaders of the Party by virtue of their mass-based election. 
As we have tried to show, it is in de facto terms the actual governing 
body of the Party, even allowing for the fact that normally it requires 
Council's assent for its programmes. 
At the Annual Conference of 1963, the following were elected to 
the most senior offices of the Party (Note. The senior elected figures 
are elected at the annual Conference which immediately precedes the 
Council from which the other members of the NEC are elected) (10): 
President, Dr. Robert MCIntyre; Vice-President, James Halliday; 
Chairman, Arthur Donaldson; Vice-Chairmen, W.A. Milne and William 
Wolfe; Treasurer, David Rollo; National Secretary, Malcolm Shaw. 
As we shall shortly see, most of these names were to become a regular 
feature of the senior offices in the years ahead. 
The first full NEC list which we were able to locate was for 1964. 
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This was also the first election following upon the crucial Wilson 
Report. The line-up was as follows: Dr. Robert tvtlntyre, Arthur 
Donaldson, W.A. Milne, William Wolfe, Jam.es Halliday, Ian Macdonald, 
Bruce Cockie, Douglas Drysdale, David Rollo, Gordon Wilson, Alan Niven, 
Dr. James Lees, R. Reid-Patrick, M. Cathcart, Anthony J.C. Kerr, David 
Stevens ton , Angus MacGi11 very, Angus MacIntosh, R. Foggie, W. Gilchrist, 
George Leask, W.S. Orr and J. Gair (11) 
From this list we are now going to draw up a continuity-table. 
In this each member of the NEC for 1964 is marked for the number of 
years he/she continued to serve over the following ten years until 1974. 
Each is given an Table Score, the maximum being 100 - that is, 10 for 
every year served on the Committee. 
Table 2 NEC, Membersh}J? Continuity Table, 1964-1974 
Dr.R.McIntyre - 100 D.Ro110 - 100 M.Cathcart - 10 
J.Halliday - 100 G.Wilson - 100 A.J.C.Kerr - 10 
G.Leask 20 A.Niven - 20 D.Stevenston - 10 
A.Donaldson - 100 Dr.J.Lees - 80 A.MacGillvery - lUO 
W.A.Milne - 50 W.S.Orr - 10 A. Mac Intosh - lu 
W.Wolfe - 100 J.Gair - 40 R.Foggie - 10 
D.Drysdale - 40 R.Reid-Patrick - 40 W.Gllchrist - 10 
B.Cockie :D (approx) 
I.Macdonald - 100 
uf tne 2~ names listed as NbC members llan Macdonald was, for part 
of the time, an employee of the Party, and Angus MacGillvery was, for 
the entire period, a paid Party worker) for 1964, no less than eight 
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had lllinterrupted Executive status right through llltil 1974. Ten had 
Executive status for at least half of the period. Seven were executive 
members for only one year, and a further six had four years or less, 
. . 
of NEC membership. However, of the latter category, many had been 
Executive members prior to 1964, thus if we take a later period the 
figures become a little more striking: 
Table 3 NEC~ MembershiE Continuity Table, 1967-1974 
(1967 was chosen because from 1968 onwards 
the figures become even more biased in favour 
of a 50+ score) . 
Dr . McIntyre - 100 H.Henderson - 10 D.Henderson - 100 
A.Donaldson - 100 G.Wilson - 100 R.Reid-Patrick - 10 
E.Gibson - 10 Dr.J.Lees - 50 W.Ewing - 100 
J.Halliday - 100 J.Gair - 10 A.H.YOlllg - 10 
W.A.Milne 
-
10 J.Braid - 50 H.MacDonald - 50 
W.Wolfe - 100 D.Drysdale - 10 D.Rollo - 100 
A.Lees 20 G.Murray - 40 W.Lindsay - 30 
B.Cockie 20 H.Rankin - 50 H.Davidson - 60 
G.Leslie - 50 R.Campbell - 10 I.Macdonald - 100 
A.MacGillvery - 100 A.MacDonald - 10 J.Picken - 10 
Of the 30 members of the NEC listed for 1967, 10 had continuous membership 
through llltil 1974, and of these eight had been Executive members since 
at least 1964. A further six had NEC membership for at least 50 per cent 
of the period between 1967 to 1974. Of the remaining 14 members who had 
a score of 40 or less, two had NEC membership for at least four years up 
to and including 1967. 
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Table 4 CoIitinuity'fable 
Table Score; ·1964-1974 . Table ·Score: . ·1967.:.1974 
100 34.7 100 33.3 
50+ 43.5 50+ 53.3 
40- 56.5 40- 46.7 
These figures reveal one striking factor: that the nucleus of the 
SNP, the Party leadership, remained firm throughout time, with 
approximately 33 per cent of the NEC having continuous membership in 
the two periods looked at. Thus although around SO per cent of the 
NEC members in both periods, could not be said to have been a very 
permanent feature of the Executive, its most senior members were: 
McIntyre, Donaldson, Wolfe, Wilson, Halliday and Rollo (Angus 
McGillvery was a special case in that although he was not an elected 
member, he retained a permanent seat on the NEC on an ex officio basis, 
by virtue of his status as a paid Party employee); and then later 
Douglas Henderson and Winifred Ewing, all were permanent Executive 
members, as well as hOlding the most senior elected offices in the 
Party. Others like Milne, Drysdale and especially Dr. James Lees, 
had significant spells in leadership posts and extended membership 
of the NEC as well. This feature we shall describe as Core Persistence, 
and it should be seen as a vital link in the management chain bestowing 
upon the Core members considerable power, born of experience, as well 
as the status which must have been awarded to senior Party members 
constantly re-elected to the NEC, was reinforced by membership of the 
important Executive sub-committees upon which so much power was 
delegated. It was in these committees that many of the schemes, later 
adopted by the NEC, first saw the light of day. 
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The Wilson Report recommended that the committee conveners should 
be appointed by the Executive Vice ... Chairmen responsible for the area of 
concern dealt with by the committee. The Organisation, Finance (which 
existed prior to the creation of the GBC), and Election Committees were 
all reconstituted (see below for origin and functions) following upon 
recommendations contained in the Wilson Report. We shall now be 
examining these committees together with two others which were created 
later; the GBC and the EPC. 
Principal Orgarti~atiortal Sub ... Committees of the NEC 
National Executive Committee 
FC GBC EPC EC OC 
The Election Committee. When Wilson investigated the EC in 1963, he 
discovered that it was not working well. In fact, although its function 
was to organise the fighting of elections it had long since been failing 
to operate effectively in that regard. He recommended (12) that it 
seek suitable candidates for constituencies, make proposals for the 
raising and spending of cash for elections, and generally advise on 
the running of the latter. Finally, remembering that in those days the 
SNP fought only in specific constituencies, to offer guidance regarding 
the constituencies thought essential for contesting. 
These proposals were adopted, and the EC evolved into an important 
and prestigous forum composed of the most senior members of the Party. 
The first full set of data we found for this committee was for 
1965. Its membership then was: Dr. Robert McIntyre, Dr. James Lees, 
Douglas Drysdale, Ian Macdonald, Gordon Wilson, William Wolfe, Alan 
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Niven, Arthur Donaldson 1 and R. Reid-Patrick. 
Thus the Connnittee was highly elitist, at least in so far as it 
was dominated not only be NEC members, but even more circumscribed than 
that; by the Party's most senior elected members. Its Convener was 
chosen by the NEC and and in his turn he chose the members of the 
Connnittee. This right of the convener to choose the membership of the 
Connnittee was connnon to all of the connnittees we shallbe looking at. 
It clearly gave to the conveners very considerable power. It may even 
have served to reinforce the elitist nature of the administrative 
connnittee of the Party. Certainly if one looks at the make-up of the 
committees such a conclusion seems justified. 
The EC membership was small in number and rarely varied through 
the years: Dr. R. McIntyre, William Wolfe, David Rollo, and from 1970 
onwards, Winifred Ewing, were its most regular members and/or attenders. 
These names, of course, largely correspond to those having received the 
highest score on the NEC Continuity Table. 
The Connnittee developed into a forum which appeared to take some 
of the most critical decisions about the contesting and conduct of 
elections, as well as the endorsement of candidates for constituencies. 
In order to demonstrate not only the exclusiveness but also the 
regularity of the names appearing on the EC, we have chosen a 
selection of its meetings from 1967 to 1974, the period for which we 
have the most complete data, to determine the regular constituent 
profile of the group; the names of the committee's members, together 
with the dates of its meetings, are listed down and along two axes. 
Table 5 Election COJinnittee, Membershin:rvtake..:.Up. 1967-1974 -~~ 
Jan '67 Dec'67 Jul'68 Oct'68 Apr'69 Dec'69 Feb '70 Jan'71 Dec '71 Mar'n Jun'73 Jun'74 
A. Donaldson X X X X X X 
D.Drysdale X X 
Dr.J.Lees X X X X X 
Dr.R.McIntyre X X X X X X X X X X X 
W.Wolfe X X X X X 
G.Wilson X X 
G.Leslie X 
t.n W. Ewing X X X X 
,..., 
N H.Watt X X X 
J.Halliday X 
M.Bain X 
M. Gibson X 
I.Macdonald X 
H.Davidson X 
R.Hall X 
D.Rollo X X X X X X X X 
'I 
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At the outset one observation must be made regarding the above 
table. It must be borne in mind that this is a random (data is 
available for 15 meetings. Thus, the dates listed represent over two-
thirds of extant material) selection of the ECls meetings over a seven 
year period. Therefore individuals who were members of this committee 
may have been absent from a particular meeting although their membership 
remained intact. With this caveat in mind what conclusions might we 
draw from this table? 
The Core Persistence we pointed to as being a feature of the NEC 
throughout the period, 1964 to 1974, is reinforced when we examine the 
EC. Secondly, several of the people given as pre-eminent on the NEC, 
in terms of representation through time, continue to be found on the 
EC. Third, over the eight years looked at, only 16 names are listed 
as being on the committee with continued membership and/or attendance 
effectively restricted to David Rollo, William Wolfe and Dr. Robert 
McIntyre. Finally, although the latter group endured over the eight 
years, one can really divide the period in two; 1967-1970, and 1971-
1974. Dr. James Lees and Arthur Donaldson would join David Rollo, 
William Wolfe and Dr. McIntyre in the first period, but drop in the 
second to be replaced by Hamish Watt and Winifred Ewing. But in every 
case meillbership of the Committee was paralleled by membership of the 
NEC. Moreover, and this is striking, in 81.1 per cent of the cases, 
membership of the Committee corresponded to officially-held posts 
within the Party. Only H. Watt, H. Davidson and M. Bain did not hold 
senior elected posts within the Party whilst being members of the EC. 
One can see immediately the power and prestige of this forum. 
Not only were most of its members long servers, but they were also 
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senior figures within the Party. When it brought recommendations 
along to the National Executive they would have added weight and 
influence as a consequence of their source. Furthermore, around 20 
per cent of the NEC, at anyone time, were also members of the EC, 
thus they had already had a sizeable voting bloc on their side. 
The next committee to be analysed is the Electoral Planning 
Committee (we shall outline the distinctions between the EPC and the 
EC presently). This Committee was of a more recent vintage, being 
set-up in April 1967. Whilst it was less elitist than the EC (the 
conveners still selected the membership) nonetheless even it remained 
a fairly exclusive gathering. 
The Electoral Planning Committee. Established in 1967, the purposes 
of the Committee were set out in a memo from Dr. J. Lees, then Vice-
Chairman for Organisation, in April 1967 (13): 
It will deal only with the mechanics of elections, 
but will expect guidance on policy, finance etc. from 
the National Executive Committee. 
In fact, its remit was to plan for General Elections. It differed 
from the EC in that the latter became more and more preoccupied with 
the vetting of candidates for placement on the Party's list of 
prospective parliamentary candidates, and the adjudication of disputes 
between candidates and constituencies. Whereas the EPC was interested 
in the logistics of fighting General Elections, for example, the 
raising of cash and the printing of manifestos, etc. 
The initial members of the Committee were: Dr. James Lees, 
Douglas Henderson, George Leslie, W. Lindsay, Dr. R. McIntyre, James 
McGinley, A. Niven, H. Skinner, Gordon Wilson, W. Valentine, A.H. 
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Young. Of this group six of the 11 (or 54.5 per cent) were NEC members 
in 1967 (the actual numbers on the committee varied from time to time 
as the convener invited individuals to attend). 
Whilst this still appears to be rather exclusive, nonetheless 
at that stage of its life it was still more 'open' than the EC. 
However, through time it also came to be a thoroughly elitist body. 
Here again the convener chose the membership as he thought fit. 
Another feature of it in this germinal stage was that it did not 
register a marked degree of interlocking membership with the EC; 
only two of its 11 members (18.1 per cent) were, in 1977, also members 
of that other Committee. 
By July 1974 the EPC was made up of Ian Macdonald, Douglas Crawford, 
Rosemary Hall, Chrissie MCWhirter, Stephen Maxwell and Muriel Gibson, 
all of whom were NEC members. 
The following Table contains the names of the members and the 
dates of the meetings for the period between December 1967 and July 
1974. 
Table 6 (14) * The Electoral Planning Committee, ~~IDbershiE Make-Up, 1967-1974. 
C*The data available did not allow us to include accounts of 
either names or dates for the period between August 1969 and 
January 1971). 
Membership Dec'67 Aug'68 Dec'68 Mar'69 Aug '69 Jan'71 Apr'72 Oct '73 Apr'74 Jul'74 
T.McA1pine X 
Dr.J.Lees X X X X X 
J.McAteer X X X X 
Dr .R.McIntyre X 
R.Ha11 X X X X X X X 
D.Henderson X X X X X 
Q) I.:Murray X ,....., 
N 
I.Macdona1d X X X X X X X X X 
K.Bovey X 
A.Niven X 
A.M:Kinney X 
W.Lindsay X 
M.Glbson X X X X 
F.Mc"Master X 
G.Wilson X X X X 
Mrs 0 Hamton X 
A.Ewmg X X X 
~.Maxwell .x. 
o 
N 
N 
Membershlp Dec'b7 Aug'b8 Dec'b8 Mar'b9 Aug'b9 Jan'/l Apr' /2 Oct' /3 Apr'/4 JUl'/4 
C.McWhirter X 
A.Yotl.Tlg X X 
D.RolIo .x. X 
P.Craigle X 
H.McDonald X X 
S.MacIntosh X .x. X X 
At flrst glance through their numbers are small - one notices that the EPc had more non-NEC members than the EC. 
However, of the 24 names listed only seven were not NbC members, and of these, five appear to nave attended only 
one meeting of the Committee. Tney were: 1. "Murray, K. Bovey, A. Niven, MrS. Barnton and F. McMaster. 
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If the Table is at all representative of the usual attendance 
(and we have no reason to belleve otherwise), then we can fairly 
conclude that the NEC memoers were much ill tne majority numerically -
and more than likely dominant in influence terms - for example, at 
the best attended meeting, October 1973 (15), five of the 11 were 
Party office-holders, and a further three were NEC members. 54.5 
per cent of the meetings actually had. a majority of senior office-
holders in attendance. 
This Committee did not rival in influence the EC. After all, the 
latter had a very considerable voice in the endorsement and placement 
of prospective candidates. This state of affairs seems to be reflected 
in the more sporadic attendance of members at its meetings. 
However, the EPC appears to share with the EC a tendency to 
divide into two distinct periods: 1967 to 1969, and 1971 to 1974. 
Between 1967 and 1969 the most regular attenders were: Dr. J. 
Lees, Gordon Wilson, D. Henderson, Ian Macdonald and Sheila MacIntosh 
(a non-Executive member). But in the second period one finds that 
Rosemary Hall, Ian Macdonald? and to a lesser extent, MUriel Gibson 
and John McAteer (the National Organiser), were the most prolific 
attenders. 
Thus in both periods for which we have data the most senior 
members of the Party had a considerable presence on this Committee. 
And indeed, in terms of numbers related to regular attendance, could 
be said to have been dominant. Here then is some evidence of Core 
Persistence through time: Lees, Wilson, Henderson, Hall, Macdonald, 
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Gibson, and McAteer were all members of the NEC as well as regular 
attenders at the EPC. 
The next committee to be analysed will be the General Business 
Committee. 
The General Business Committee. The establishment of a GBC was first 
recommended in a memo (16) from Gordon Wilson to the NEC in 1967 (see 
the Chapter on Finance for the origins and motives behind the creation 
of this Committee). He suggested that the GBC embrace two existing 
committees, Finance and Administration. 
The first meeting of the GBC was December 1967. Its remit was 
broad, covering, as it did, administration, investment and staffing, 
etc. The Finance Committee continued to operate but its functions 
were relegated to devising schemes for fund-raising. Consequently it 
was a Committee of little strategic importance. 
Gordon Wilson noted in his Report on Organisation (17) in 1963, 
that the Finance Committee 
which should be the cornerstone of our finances is 
moribund. It has no convener and no members. 
However, he was in no doubt as to the potential value and worth of the 
Committee: 
••• I believe it to be a real and vital necessity for the 
Committee to be rekindled with enthusiastic personnel. (18) 
In the end the~GBC was to evolve into the real management committee 
of the Party. It became a body which boasted the most senior personnel 
of the SNP as its members. It dealt with every area of business central 
to the efficient functioning of the Party (its convener was chosen by 
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the NEC, and he chose the other Committee members). 
At its first meeting held on December 1967, the following people 
attended: Gordon Wilson, Dr. Robert McIntyre, Arthur Donaldson, 
Muriel Gibson, Douglas Drysdale, George Gibson, .Angus :McGillvery 
" 
(an ex officio member), David Rollo and A. Lees. They were invited 
to attend by the Committee's Convener, Douglas Drysdale. 
Once again we shall construct a Table listing the dates and 
attenders at GBC meetings. These will be placed along horizontal 
and vertical axes, in order to establish composition and evidence of 
Core Persistence. 
The caveat given for Table 4 also applies to the following Table. 
That is, there were people who were members of this Committee during 
the six years between 1968 and 1974 whose names are missing from the 
list given above. This is simply because the dates given are the only 
ones for which we could locate complete minutes. However, as with 
the above, we have no reason to suppose that this has, in any way, 
diminished the representativeness of the data. 
Table 7 The General Business Committee Membership Make-Un, 1967-1974 
Jan' 68 Nov'69 Dec' 70 Mar' 71 June '71 }.1ar' n Jul'n Apr'73 Nov'73 Aug' 74 
D.Drysdale X 
M.Gibson X X X X X 
G.Gibson X 
D.RolIo X X X X X X X 
G.Wilson X X 
J.C1oag X 
D.Henderson X X X X X X X 
I.},1acdona1d X X X X X X X 
<::::t A.MacGill very X N 
N H.Davidson X X X X 
M.Murgatroyd X X X X X X X X 
B.Cheetham X 
Dr.J .Lees X X X 
R.Hall X X 
C.McWhirter X 
T.McAlpine X X 
K.Bovey X 
W.McRae X 
M.Grieve X 
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Of the 19 names appearing on this Table, 18 were NEC members, 
and 10 were senior Party figures (they held senior elected office). 
The most regular at tenders were D. Rollo, D. Henderson, M. ~~rgatroyd, 
M. Gibson, H. Davidson and Dr. J. Lees. Therefore, features of Core 
Persistence are once again in evidence: R. Hall, D. Rollo, D. Henderson, 
I. Macdonald, M. Gibson and Dr. J. Lees have all figured prominently at 
one or both of the Committees we have previously looked at, and all 
held senior Party office. 
The importance of the GBC cannot be overemphasised. It 1~as from 
this forum that the ideas for investment and the approaches to 
businessmen, etc., were made, and it was this Committee which originated 
proposals for the raising of subscriptions and branch dues. Many of 
the resolutions which subsequently went forward to Council concerning 
financial and administrative matters, first saw the light of day in 
the GEC. For example, the series of increases in dues which went 
through in 1972 were a consequence of recommendations made in the 
GBC. Similarly, when measures for financial stringency were required 
it was the GBC which was responsible for their implementation. 
The GBC had the advantage over other committees, even including 
quasi-administrative committees like the EPC and EC, in that it was 
almost utterly non-political, being a management and administrative 
forum. Therefore, its recommendations were likely to be treated by 
the NEC as a whole as a management concern rather than merely 
positioning. MOreover, its members were regarded as having certain 
skills in matters of administration. Such a view is reinforced when 
one looks at the composition of the Committee. For example, at the 
August meeting of 1974, six of the seven at tenders had experience 
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directly relevant to membership of the Committee: D. Rollo had 
been a long-serving Treasurer of the Party; Ian Macdonald had been 
the Party's National Organiser for seven years; Michael ~rgatroyd 
was a Chartered Accountant, and was the then serving Party Treasurer; 
Rosemary Hall, then National Secretary, had been the Party's office 
manager for several years; finally, William McRae was the Party's 
lawyer. 
The combined weight of this full-time and part-time administrative 
experience gave to the GBC a profile which encouraged belief in its 
purely functional role, and meant that the NEC would be more willing 
to accept its conclusions and recommendations. 
This Committee bears evidence, yet again, to the domination of 
certain strategic committees by senior Party figures, and more 
specifically by particular members of that body. We shall analyse this 
phenomenon, at greater length, below. 
J!1e Org~isation Committee. Like so many other committees within 
the SNP the OC was found to be moribund when Wilson examined the 
Party's organisation in 1963. Of this Committee he wrote: 
It should go without saying that this committee should be 
re-activated without delay. I see no clash with the Election 
Committee, and the National Organiser should be the servant 
of both. (19) 
He went on to summarise the remit of the Committee in a typically 
succinct fashion: 
... it should be concerned with the organisation of old and 
new branches from the viewpoint of efficient running. (20) 
Its other duties were to include the promotion of membership 
drives, the keeping of records regarding branches and their members, 
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the selection of constituencies where conditions were suitaoe for the 
SNP to create new branches and contest elections, and the periodic 
reporting to the NEC about the state of health of the Party at large. (21) 
Members of the OC like the other committees, were chosen by the 
Convener of the Committee. But this committee had many fewer Party 
notables as members than the other committees looked at. 
There are several reasons for this: the existence of a full-time 
National Organiser meant that much of the actual day-to-day decision-
taking could be made by him (there was no other equivalent bureaucrat 
serving the other committees). Secondly, for many years membership 
of the Committee was partly on an area basis with members being 
invited from throughout Scotland. This had the effect of making 
membership not ally large but also diverse; it was very uncommon to 
have the same group in attendance at each month's meeting. There was 
no limit to the size of the Committee, and it varied at every meeting. 
All of this served to depress the Committee as an important innovation 
and decision-making source (see below for remarks about important of 
size). 
Whatever the precise reason, the OC was by no means as influential 
within the Party machine as the other Committees we have examined. 
However, we include it in this analysis for two main reasons: it was, 
after all, a management committee, and secondly, because we still 
deem it important to determine if there was any evidence of Core 
Persistence, even on this Committee. In order to facilitate this, 
the method of analysis was as follows. 24 r:ommi ttee meetings, 
starting in May 1965, and running through until April 1974, were looked 
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at with 'three cbjectives :in m:ind: (1) to establish the size of NEC 
representation on the Committee; (2) the number of Party office-
holders who were members of it; and (3) to find evidence of Core 
Persistence. 
Only two NEC members appear to have had consistent representation 
on the OC on a permanent basis: Dr. J. Lees, who was a member from 
1966 until 1972, and Ian Macdonald, first an an employee and then as 
an elected office-bearer, from 1965 until 1974. (22) 
Given this data there is no justification for claiming that there 
is evidence of substantial Core Persistence of NEC members. 
Table 8 % NEC Representation_on O~ganisation Committee, 1965-1974* 
1965 May Aug Nov 29.4 42.6 54.6 
1966 Feb Oct 66.6 55.5 
1967 Feb Apr Dec 40 40 10 
1968 Jan Aug Oct 23.1 30 22.2 
1969 Jan 25 
1970 Jan Mar Apr July Aug 13.4 13.4 22.2 28.4 25 
1971 Aug Nov 50 40 
1972 Feb Nov 33.3 25 
1973 Apr June 33.3 37.4 
1974 Apr 20 
* The two years for which we have only one date is a result of 
the unavailability of data. 
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As we can see, NEC representation was exceedingly erratic (there 
was no obvious reason for this), varying from 66.6 per cent in February 
1966, to 10 per cent in December 1967. What is equally apparent is that 
the NEC dominance - so obvious in other committees - is not nearly so 
marked on the OC. Only in 1966 would it appear that NEC members were 
in a majority on the Committee (and that may only be a consequence of 
the data available to us). Nor is there any discernable pattern of 
peaks and troughs, although 1970 and 1974 were, for some reason, 
particularly bad years for NEC representation. 
Nevertheless, whilst the NEC did not have anything like the 
numerical dominance on this committee that it had on the other 
management committees, neither was its representation insignificant. 
If we take an average of NEC representation from the years given in 
Table 7, then we can see that the Executiw's presence was not 
insubstantial. 
Table 9 % Annual Average ~epresentation of NEC Members, Organisation Comm.* 
1965 
42.2 
1966 
61.05 
1967 
30 
1968 1969 
25.1 25 
1970 
20.5 
1971 
45 
1972 
29.1 
1973 
35.3 
1974 
20 
* The months used do not represent the entire spectrim of Committee meetings, 
rather they were selected on the basis of available data. 
As we can see, 1970 and 1974 appear to have been the worst years 
for NEC representation, and yet even in the worst year there was still 
an Executive presence of some 20 per cent, an average 2 people out of 
around 9. Further, the Committee Chairman was on every occasion but 
one, a member of the NEC. 
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The final element to analyse was the size of the representation 
of the Party's office-bearers on the ac. This can be quickly dealt 
with. Only Dr. J. Lees, Ian Macdonald and James Braid of the office-
bearers had anything like regular attendance on the Committee, that is, 
were present at two or more of the meetings we examined. 
The composition of the OC is certainly not testimony to NEC 
dominance, personnel Core Persistence, nor significant senior office-
bearer presence. This Committee, therefore, cannot be said to 
contribute to the overall hypothesis of specific elite domination of 
the management committees. There were certainly too few senior Party 
figures on this Committee to allow us to speak of Core Persistence. 
The number of NEC representatives on any committee is, of course, 
no guarantee that the Executive members will dominate the proceedings 
of the committee in question. This caveat applies equally to the 
presence of senior elected members. However, at least some management 
theory leads one to believe that the NEC representatives, and 
especially the office-bearers, would have been in a strong position to 
influence decision-making - as well as other facets of the committee's 
work. This flows from the fact that the leaders in an organisation 
are usually attributed with possessing certain skills and qualities 
which set them above the mass: 
Increases in authority have been found in a number of 
investigations to increase with status as measured by 
rank or echelon. (23) 
or, again: 
Much related data and empirical evidence can be cited 
supporting the proposition that the higher status of a 
member the more successful will be his attemnts to lead 
others of low status. (24) . 
~-----
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The non-leaders defer to the leadership because the latter have 
qualities and talents which are necessary for the perceived achievement 
of the organisational goal. As we have seen, senior Party figures were 
dominant on the management committees. This dominance was based on 
institutional deference - the feeling among members that the leaders 
sat on management committees by virtue of skills and services to the 
Party, etc. This may explain why there was no objection to the manner 
in which the committees were formed, that is, by invitation of the 
convener. It would be interesting to know whether or not this 
acceptance of elite dominance was also a feature of the 'policy' 
committees. 
If we were to detect continuing NEC, and more specifically 
senior-officer, dominance on the Party's 'policy-making' committees, 
then this would fortify our contention that senior party figures were 
in a strong position to dominate the management committees. Because 
if the membership was prepared to have a strong leadership presence 
on the 'policy' committees - where their knowledge and interests might 
equal those of the leadership, then it is much easier to understand 
their willingness to have such dominance on the management committees, 
where specialist skills and service to the Party counted for much 
more. 
Our data covers one full year, 1967-1968, and it is broadly 
representative of the overall pattern of policy committee membership (25) 
throughout the period we are examining. The information is taken 
from lists of members submitted to the NEC in November 1967 (26). 
The committees scrutinised are as follows: the Economics and 
Information Department (as it was so grandly entitled), the Foreign 
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Affairs Committee, the Publicity Committee, the Education Committee, 
and, finally, the Conference Committee. 
The Economics and Information Department (General Committee). This had 
35 members, and of these some 20 per cent were on the NEC, with 17.5 per 
cent senior office-bearers. William Wolfe was the Convener. 
This Committee appears to .have been responsible for a great deal 
of the information flow concerning the relative economic position of 
Scotland within the Union. As such it was rather influential ~"ithin 
the Party's 'policy-making' circles, but the NEC members did not seem 
to display any particular expertise, rather they would appear to share 
a general interest with the other members. 
The Foreign Affairs Committee. This had 15 members, and of these 
73.5 per cent were NEC members, with 40 per cent senior-office holders. 
Its 'Director' was John Picken, and he was also a member of the NEC. 
The Publicity Committee. 24 members, of whom only one, James Braid, 
who was also its Convener, was on the NEC. 
The Education Committee. Out of 16 members, four, or 25 per cent, also 
sat on the Executive. John Gair, an Executive Vice-Chairman, was the 
Convener. 
The Conference Committee. This was responsible for setting the Agenda 
for annual Conference, and in this sense it might be regarded as 
potentially quite influential since it could determine which resolutions 
did, or did not, corne up for debate. Of seven members, three were 
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on the NEC. Another was a ful1~time employee of the Party, and two 
others were Party office-bearers. Therefore, only one member was not 
then currently on the NEC. Finally, its Convener was Gordon Wilson. 
Of the five committees looked at, two were completely dominated by 
NEC members, a further two had a siz able Executive representation 
(20 per cent or more), and the fifth, the Publtity Committee, had 
only one NEC representative. 
Senior office-bearers ranged from none on the Publtity Committee 
to 40 per cent on the Foreign Affairs Committee. 
With the possible exception of the Conference Committee these 
bodies had practically no management significance and this would 
appear to be reflected in (a) the presence of NEC members, and 
(b) senior Party figures. Even so we discovered a not insignificant 
penetration of these two groups on the 'policy' committees. 
We can best illustrate the extent of NEC dominance on both types 
of committees by using a continuum of representation with, at one end, 
100 per cent presence and, at the other, 0 per cent membership. 
Table 10 
Continuum of NEC Representation on Policy and Management Committees 
GBC CC FAC EPC OC EflJC E C PC EC con. 
1100 'I 90 I' 80 170 I (jJ 50 40 I:D 1 JJ 10 1 0 I 
(Key overleaf) 
Key to Table 9 
EC, Election Committee 
GBC, General Business Committee 
CC, Conference Committee 
FAC, Foreign Affairs Committee 
EPC, Electoral Planning Committee 
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OC, Organisation Committee 
Beon, Economics Committee 
Educ, Education Committee 
PC, Publicity Committee 
(Table 9 is only intended as being broadly illustrative of the extent 
of the NEC's presence on the various committees we have looked at in 
this chapter. The percentages arrived at are for different years, and 
in the case of the 'policy' committees are for one year only. Therefore, 
we do not claim that the Table is a precise statistical statement). 
The table indicates the dominance of the NEC (a) on the 
management committees, and (b) a not insubstantial presence on most 
of the 'policy' committees. Only one management committee fell into 
the bottom half of the continuum. In fact, five of the nine committees 
had memberships of ,vhich at least 60 per cent were also on the NEC. 
Two of the five 'policy' committees had NEC representation in excess 
of 60 per cent, and yet another had one-third Executive membership. 
There is little doubt that the Party's leaders spread their 
influence well beyond the management committees, and the fact that 
they had such a pronounced presence on 'policy' committees only served 
to reinforce their hold on the management forums since the members were 
less likely to be deferential about NEC members on 'policy' bodies than 
on their management equivalents. 
The next aspect of NEC dominance to be examined concerns the 
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turnover of personnel in the most senior posts of the Party. This is 
important for two reasons: if the SNP was an 'open-ended' structure 
then one might expect to find a fairly regular change of leaders as 
new people climbed the Party pyramid, and, secondly, Michels pointed 
to the dangers for party democracy of leaders who retain party posts 
for too long (27) The force of tradition is powerful indeed, at 
least when it comes to voting out of office long-serving members, and 
replacing them with younger people: 
The failure to re-elect a comrade who has assisted in 
the birth of the party, who has suffered with it many 
adversities, and had rendered it a thousand services, 
would be regarded as a cruelty and an action to be 
condemned. (28) 
One suspects that Michels may have been overstating his case, but he 
may be closer to the mark when he later comments: 
But wherever division of labour prevails, there is 
necessarily specialisation, and the specialists 
become indispensable. (29) 
He continues in the same vein later, when he writes: 
... it is indispensable that the official should rem~in 
in office for a considerable time, so that he may 
familiarise himself with the work he has to do, may 
gain practical experience, for he cannot become a 
useful official until he has been given time to work 
himself into his new office. (30) 
Of course, long tenure in office need not endanger a democracy: 
if someone is continually re-e1ected to a post (as in the senior 
Party posts) presumably it is because people are satisfied with his 
performance. However, continual re-election can give the incumbent 
prestige and a concomitant power spin-off. Michels described it in the 
following way: 
There arises in the leaders a tendency to isolate 
themselves, to form a sort of cartel, and to surround 
themselves, as it were, with a wall, within which they 
will admit those only who are of their own way of 
thinking. (31) 
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In our view this overstates the case. The leaders of the SNP did 
not consciously seek to exclude from the leadership those who disagreed 
with them on certain organisational matters. For example, Dr. James 
Lees was an unequivocal decentraliser. Rather it was the force of 
circumstances which created centralising sympathies within the over-
whelming majority of the leadership. -But even this need not have led 
to the leadership actually choosing their successors - in the case of 
the SNP it certainly did not. However, it can lead to a certain 
divorce occuFing between leaders and led. The former's detachment 
encourages them in a belief that their duration in office, counled with 
their expertise, elevates them well above the rank-and-file and 
consequently entitled them to take decisions without mass consultation. 
In short there evolves a leadership class. 
In this section we shall analyse the length of tenure, starting 
in 1963 (full data begins then) and running through until 1974, of the 
senior officers of the Party. These are elected annually at the Party's 
Conference. 
President only one incumbent, Dr. Robert McIntyre. 
Chairman. Arthur Donaldson, and then William Wolfe, held this post 
during the years which interest us. Wolfe replaced Donaldson in 1969. 
Senior Vice-Chairmen. 1964 W.A. Milne 
1965" " 
1966 William Wolfe 
1967 " " 
1968 " " 
1969 George Leslie 
1970 Douglas Henderson 
1971" " 
1972" " 
1973 Gordon Wilson 
1974 Margo MacDonald 
On the face of it there seems to have been a regular turnover of 
incumbents in this post, six in 11 years. However, this must be seen 
against the entire backcloth of personnel turnover in senior office-
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bearer positions, that is, a great deal of job interchange was going 
on during this period with large numbers of (the same) people giving 
up one job and replacing it with another job in the leadership. 
Executive Vice~Chairmen. Following upon the VJilson Report these 
posts carried real management responsibility. The reference to job 
interchange given above becomes clearer when we look at these posts: 
D. Henderson, William Wolfe, George Leslie, W.A. Milne, Gordon Wilson, 
and Margo MacDonald all held Executive Vice-Chairmanship posts as well 
as, on other occasions, holding different senior Party offices (each 
del~gate to Conference is allowed the same number of votes as there 
are offices to fill). 
1963 William Wolfe, W.A. Milne 
1964 
1965 
" 
" 
" 
" 
1966 Dr. J. Lees, 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
" " 
" " 
" " 
G. Murray, 
" 
II 
Douglas Drysdale 
" " 
" " John Gair, James Braid 
11 
" " " " " 
G. Leslie, Douglas Henderson, " " 
M. Grieve, " " Hugh MacDonald 
" 
11 Ian Macdonald, 11 " 
" 
11 II 
" " " 
1972 Isobel Lindsay, !1 " Gordon Wilson, Margo MacDonald 
1973 " " " " Torn McAlpine, " " 
1974 A. Donaldson, " " " " Douglas Crawford 
Eighteen different individuals filled the post of Executive Vice-
Chairmen in the 12 full years between 196~ and 1974, this was out of 
a possible 42 (theoretical) placeso 
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National Secretary. As we have seen, this was an important management 
post, and a potentially critical one in terms of internal Party power. 
The main feature of the 12 years in question, so far as this office was 
concerned, was the lengthy tenure of Gordon Wilson. The incumbents for 
the period 1963 to 1974 were are follows: 
1963 Malcolm Shaw 
1964-1970 Gordon Wilson 
1971 Muriel Gibson 
1972-1974 Rosemary Hall 
In the twelve full years between 1963 and 1974, four people filled 
the office of National Secretary. But for 59 per cent of the time, one 
man, Gordon Wilson, held the post. Mbreover, he held it during the 
most climactic years - terms of organisational growth - in the Party's 
history. This gave to Wilson quite enormous personal prestige, respect 
and, one suspects, power. What is clear is that he used the office to 
institute some very important management innovations. 
National Treasurer. The following persons held the post of National 
Treasurer between 1963 and 1974: 
1963-1965 David Rollo 
1966 James Cook 
1967 George Gibson 
1968-1969 Joseph Cloag 
1970- Michael Murgatroyd 
Over the 12 full years between 1963 to 1974, five people held this 
post. But for 42 per cent of the time, one man, Michael Murgatroyd was 
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the incumbent. 
Out of all of the senior Party offices analysed here (32) there 
was a possible personnel turnover of 102, that is, the potential number 
of people who could have held these posts if there had been a 100 per 
cent change in incumbents every year. However, only 27 different 
individuals actually held office. This represented 26 per cent of 
the total. 
We consider this figure to be remarkably low. But in order to 
put it into some kind of perspective, we shall compare the Labour 
Party's NEC with that of the SNP in terms of a Continuity Index. The 
Executive of the Labour Party is chosen because of the difficulties 
implicit in establishing suitable parallels between so called 'party 
leaders'. For example, the Leader of the Labour Party is the 
Parliamentary Leader, whilst the 'leader' of the SNP is the Party 
Chairman. MOreover; both are elected by different constituencies 
and face different pressures as a consequence. 
However, the Chairmanship of the Labour Party must change 
annually, and its significance is both politically and administratively 
less consequential than that of the Chairmanship of the SNP. The 
latter is open to election annually but need not change, indeed rarely 
does. 
Other leadership positions within the Labour Party likewise tend 
to be concentrated within the Parliamentary Party rather than in 
Transport House. Given the absence, within the SNP, of suth a grouping 
(that is, between 1963 and 1974) we must seek to establish a more 
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legitimate forum for comparison. Now, since we are concerned with 
administrative power; that is, the power utilised in internal 
organisational matters, it seems more reasonable that we compare the 
major management bodies of both parties; their respective Executive 
Committees (both Executives are elected annually by party delegates). 
The more so since all organisational topics within the Labour Party 
come under the remit of the NEC. 
It is with these distinctions in mind that we now undertake this 
brief comparison of Core Persistence among the Executive Committees of 
the Labour and Scottish National parties. 
According to MCKenzie (33) the Labour Executive has two broad 
functions; supervising the Party's work outside Parliament and 
reporting on its activities to Conference. This also involves ensuring 
that all officers and members of the Party conform to the Constitution 
and Standing Orders. In the extreme this can mean expulsion or 
disaffiliation of an organisation and/or individuals. In the context 
of this thesis it is interesting to note that: 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the whole history of 
NEC disciplinary action ... has been this: in almost every 
case the action of the NEC has been overwhelmingly approved 
by the subsequent annual conference .. , The NEC can almost 
invariably depend upon the Conference to sustain its action. (34) 
It would appear that the experience of the SNP's NEC was duplicated 
elsewhere. But of even greater significance for our purposes, are the 
observations made by McKenzie regarding the duration of membership by 
certain individuals on the Labour NEC (35) He believes that any 
discussion of the Labour NEC must 'include some reference to the 
striking continuity (my italics) of its membership'. 
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He goes on to give figures for the NEC elections for the period 
between 1900 and 1953, noting that 1,125 places had to be filled, he 
found that 199 people filled these places, and of these, 21 per cent 
were on the Executive for ten years or longer. Whilst observing that 
these figures do not necessarily mean that this led to oligarchical 
control of the Executive, nevertheless: 
there was never in the course of NEC elections a sudden or 
dramatic transformation in the membership of the Executive. 
A hard core of members who enjoyed the confidence of the 
Party retained office for long periods and thereby helped 
to ensure continuity of policy. (36) 
There is clear evidence therefore, that the Labour NEC displayed 
striking Core Continuity over the period McKenzie analysed. In order 
to compare this continuity with the SNP over the period 1964 to 1974, 
we examined the composition of the Labour Executive over these same 
years. 
We discovered (37) that whilst it remained 'striking' it did not 
equal that of the SNP's Executive: 17.8 per cent of those who sat on 
the Labour Executive between 1964 and 1974, served for ten years of 
longer. This compared with 34.7 per cent for the SNP. Over the other 
period examined for the SNP, 1967 to 1974, we found that 33.3 per 
cent of the SNP NEC served continuously, whilst 27.5 per cent of the 
Labour Executive did so. 
These figures suggest that the power of the SNP Executive, as 
measured by the duration in office of certain individuals, is 
considerable 0 Unlike the Labour Party there was no alternative power 
centre. William Wolfe was quite clear about this when he said: 
Until we had the seven "MPs elected there was just one 
leadership 0 There was no division within the leadership 0 
(My italics) (38) 
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And whilst there was considerable continuity in both Party Executives, 
it is important to remember that with the SNP the continuity was 
amongst those very clearly identified as the Party leaders. This was 
just as true in the political as much as in the administrative sense. 
Only Harold Wilson, James Callaghan and Tony Benn, of those who were 
members of the NEC for the full period, were obvious Party leaders. 
This compares with seven out of eight on the SNP NEC, over the same 
number of years, who were all obviously identified as Party leaders 
in that they all held senior elected office. In percentage terms this 
was 10.3 per cent in the case of the Labour Party, and 29 per cent 
for the SNP. 
Senior office-bearers are, as we indicated above, much more 
difficult to compare. In the years between 1964 and 1974, the Labour 
Party had one Leader, 10 Chairmen and three Treasurers. The SNP had 
two Chairmen (who also functioned as Party leaders) and five Treasurers. 
Therefore both parties appeared to show considerable continuity 
in this regard. But it is really in the dominance of crucial 
management sub-committees that we see the strength of the leadership 
group within the SNP: 
Many committees exercise power beyond the limits implied to 
their legitimate organisational role. Even 1~hen they are 
supposed to be only advisory groups, they initiate action 
in other organisational units by virtue of their expertise, their 
control of communication, and perhaps merely by default. (39) 
Examples of this abound within the SNP: the creation of the National 
Assembly, the EPC and GBC, the many instances when the decisions taken 
to increase branch dues and exact penalties for those not meeting the 
increased payment, the hiring, placement and subsequent firing of the 
'regional organisers', or the co-option of Douglas Drysdale onto the 
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NEC, and the investment policies of the Party) etc.) were all 
initiated by senior members of the NEC. 
As we have said above, the NEC) for the most part, was dealing 
with matters which had already been discussed in sub-committees, and 
as we have already seen) the most important of these were dominated 
by the most senior figures of the Party. The most critical management 
committees were likewise dominated by this group, for example, the 
GBC, the EPC and the EC. These committees also had one other 
predominant feature; smallness of size. 
It is interesting to note that the problem of committee size 
is overcome in government, and probably business as ,~ell, by 
the use of sub-committees and executive committees. The 
larger committees seem to be more collection of sub-groups 
than truly integrated operating units. In such cases, the 
size of the sub-committees is probably a more significant 
statistic. (40) 
Filley and House (41) suggest that classical organisation theory argues 
that the typical committee is, and should be, small; for example, 
around five or six members. MOreover, surveys tend to suggest that 
this is borne out in practice. It was in the case of the SNP 
Executive's sub-committees: attendance at the EPC averaged around 
seven members, attendance at the EC was approximately four, at the 
GBC usually six, whilst average attendance at the less important OC 
was nine. 
The Labour Party's sub-committee on Organisation had around 17 
members, and although this Committee always included very senior 
Party figures (defined as ~1inisters and ex-Ministers) they usually 
did not form a majority: the composition of the Organisation Committee, 
in common with the other sub-committees reflected: 
the same preponderance of MPs (and of Ministers and ex-Ministers) 
as has the NEC itself. (42) 
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Therefore, Ministers, or ex-Ministers) whilst a crucial Dart of 
this forum were not as dominant, in terms of representation, as were 
the senior elected members of the SNP on its management sub-committees. 
For example, in McKenzie's analysis of the Finance and General Purposes 
Committee (43) he found only one occasion when Ministers or ex-Ministers 
formed a majority on that body over a nine year period. In fact, on 
six occasions non-MPs formed a majority. 
The equivalent committee in the SNP was the GEC, and it contrasts 
markedly with its Labour Party opposite number in that it was totally 
composed of the most senior members of the Party. 
A comparison with the Labour Party and SNP NECs suggests a 
profile of strong Core ~ersistence of senior party figures in both. 
This was something MtKenzie had previously noted to be a striking 
characteristic of the Labour Party. Yet the fact is that it was a 
feature more evident in the SNP than in the Labour Party. 
Conclusion 
This chapter on management committees within the SNP points very 
firmly to two directions: 
(a) the NEC dominated three out of four management sub-committees 
and its presence was marked on a fourth. But more than this, we 
discovered that on two of the committees there was a majority of 
senior office-bearers, whilst on another, 41 per cent of the 
committee members were senior office-holders. 
(b) there is very clear evidence of Core Persistence, with 
certain individuals having not only interlocking membership and 
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holding senior office, but also fulfilling both of these roles 
through time. These individuals were: Dr. Robert McIntyre, 
Gordon Wilson, 1~illiam Wolfe, Ian Macdonald and David Rollo. 
This group was joined around 1970 by Douglas Henderson, Michael 
Murgatroyd, Rosemary Hall, Winifred Ewing and John MCAteer (an 
official), as senior office-holders and members of one or more 
management sub-committees, as well as constant NEC members. On 
top of this there were others who not only held senior office, 
but had interlocking membership of several committees as well. 
For example, between 1964 and 1969, Dr. James Lees, Douglas 
Drysdale and James Braid. There were several others who came to 
the fore a little later, around 1971-1972, these included Margo 
MacDonald, Tom McAlpine and Isobel Lindsay. 
Although there is an element of arbitrariness in using round 
figures in an attempt to quantify the dominant group, it is still worth 
doing if we are to meet the definition given by Dahl. Therefore, we 
would suggest that somewhere around 15 persons were in dominant 
management positions for all, or a large part, of the period under 
investigation, and this is reflected in the fact that almost 35 per 
cent of the NEC in 1974 had been continuous members since 1964 (or 
longer); and of this group 62.5 per cent had held senior office for 
the duration. The 15 (17 if we include Donaldson, who lost the 
Chairmanship in 1969 - though he did serve for one year as Vice-
Chairman in 1974, and John M:Ateer, who was paid official) can be said 
to be representative of Dahl's ruling elite. 
We believe the evidence presented in this chapter is sufficiently 
strong to allow us to give an affirmative response to Dahl in his demands 
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for a 'well-defined group'. We do not suggest that they always agreed 
in sub-committee, or in the full NEC. However, whatever disagreements 
there may have been they do not appear to have been sufficiently 
powerful enough to elicit a resignation from amongst the group. 
Bearing in mind the data given in previous chapters concerning the 
source of innovation of management proposals - and their acceptance 
by the mass - we consider that this chapter adds further weight to our 
contention that a comparatively small group, which remained remarkably 
stable over time, was responsible for the guidance and control of the 
SNP's organisational direction, and, moreover, it can, retrospectively, 
be specifically delineated. 
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Chap~£.Nine 
Party Communication Channels and IrtternalPower 
In terms of information theory, unrestricted communication 
produces noise in the system. Without patterning, without 
pauses, without precision, there is sound but there is no 
music. Without structure, without spacing, without 
specifications, there is a Babel of tongues but there is 
no meaning. (1) 
This chapter deals with a process central to the meaningful 
functioning of any organisation, regardless of type: its communication 
system. But as the above quote suggests, the structural form which 
information flow takes is critical; without well-defined channels 
through which knowledge can flow, it is more than likely that chaos 
and system breakdown will ensue. It is in pursuit of an understanding 
of how these channels functioned within the SNP that we now concern 
ourselves. 
How were the advances in organisation between 1960 and 1974 
achieved? We have tried to demonstrate the structural/management 
techniques employed, the financial innovations and the Wilson Report, 
etc. But such changes had to be passed on to the activists in the 
field, and this could not have been easy. After all, the SNP was 
spatially diverse, spread unevenly across the country, its members 
did not meet in one, or even a handful of locations. But rather were 
found in hundreds of branches. These branches did not meet at the 
same time every month, indeed some did not meet at all. Even those 
which did meet monthly may have had irregular attendance. Despite 
this, the leadership managed to maintain, for the most part, a 
sufficient degree of system stability, in the sense of coordinating 
action and ensuring all parts and regions of the Party were kept in 
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touch with what was going in the Party as a whole. This stability 
helped the Party in its organisational and electoral growth. 
What can this tell us about the SNP's internal communications, 
and beyond that, what role did the leadership play in information 
coordination and dispersal? Were Party communications predominantly 
two-way, with equal degrees of data and instruction flowing from the 
branches to the centre and vice versa? Or did the leadership dominate 
in this sphere as in others? 
Given the generally-held view of the SNP as being 'open-ended', 
one would expect to find a communication system which was typified 
by a free flow of information both vertically and horizontally (2) 
and one in which branch activists used every structural means at 
their disposal to question, and/or advise the leadership of their 
feelings. Thus, although the centre would dominate the periphery 
in the sheet quantity of data it sent out, nevertheless, there 
would be a considerable flow in the opposite direction. 
We shall attempt to quantify these assumptions in the following 
chapter, but to begin with we shall outline what is known empirically 
about communications within organisations, and how best to relate this 
to our investigation into the operation of the information network 
within the SNP. 
Organisational Communications 
In the previous chapters we have observed how, as the organisation 
increased in size (as defined by membership growth) a structural 
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response based on increasing specialisation and a hierarchy of power 
occurred. This began with the employment of a full-time official, was 
accelerated by the Wilson Report, and continued throughout the 1960s. 
Such developments could have been forecast given what is already lcnown 
about organisational growth and the lenock-on effects which follow in 
the wake of the latter. Communications theory also leads one to expect 
a consequential growth in a formal communications network as the 
organisation expands: 
and, 
It seems that the necessity for a formalised 
communication network increases as the organisational 
membership increases (i.e. as sociological size 
increases). (3) 
As the organisational membership grows and the tasks 
performed become increasingly diversified and specialised 
communication is necessary to coordinate these various 
tasks with one another. (4) 
But why, one might ask, is it necessary to devise or evolve a 
highly structured communication system? The answer, of course, is to 
improve organisational effectiveness (perhaps even control by the 
leaders). Moreover, since this is closely tied to goal realisation 
it also improves the chances of the achievement of organisational 
goals (5) How else would one's members lenow what was expected of 
them? 
Communications are central to the proper functioning of the 
organisation, without them 'peripheral anarchy' would occur; people 
would be isolated and uncoordinated in their behaviour: 
formal communication networks are necessary for several 
reasons. Attainment of goals, interdepartmental coordination 
of work activities ... Ideally, adhering to the formal 
communication network prescribed by organisational leaders 
will have predictably favourable consequences for 
effectiveness. (6) 
252 
Such a planned, coordinated, strategy whilst vital in all large 
organisations is even more needful in a national political party; the 
latter is territorially polymorphic, and unlike even large corporations 
is not located in one, or several centres, but spread across the entire 
nation in multitudinous units. In such circumstances a coordinated 
approach to intelligence gathering regarding what is happening to the 
organisation, and the distribution of information from the centre, is 
of paramount necessity if goal realisation is to be achieved. 
What are the consequences for the organisation of such a formal 
communications network? 
For our purposes perhaps one of the most interesting is the support 
a communication network gives to the existing organisational structure 
and power hierarchy: 
The transmission of information to all points in an 
organisation is generally characterised as vertical 
and downward. The typical pattern is for persons in 
superior positions to dispense information to subordinate 
personnel, usually under their direct control in the 
hierarchy of power. (7) 
Formal communication and power hierarchy are intimately related; 
unrestricted and uncoordinated information flow would have a negative 
impact upon the organisation, rurnour would replace fact, random 
communication could easily distort the intention of leaders and led, 
and give rise to uncertainty - as the quote given at the start of this 
chapter argues. There is then the necessity of system constraint 
and direction: 
To move from an unorganised state to an organised state 
requires the introduction of constraints and restrictions 
to reduce diffuse and random communication to channels 
appropriate for the accomplishment of organisational 
objectives. (8) 
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It is only through a communication network that managers can 
operationalise basic organisational programmes. According to Blau and 
Scott (9) research by Leavitt showed that a centralised communication 
network (10) contributes to effective coordination. Experimental 
evidence strengthens this view: 
hierarchical organisation serves important functions for 
achieving coordination and that it does so specifically by 
restricting the free flow of communication. (11) 
It is because a hierarchy restricts the free flow of communication that 
it improves coordination. Moreover, if a hierarchy did not exist it 
would appear that informal communication would create one: 
even if there were no formal hierarchy in the organisation, 
communication among peers would be likely to give rise 
to informal differentiation of status, which also creates 
obstacles to communication. (12) 
A coordinated communications' network is an integral part of the 
managerial structure, without one an organisation would find it impossible 
to properly function. However, communication is, by definition, a 
plural process, it involves a network of individuals. Moreover, to be 
effective it must carry cultural meaning so that each individual can 
understand the context and the intention of the message, in order that 
there will be a probability of a predictable response - though this 
need not be a positive one: 
Communication experts tell us that effective communication 
is the result of a common understanding between the 
communicator and the receiver. (13) 
In all organisations communication may be seen to occur vertically 
(in both directions), and horizontally (across institutional and/or 
specialist divisions). Yet this need not mean either an equal and 
balanced flow, and/or an acceptance of the need for a two-way response. 
However, there seems little doubt that the predominant form of intra-
organisational communication is of a vertically downward type. At 
least one investigation (14) has shown that the necessity for upward 
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communication is high only when superior and subordinate roles are 
differentiated so that the superior is divorced from the day-to-day 
operating problems of the subordinates. 
We shall return to the relevance of this for the SNP later; in 
the meantime we will continue to examine the important subject of 
vertical information flow. 
Downward vertical communication is generally of five types: (15) 
1. Task directives. These amount to job instructions. 
2. Information designed to produce an understanding of the task and 
its relationship to other organisational tasks. 
3. Information about organisational procedures and practices. 
4. Feedback to subordinates about their performance. 
5. Information of an ideological character to inculcate a sense of 
mission. 
Numbers 1, 3, 4 and 5 have an immediate relevance for our study, and 
we shall return to these categories in the conclusion of this section (16) 
As we shall see, most of the information flow within the SNP was 
characterised by a vertically downward pattern. However, this should 
not be seen as surprising; on the contrary, it is in line with the 
evidence of other studies. Central to this downward flow is trust; 
the receiver believes that those higher in the organisational pyramid 
are motivated by a desire to improve the effectiveness of the 
organisation, and the issuance of orders is in line with this drive. 
According to communication experts, effective, viable communication 
is the result of 'a common understanding between the communicator and 
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the receiver' (17) One cannot overestimate the importance of empathy 
(Weber's Verstehen) and trust for an effective flow of communications 
within an organisation. Information networks are greatly aided by a 
common bond between leaders and led: 
Source credibility is the trust, confidence and faith the 
receiver has in the words and actions of the communicator. 
The level of credibility that the receiver assigns to the 
communicator in turn directly affects how the receiver 
views and reacts to words, ideas, and action of the 
communicator. (18) 
Such is the importance of 'trust' that, in itself, it can be sufficient 
to overcome problems of comprehension and/or relevance, which the 
members/workforce may have with a particular directive. Downward 
vertical flow is thus facilitated by such confidence: 
A partial substitute for translation is the ability of 
some leaders to develop confidence and liking for 
themselves as personalities among the rank-and-file. 
Their position on a pOlicy issue will be accepted not 
because it is understood, but because people trust them 
and love them. This is more characteristic of political 
leadership than leadership in non-political organisations. (19) 
In order to understand the operation of the communication system 
within the SNP we shall now illustrate the basic models of information 
flow. 
The first, and theoretical, model is called the All Channel 
Network. Theoretically, the NEC/senior officers could have written 
to the entire membership, but for obvious financial and logistical 
reasons this never happened. Therefore, direct leader/led communication 
is an ideal-type situation never instituted in reality. 
Modell 
NEC (Senior Officers/Staff) 
1 
Party Members 
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In practice, communication was effected through the medium of branch 
secretaries whose duty it was to circulate information and instructions, 
etc., to the activists and ordinary members. 
Model 2 
NEC (Senior Officers/Staff) NEC (Senior Officer/Staff) 
~ 1 
Branch Secretaries Constituency Assoc. 
Secretaries 
Model 2 was the most common form of downward information flow. Strictly 
speaking, it was the Executive Vice-Chairmen, National Secretary and 
staff who, in communication with the local secretaries, dominated the 
information network. 
Model 3 Model 4 
Senior Officers/Staff Senior Officer/Staff 
1 l 
Conference Delegates Council Delegates 
Model 3 was the communication form which occurred at the Party's 
annual conference (N.B. we are concerned here with organisational 
meetings of the Party's National CouncilJ Both types took a written 
form but with considerable additional verbal information. Each 
officer was given approximately ten minutes to speak to his report. 
This contrasted with the two minutes allocated to the individual 
delegates. However, given the fact that the delegates could, within 
distinct time limits and depending upon the number of delegates who 
wanted to ask a question, interrogate the Officers/staff, there is some 
grounds for suggesting that Models 3 and 4 were two-way networks. 
Two other forms of downward communication were the Party's 
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newspaper (although this was not the official voice of the leadership), 
the Scots Independent, and media appearances. Yet neither of these 
should be regarded as major conduits for the dissemination of 
information about the organisation. However, it seems likely that 
regular media appearances would have boosted the personal standing of 
senior Party figures. 
If downward vertical flow was the most common form of intra-
organisational communication, it was not the only one. There must 
have been some degree of upward contact. Yet this is difficult to 
achieve. 
An effective organisation needs upward communication as much 
as it needs downward communication '0' effective upward 
communication is difficult to achieve, especially in larger 
organisations. However, successful upward communication is 
often necessary for sound decision-making. (10) 
Effective communication, in whatever direction, is more likely 
if there are not too many intervening channels between communicator 
and receiver. MOreover, achievement of goals is eased if the number 
of links in the network are minimised. 
A related aspect of communication systems: is the efficiency 
which can be measured in terms of the number of communication 
links in a given network 00' Experimental work has generally 
supported the hypothesis that the smaller number of 
communication links in a group, the greater the efficiency 
in task performance. (21) 
Certainly the SNP could not be said to have had a plethora of 
'links' separating the communicator from the receiver, but those that 
existed - though few in number - were quite formidable. We can look 
at these, in the first instance, from the viewpoint of upward 
communication. 
Model 5 
NEC/Senior Officers (Staff) 
I 
Members 
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An ordinary Party member who might have wished an alteration in the 
manner in which a certain organisational function was carried out by 
the centre could, of course, simply have written, phoned, or otherwise 
contacted the Party official (22) responsible - although if all the 
members had exercised that right then system overload would have 
occurred (see above for comments on the need for restrictions on the 
flow of upward communication). The fact is that the great majority 
of members did not choose to contact the leadership directly. Therefore 
MOdel 5 was neither a common, nor encouraged, communication link. 
Model 6 was an altogether more manageable proposition. In this the 
member could have urged his branch to write to the NEC commenting on 
some matter of Party business. If the branch agreed then a letter 
would have been sent via the secretary directly to the Executive. 
However, if their suggestion required constitutional change, or an 
alteration in procedure, then the matter would have to have gone before 
the quarterly Councilor annual Conference as in MOdels 7 and 8. 
Model 6 MOdel 7 
NEC/Senior Officers (Staff) NEC/Senior Officers (Staff 
l' i 
Branch Council 
I l' 
Members Branch 
l' 
Members 
Model 8 
NEC/Senior Officers (~taff) 
T 
Conference 
l 
Members 
t 
Members 
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Models 9 and 10 are really variants of 8 and 9, except in this instance 
the matter in question is channelled through the constituency associatiop 
rather than the branch. Nevertheless, in terms of links in the network, 
Models 9 and 10 presen.t quite significant barriers; the individual in 
the branch must persuade the latter that the matter is worth raising 
at the constituency association, and the same feat must be accomplished 
at the associations's meeting. Neither outcome could be taken for 
granted; and the same caveat regarding the distinction between a 
suggestion and an alteration in procedures, applies. 
Model 9 
NEC/Senior Officers (Staff) 
t 
Conference 
l' 
Constituency Association 
l' 
Branch 
t Members 
Model 10 
NEC/Senior Officers (Staff) 
t 
Council 
11\ 
Constituency Association 
t 
Branch 
t 
Members 
Therefore we can see that if any constitutional change, or 
organisational alteration was required, then the fastest route to 
implementation was Model 7. Yet even that required persuading one's 
branch, and then Council itself, of the wisdom of the suggestion. 
Even then one was still dependent upon the Executive officer, for 
example, Vice-Chairman (Organisation) for its implementation. We 
shall quantify the success rate of this approach in the next section. 
If a mernberof the NEC, or more commonly one of its senior members, 
wished to propose a change he could go immediately to Council with it, 
or get the NEC's backing for a resolution. We shall also examine the 
success rate of NEC-inspired resolutions in the next section. 
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Upward communication flow need not be as formalised as resolution 
formation, it could simply take the form of questioning, or even, in 
extreme cases, the rejection of a report given by the senior officers 
of the Party. The next section will also deal with the number and 
outcome of such rejections. 
To summarise: the members could communicate with the leadership 
(on organisational matters) most regularly at National Council, but 
they also had annual access at Conference. Both of these forums were 
filled on a delegate basis and this had the potential effect of 
removing the vast bulk of the members from direct access. This need 
not have crippled attempts by them to advise or question the leaders; 
after all, they could still write or phone etc., on an individual 
basis, but these were unlikely to result in any alteration in prevailing 
organisational techniques. Rather it would have required a mass 
approach, and pErhaps even a coordinated lobby. There is no evidence 
that this ever occurred. 
The leaders, for their part, had to report to both Council and 
Conference. Beyond that they could use monthly branch 'outputs', sent 
by headquarters to the secretaries of the branches, for action or 
money etc., as well as inform them about Party activities (these outputs 
became regularised in the early 1960s). NEC members were often also 
invited to branch and constituency meetings, as well as the many social 
functions which were held throughout the country. It was also much 
easier for them to contact each other that is horizontal communication 
given the small numbers involved and the regularity of contact, than 
for members of branches to meet to coordinate activities. In fact it 
was headquarters' practice not to circulate the names and addresses of 
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branch and constituency secretaries to other branches and constituency 
associations. MOreover, the sheer number of members and branches 
involved made such lateral contact difficult anyway. 
Yet both leaders and led had a similar problem. In a normative 
organisation, such as a political party, and unlike a large company, 
the leaders are dealing with people who need not take any part in the 
functioning of the organisation - other than to hold a membership card. 
The members are disparate and geographically dispersed, so that even 
with a communications network which seeks to minimise the distance 
between leaders and led, and optimise points of contact, major obstacles 
remain in the path of information dispersal. A related difficulty sterns 
from the fact that whilst a company may have an 'open-door' policy which 
allows the cleaner to take a grievance to the factor'!:I manager, in a 
political party this could involve contact over a distance of several 
hundreds of miles. 
Balanced against these difficulties there are several advantages 
a political party has over the industrial corporation: membership 
commitment and, for the most part, confidence and trust in the leader-
ship. We have already seen that trust in the leadership is an 
essential component for an effective communications system, and may 
indeed overcome difficulties in the understanding and interpretation 
of directives. Membership commitment, generally speaking, will be 
greater for those who are motivated enough to join a political party, 
than for those who fulfil a purely instrumental role working on the 
factory floor or some other form of occupation. This in itself 
facilitates communication, indeed members may even inconvenience 
themselves to get news of the party's activities. 
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Vertical flow did exist, and was really quite effective. Indeed 
it had to be if the SNP was to survive organisationally and electorally. 
Therefore before we conclude this section we shall briefly look at the 
five main types of downward communication and assess their relevance 
for a political party. 
1. Task Directives, or job instructions. Obviously the National 
Organiser and Vice-Chairman (Organisation), had to explain to activists (23) 
what was expected of them. As we saw in the chapter on Finance, these 
instructions could go the extremes of specificity, so that party 
workers would be in no doubt as to the nature of the task. Such 
communication is vital to a political party, the more so if a 
majority of its workers are neophytes. 
2. Information about the task and its relationship to other tasks 
within the organisation. Basically this is the communication that is 
designed to show the worker how his job contributes to the overall 
achievement of the company's goals. 
3. Information about organisational procedures and practices. This 
is absolutely vital for the active member 1 especially if he aspires 
to office, or seeks to influence the decision-making of the Party. 
4. Feedback to subordinates about their performance. On an individual 
level this is a concept more associated with a factory than a political 
party. But on the collective level it also occurs within a political 
party, for example, the injunctions frequently made by the Treasurer 
for more cash from the branches, or by the National Organiser to sign 
up new members. 
5. Inculcation of a sense of mission. Clearly this is vital for a 
political party, in fact, it may be the most critical element in the 
entire organisational efforts of a party. 
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Downward flow is vital for management efficiency, and the party 
leadership enjoys enormous structural and psychological advantages 
which facilitate control over the communication network. This, at 
least, is the finding of much of the research on the role of the 
managers in the information net. 
In the next section we shall recount, and then quantify, the role 
of the SNP's leadership in the Party's communication network to 
determine if that was also centralised and dominated by the senior 
officers of the Party. National Council and Annual Conference reports 
of the period will be analysed to determine the extent to which branch 
delegates used these forums to question and/or chastise the leadership, 
and recommend organisational innovations, and the extent to which 
the leadership used them as an important communications link. That is, 
what was the dominant flow pattern of Council and Conference? 
National Council As A Communications Link 
. . 
This section will be in two parts. The first will describe the 
most relevant episodes which best illustrate how aspects of communication 
were handled. For example, how Council was used by officers and 
delegates to inform each other of their respective problems. The 
second part of the section will be quantitative, in that it will list 
the number of reports, given by Party officers, which were accepted, 
rejected or remitted back by the delegates. The number of resolutions 
formulated by delegates, or branches, which were passed by Council. 
And the number proposed by the NEC which were endorsed or rejected 
by the membership by way of their Council delegates. Finally, the 
number of questions put by the delegates to the Party's officers. 
264 
As we indicated above, National Council, which meets quarterly 
and is composed of delegates from branches and constituency parties 
was the most likely forum for communication between activists and 
Party managers, especially for the former. It was at Council that 
the members could most easily question or advise, formulate resolutions 
or reject proposals. Council was the central link in the network 
of Party communication. From the following analysis we hope to be 
able to assess the degree of fit between the typology of downward 
communication, looked at above, and the experiences of the SNP 
between 1960 and 1974. 
The typical format of Council meetings was, and is, for the 
senior officers to give a report of their activities on behalf of 
the Party since the last meeting of Council. They may also propose 
changes or make some recommendation or other regarding organisational 
practice. On top of this there is almost always an exhortation for 
greater effort from the members. One should also bear in mind that 
it was only the delegates to Council who were sent the minutes of its 
meetings, together with the agenda and officer reports, for the next 
meeting. 
Therefore, the extent to which ordinary members had access to 
information about the proceedings of Council largely depended upon the 
assiduousness of the delegates in disseminating information to their 
fellow members, and the degree to which both delegates and members 
actually understood what was being said. Thus although Council was 
at the centre of the network it was by no means a fail-safe method 
of keeping the members in touch with events. 
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Even so, in the early 1960s Council delegates had several 
advantages over their equivalents of a later period (from the mid-
1960s on): at that stage NEC minutes were actually circulated to the 
delegates, and many of those who attended Council in the early years 
also sat on the organisation committees of the Party, and could have 
had their enquiries dealt with there. For example, at the Council 
meeting of June 1961, 13 of the 24 delegates attending were NEC 
members. Obviously when Council attendances swelled to several 
hundred as a consequence of the growing number of branches, then 
such inter-delegate contact became much more difficult. 
The Council in the early years of the 1960s spent a great deal 
of time discussing publicity matters with little direct reference to 
organisational questions. Indeed the first direct reference to 
internal communications that we could find, occurred at the December 
1962 Council: 
It was pointed out that Conveners of Committees are 
expected to submit their written reports to Headquarters 
not less than two weeks before a National Council meeting 
in order that they may be duplicated and circulated. (24) 
It is difficult to estimate what this meant for the general level of 
communications in those years. It could either mean that committees 
which normally circulated reports were failing to do so, or that one 
or two defaulters were damaging the overall level of information flow. 
However, one incident from April 1963 suggests that the leadership was 
unwilling to circulate too much data to the membership, and that the 
downward flow was being carefully channelled. A report by the Party's 
Organisation Committee was presented to the Annual Conference (25) of 
that year. Part of the document was marked 'Private and Confidential' 
and was not available to the delegates. It makes interesting reading: 
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This part of the Organisation Committee Report, prepared 
by the Convener without discussion by the Committee, has 
been circulated to the following people only: (Dr. R.D. 
McIntyre, Messrs. Arthur Donaldson, M.B. Shaw, W.A. Milne, 
Wm. Wolfe, D.R. Rollo, Robert Campbell, Murdo Young, Ian 
Macdonald and Mrs. Unity Miller: and must NOT be discussed 
with, or shown to, any other person. There will be NO 
discussion of this information at the Private Session-of 
Conference as many new members will be present. 
With the circulation list as above, there can be no leakage 
of information. (26) 
The implication to be drawn from this is quite clear: there 
were certain subjects which were permissable for internal communication 
purposes, that is, to be relayed to the delegates/members and other 
matters which had to be censored - depending upon the judgement of 
the leadership (five of the names on the list were found to be part of 
the persistent core of the leadership cadre examined in the last 
chapter). One wonders how many other subjects likewise removed from 
the agendas of Council and Conference. Obviously one cannot draw 
conclusions from this one example about agenda setting. Nevertheless, 
we should bear in mind that even a close examination of Council and 
Conference minutes is no guaranteee that we are tapping all the issues 
which the leadership discussed and the decisions taken by them 
regarding information diffusion. 
However, it may be that individual members felt a general 
unhappiness with the amount of communication they were receiving from 
the centre. In a communique from Ian Macdonald, National Organiser, 
to the branches in mid-1963, it was noted that: 
Vague grumbles are heard from time to time that things 
happen without the knowledge of the branches. We would 
like to draw the attention of such grumblers to the fact 
that all branches are continually urged to send a delegate 
to the National Council meetings and that also that a report 
back to the branch should be made by that member. The delegate 
receives the minutes of both Council and Executive meetings and 
these, if read, give a clear picture of what is happening in 
the Party ... (27) 
-----
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Macdonald is pointing to the theoretical position, that is, delegates 
should keep the membership informed. Yet as we have just seen not 
even the delegates were told everything, and to rely that they, in 
their turn, recounted everything they they knew to even the active 
members who bothered to turn up at branch meetings was something of 
a pious hope. In any case, somewhere between one-third and one-half 
of the accredited delegates failed to attend Council. 
The 'newsletters' which were sent out by Headquarters on a monthly 
basis to branch secretaries and were supposed to be read out to the 
members at branch meetings. They were replete with important dates, 
action expected of the branch members, forthcoming social events, and 
reminders by committee conveners, of cooperation desired of the membership 
in some field or other. In other words the 'newsletters' exhorted 
rather than informed. 
The next occasion when a serious question of communication was 
raised was at the September 1966 Council meeting. The Vice-Chairman 
(Organiser), Dr. James Lees, was recorded as having: 
spoke of the communications problem between H.Q. and Branches 
and between H.Q. and constituency associations. 
He would like to have seen: 
(a) Vertical organisation - 10-15 Area Councils with an 
office and a Chairman, who would act as H.Q. and National 
Council representative in the area. Area councils should 
be able to support - aid staff and organiser. 
(b) Horizontal organisation - voluntary bodies of people 
engaged in aspects of Scottish social life to act as a 
body of expert opinion available to the Party. (28) 
It would appear that no further action was taken in either regard. 
Lees had always been an avid proponent of more membership participation, 
but his concern does not appear to have been shared by the rank-and-
file, and on those rare occasions that matters of communication were 
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raised at Council it was usually the leadership that was responsible. 
At the Council meeting of September 1968, the Vice-Chairman (Organisation) 
expressed concern about the inadequate level of communications between 
the centre and the branches. The Organisation Committee 
was composed of a Member from most of the areas in Scotland 
It is hoped that branches or members who have a grievance 
will take it in the first instance to the Organisation 
Committee Member for their area so that it may be considered 
by the Committee and perhaps a remedy given, or, if not, 
report made to higher authority. (29) 
What stikes one immediately about this is that it introduced, if it 
wasruthered to, a barrier to direct upward vertical communication: the 
discontented members were asked to go through the Committee rather 
than go straight to the top. Moreover, it was hoped that this would 
improve communication between the centre and the branches, the obvious 
implication being that there already existed an inadequate dialogue 
between the two, or at least the centre did not have much input from 
the periphery. The suggestion made by the Organisation Committee had 
an inbuilt structural weakness in that it erected, or at least 
recommended, that another obstacle be placed in the path of the 
activists in the latter's attempts to communicate with the leadership. 
We shall presently quantify the flow pattern of National 
Councils over the years. However, it is already evident that the 
membership appeared not to be overly concerned with a situation which, 
to all intents and purposes, relegated them to a position whereby 
they were almost continually the recipients of information, and very 
rarely the communicators. 
A curious resolution from the March 1969 Council appears to confirm 
this view. Dr. James Lees, perennially concerned with the slippage 
in membership power, felt moved to oppose the following resolution 
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put by an ordinary delegate to Council: 
This Council resolves that Executive Vice-Chairmen giving 
written reports should be available to answer questions 
on their reports and should not give a verbal report in 
addition to their written reports. (30) 
The resolution was carried by 104 votes to 97. In a word, the result 
was to reduce even further the flow of information made available to 
the delegates. Lees appeared to have recognised the dangers to Party 
communications inherent in the resolution, hence his opposition. 
His concern about the erosion of Council's power in matters of 
Party administration, was again manifest at the December 1971 
National Council. He proposed a lengthy resolution which sought to 
reassert Council's authority over the leadership. It also included a 
section which called for the re-introduction of verbal reports. The 
first demanded that Council 
resume its constitutional function as the senior 
administrative body of the Party. 
The second section continued in the same vein. Council should 
reassert the immediate responsibility to it of all 
National Office-Bearers and of the National Executive 
Committee. 
Section 3 called for national office-bearers to give a verbal report 
of their activities to each Council meeting. The final section asked 
for the National Secretary to prepare the Council agenda on the basis 
that the foregoing demands represented the main purposes of National 
Council (31) 
Despite his obviously strong feelings about 'verbal' reports, 
Lees accepted an amendment which substituted 'written' for verbal. 
Yet even this concession was not enough to bring success to the 
resolution. The whole thing was remitted back to a Committee on 
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the Constitution. 
The delegates' lack of enthusiasm and/or concern about the necessity 
to enlarge the potential audience which received communiques from 
Headquarters, was demonstrated at a Council meeting two years before 
this. 
A resolution (32) which called for the agenda and minutes of 
Council to be sent to branch secretaries, as well as delegates, and 
this to be done three weeks prior to the Council meeting was rejected, 
although they did agree that the agenda be sent out to the delegates 
three weeks before Council. 
It seem remarkable that such an obvious improvement in 
communications which might have had the effect of involving more 
members in the affairs of the Party, should not have been accepted 
by the activists of a Party which prided itself on the level of 
membership involvement. The minutes do not record the debate itself 
so that reasons why this resolution fell are not known. 
Another, and quite similar attempt, to improve the speed of 
communications by having abbreviated minutes of Council and Assembly 
sent two weeks after the meeting of each, was overwhelmingly defeated 
at the April Council meeting of 1974. (33) 
The most probable reason for the reluctance of the members to 
assert themselves, may be gauged from an unpublished opinion poll 
taken from amongst 'key activists' in 1970 (34). It discovered that 
74 per cent found the existing distribution of power within the Party 
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satisfactory, 57 per cent found headquarters' service satisfactory 
(only 30 per cent were dissatisfied), and, more significantly, 75 
per cent believed that a political movement should have a strong 
leader. 
What is interesting is that this poll was taken after the 1970 
General Election when one might have expected to find rumblings of 
discontent with the prevailing state of affairs. Gordon Wilson has 
observed that 
when things are going well there is probably an exaggerated 
reception of the work you do. When things are going badly 
it is the converse. (35) 
Evidently the activists thought, even after the 1970 Election, that 
the SNP was in good hands. 
As we have attempted to show in this section the delegates' 
concern with internal communications appears to have negligible; the 
majority were content to allow the NEC, or at least some of its 
members, to dominate the infonna tion network of the Party. This 
seems strange in view of the fact that Council was the major link 
in the formally delineated system. However, upward communications 
need not have tkaen the form of structured resolutions regarding 
organisational innovation (we have already seen that this did not 
occur), but rather a critique of the management of the Party. Brand 
saw Council as very important from this perspective: 
The very fact that there is such a regular means of 
consulting the membership is significant as compared 
with the infrequent and often ritualised meetings 
of other parties. (36) 
And, perhaps more significantly: 
At Conference and National Council the reports of 
the Chairman, the parliamentary leader and other 
offices are often fiercely debated and are not 
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regarded as statements to be accepted automatically 
with acclamation. (37) 
Thus if Council should not exactly be viewed as a forum for Party 
law making in the true sense, it shoUld, nevertheless, be seen as a 
serious investigative body closely scrutinising the work of the NEC, 
and, presumably, on occasions rejecting the actions of 'Cabinet'. 
It was here, after all, that communication to the leadership was 
likely to have had the widest and most influential audience, composed, 
as it was, of the most active members of the Party. 
In order to quantify these assumptions about National Council 
we analysed the minutes (all we could locate) of 49 Council meetings 
held between 1960 and 1974, to determine: (a) he number of resolutions 
on m~tters of organisation which came from the delegates; (b) the 
number which were accepted; (c) the number of questions which were 
put to senior officers - also on matters of organisation; (d) the 
number of times parts, or all, of the reports were remitted back for 
further consideration; and (e) the number of resolutions put forward 
by the NEC, and the number which were successful. 
Table 11 Resolutions from Council Delegates, 1960-1974 (38) 
Resolutions Unsuccessful Successful Remitted 
--
5/6/65 3 2 1 
11/12/66 3 2 1 
15/6/68 2 2 
1/3/69 1 1 
6/12/69 1* .5 .5 
6/3/71 1 1 
6/12/71 1 1 
20/4/74 1 1 
Total 13 6.5 4.5 2 
(*The resolution was divided in two, with one half successful and 
the other rejected.) 
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Therefore out of 49 Council meetings which we examined, only 13 
resolutions relating to organisational questions emerged from the 
branch or constituency delegates. And of this number only 4.5 (34.6%) 
were successful. 6.5 (50%) were unsuccessful, and 2 (15.4%) were 
remitted back for further consideration. 
The number of successes would appear to be extraordinary few -
as were the overall number of resolutions - but we shall be in a 
better position to judge the quantity and direction of the communication 
flow when we come to analyse the number of resolutions coming down 
from the NEC. However, if the actual number of resolutions on 
organisation coming from the delegates appears to be small, perhaps 
there was a compensatory element in the questioning of senior officers, 
and the number of times their Reports were rejected or remitted back 
by the members. In fact, this may have been the most effective method 
of communicating one's feelings to the leadership. Indeed, S.E. 
Finer in referring to the SNP, has noted that 
The "centre", as it is called, plays a purely administrative 
role. The decentralisation of the party creates a heavy 
administrative load. It fosters a certain self-sufficiency 
in the branches, which indeed sometimes leads them to 
react against the party centre. (39) 
Council was the most obvious forum for such reaction against the 
centre since it was at Council that the most active members of the 
Party met on a regular basis, and where the leaders gave a quarterly 
account of their stewardship. 
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Table 12 
Interrogation of NEC Office Bearers By Council Delagates~ 1960-1974 (40) 
Q!estions Reports Rejected 
11/12/66 4 
30/11/68 2 
1/3/69 3 
11/4/70 4 
Total 13 0 
On 7/7/62 an amendment to an NEC recommendation was defeated. 
On 6/6/64 an Organisation Committee report was remitted to the NEC. 
On 7/3/64 " " " " " not adopted. 
On 6/13/69 three paragraphs of the Chairman'S Report were not adopted. 
On 4/12/71 there were two amendments to the Chairman's Report. 
On 10/6/72 there was an attempt to have the Executive Vice-Chairman 
(Organisation) report rejected. This was defeated. 
On 14/4/73 one paragraph of the Chairman's Report was deleted. 
Out of the 49 Council meetings covered by this analysis, we could 
find only 13 questions put to the leadership on organisational matters, 
and we could find no evidence of a Report being rejected - despite 
one attempt. Only one committee Report was remitted back to the NEe, 
and another was not adopted. On three other occasions there were 
small alterations to the Chairman's reports. 
There is no evidence here of any serious critique or interrogation 
of the leadership by the membership. As an upwardly vertical 
communication channel Council did not appear to have been very 
effective, and there is little reason to conclude that it, even on 
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an infrequent basis, reacted against the centre. 
The following Table lists the number of NEC and/or senior officer 
inspired resolutions on organisational questions, which were put before 
Council between 1960 and 1974. 
Table 13 
NEC/Office Bearer Resolutions to National Council, 1960-1974 (41) 
Source Outcome 
3/3/62 Dr. R. .Me Intyre Remitted to NEC 
7/7/62 NEC Carried 
8/2/64 A. Donaldson " 
6/3/65 W. Wolfe " 
5/6/65 D. Drysdale " 
4/12/65 A. Donaldson " 
5/3/66 NEC " 
11/3/67 " " 
" " " 
" " " 
" " " 
1/3/69 " " 
6/9/69 " " 
" " " 
12/6/71 " " 
1/9/73 " " 
Total 16 15 
Out of 16 resolutions, 15 were carried and one was remitted. Not 
only were there three more organisational propositions put to Council 
by the leaders than came from the delegates, but there was a 94 per cent 
success rate compared to 34.6 per cent for the delegates. We could not 
find one example of an NEC-inspired resolution which was rejected by the 
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membership at Council. 
The implication to be drawn from this analysis of organisation 
matters is quite clear: National Council as a communications link was 
dominated by the Party leadership; this despite the fact that it should 
have been the locus of the members' attempts to communicate upwardly 
to the Party managers. However vigorous it may have been there is 
little evidence to support the view that delegates used Council as a 
means to institute changes in the way the Party was govemed or 
administered. Neither does it give the impression of having closely 
monitored the leadership. William Wolfe seemed to confirm this view 
of a leadership not much inhibited or constrained by Council, when he 
observed, 
I had no feeling of having being checked. I felt that I was 
responsible to National Council, but I didn't feel in any 
way restricted by National Council. (42) 
Nevertheless, it might have been the case that Annual Conference 
filled this role, and it is to Conference that we now tum our 
attention. 
Annual Conference as a Communications Link 
Annual Conference is composed not only of the most active elements 
of the Party, but also of those who regard it as an occasion to renew 
acquaintances, make new friends, find out about the Party activities 
in other parts of Scotland, and enjoy the cut and thrust of debate. 
Beyond this, and despite its overloaded agenda, it is the functional 
equivalent of a company's annual general meeting, where the Board 
(the NEC) is called to account for its management, and where new ideas 
for the improvement of the latter can be presented. It is then 
potentially a very important communications links, and, in 
organisational matters, second only to Council itself - though, of 
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course, in strict constitutional terms it takes precedence over all. 
The same basic approach used for the analysis of Council resolutions 
will be employed here. We will quantify the number of resolutions on 
organisational matte~s coming from, in this case, branches and 
constituency associations, and then from the NEC. Finally, we shall 
assess the success rate of these propositions. TIle tables below 
contain the extent of this data. Unfortunately, the material at our 
disposal does not allow us to quantify the number and type of questions 
put to the Party's officers on organisation. Thus our conclusions 
are based upon an analysis of resolutions only. The material used 
comes from agendas and reports of conferences, and the organisational 
matters are dealt with in a section known as Internal Business. 
We have applied a certain discretion in the selection of data in 
that we have limited it to those questions which dealt strictly with 
organisational and management matters and not with policy-related 
questions. This is necessary because not all of the 'internal questions' 
relate directly to organisational concerns - not even indirectly. 
However, we estimate that the resolutions examined represent in excess 
of 80 per cent of all those which appear under 'internal matters' in 
the agendas. Finally, the period covered starts in 1963 since this 
was the first year for which we were able to obtain data. 
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Table 14 
Annual Conference: Internal Resolutions, 1963-1974 (43) 
Total Source Passed Unsuccessful * 
1963 4 Unattributed 4 
1964 6 Branches 3 3 
1965 3 II 3 
1966 3 " 3 
1967 6 " 6 
1968 4 2 branches 1 3 
2 Council 
1969 8 5 branches 8 
3 C.A. s 
1970 2 ? 2 
1971 5 3 C.A.s 2 3 
2 branches 
1972 7 6 branches 1 6 
1 C.A. 
1973 5 1 C.A. 5 
4 branches 
1974 2 1 C.A. 2 
1 branch 
Total 55 7 48 
(*This means that they were either defeated, remitted or were not 
debated through lack of time). 
Out of the 55 examined, only seven (12.7%) were successful. 
Forty-eight (87.3%) were unsuccessful. All of the resolutions, save 
for two which came from National Council, emanated from either 
constituency associations or the branches, with the great preponderance 
coming from the latter. We included in the category 'unsuccessful' 
those which fell through lack of time. After all, if Conference was 
a meaningful link in the communications chain the delegates should 
have been able to express their views. If they were unable to do so, 
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for whatever reason, then the value of Conference was consequently 
diminished. 
We can draw several conclusions from the figures. Firstly, 
Conference was apparently viewed by the branches and constituency 
associations as a more important forum for organisational resolutions 
than Council. This might have been because the former was a more 
glamorous occasion, especially in view of the fact that the attendance 
was much bigger. It may also have been because branches regarded 
Conference in its constitutionally defined role. Therefore there was 
a greater incentive to participate. Whatever the reason, one cannot, 
nevertheless, avoid the conclusion that Conference was not nearly as 
effective as Council (or, more accurately, even more ineffective) as 
a forum for the successful presentation of organisational resolutions: 
branches had a 34.6 per cent success rate as Council, compared to a 
12.7 per cent branch constituency association success rate at 
Conference. 
All of this assumes that for communication to be successful it 
has to be translated into action. It might be said merely getting 
one's resolution onto the agenda was in itself a meaningful communicative 
act. However, in the context of legislation governing the Party's 
organisation, the mere appearance of a resolution, whilst perhaps 
carrying symbolic significance, did not amount to an expression of 
branch/constituency association power. In this sense we view 
communications as being part of a 'decisional' process. That is, 
we are attempting to quantify power within the Party by means of a 
decision-making analysis; we consider that such an aggregate approach 
avoids mere theoretical conjecture, and as such 'communication' is 
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central to decision-making. 
Communication may be formally defined as any process whereby 
decisional premises are transmitted from one member of an 
organisation to another. (44) 
The most effective method the delegate from, or the member of, 
the branch had of influencing the SNP's organisational management, in 
its mass-membership stage, was seeing his/her resolution being accepted 
by Conference or Council. Both forums almost invariably disappointed in 
that regard. Yet even if a resolution managed to complete the tortuous 
path from branch to acceptance, there was no guarantee - constitutional 
provisions notwithstanding - that action would thereafter be taken by 
the NEC. Consider this resolution, and amendement, from the 1964 
Conference: 
This Conference deplores the lack of positive action on 
the part of the National Council in regard to the 
implementation of resolution passed at previous Conferences. (45) 
An amendment from Edinburgh Branch countered thus: 
Delete "deplores" and substitute "accepts". 
The amendment was carried. 
This episode, heavy as it is with irony, nevertheless would appear 
to reflect a basic reality: Conference was essentially a debating 
forum where communication from the delegates was rarely formally 
translated into action. 
The NEC apparently accepted that Conference should be regarded as 
a venue where more heat than light was generated - in so far as 
organisational questions are concerned, an occasion where the members 
be allowed full expression. An indication of this may lie in the 
fact that the NEC does not itself put forward policy resolutions 
(except for 'emergency' resolutions dealing with some crisis or other 
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which arises after the publication of the agenda). The NEC did not 
put forward resolutions on organisation to annual Conference. The 
fact was that Conference was too busy, too big, and too uninformed to 
debate serious questions of Party management for the NEC to waste time 
in proposing organisational innovations. They recognised, even if 
the members failed to, that in terms of optimum communication flow and 
effective management techniques, Council was superior to Conference. 
Conclusion 
The SNP is a spatially diverse organisation. This territorial 
diversity presents very special kinds of problem for the Party 
managers, and the burden of effort to overcome this difficulty lay 
largely on the Party's communications network. But in the period up 
to and around the late 1960s, this spatial problem was compounded by 
the sheer inexperience of its workforce, that is, the activists. One 
cannot overestimate the importance for the leadership in properly 
harnessing the untrained energies of these members towards constructive 
political and organisational channels. Until this was achieved no 
serious campaigning was possible, hence the importance of downward 
communication, and the almost ludicrous lengths these instructions 
sometimes went to in explaining what was expected (see the chapters 
on Finance and Organisation) of the activists (46) 
The leaders then had to ensure that the communications network 
was so constructed as to ensure that whilst they did not overload the 
activists with data and instructions, they were, nonetheless, enough 
to achieve set targets like membership growth, distribution of leaflets 
and payment of dues to headquarters. Several features of the SNP came 
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together to aid this operation, not least of which was the position 
of the senior officers in the network. 
As we have shown, the only viable way the branches could really 
communicate with one another, on a widespread basis, was through the 
centre, that meant Councilor Conference, or by asking headquarters 
to circulate information to other branches o~ their behalf. Over 
and above this, the centre publicised, through 'newsletters', senior-
officer Reports and the Scots Independent what was going on in the 
Party. This pivotal role placed the leadership in an extremely strong 
position, a point confirmed by experiment. This power has a self-
reinforcing effect; just as the leader is in a central position to 
communicate, thereby increasing his leadership role, so does this make 
h " 1 "" f" (48) lffi a centra communlcatlon 19ure 
We could find no evidence that the membership used the channels 
open to them to innovate organisationally, or seriously question the 
management of the Party leaders, on anything approaching a regular 
basis, and when this did occur it was usually unsuccessful. Thus the 
material which we have examined would tend to support the experimental, 
experiential and theoretical studies on the subject of communications 
and leadership. 
The SNP between 1960 and 1974 had a communications network which 
was thoroughly dominated, for structural and psychological reasons, 
by the leadership group. This situation was not only accepted by the 
mass membership, but, from what evidence we have examined, they actually 
appeared to endorse this state of affairs. This may have been because 
the members recognised that too much input into the network would 
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instigate an overload of the system and make it nearly impossible 
for the leaders to direct branch activity. Alternatively - and more 
realistically - it may simply have been indifference, or lack of 
knowledge as to how to go about having an impact on the network. 
Whatever the cause, the membership were almost always the recipients 
and not the source of internal communication, and the delegates to 
Council and Conference did not play a significant role in an all-
system communications network. 
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Chapter Ten 
The SNP's Approach to Election Organisation 
If the SNP had a decentralised organisational structure it seems 
likely that we would find evidence of it in the approach the Party 
adopted to the fighting of General Elections. After all, it is 
extremely difficult for the 'centre' to monitor, far less control, the 
activities of 71 constituency associations during the hustle and bustle 
of a three- or four-week election campaign. Yet this tendency to shed 
workload need not lead to administrative decentralisation: 
It is important, however, to recognise that decentralisation 
of workload is not identical to the decentralisation of 
administrative and political power. It may be both efficient 
and convenient to move workload out of the capital, but it may 
not involve any decentralisation of administrative or political 
initiative. Indeed the desire to shed workload while retaining 
administrative initiative at the centre has been a general 
characteristic of centre-local relations in Britain. (1) 
However, it must be admitted that it is exceedingly difficult to 
exercise effective control over the constituencies during a General 
Election: the centre has enough to do organising press conferences, 
effecting leaflet distribution, and damping down organisational brush-
fires that invariably break out in diverse parts of the country. Such 
problems and preoccupations are true of all parties. But if the 
traditional view of the SNP is accurate then we would expect to find 
administrative decentralisation during general election campaigns as an 
institutionalised part of the Nationalists' structure, and in line with 
its supposed organisational democracy. 
This chapter will focus on the approach taken by the SNP to the 
two elections of 1974 to determine the degree of centralised control 
over the constituency association during the course of the campaigns. 
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The data will come from hitherto unpublished sources (held in the 
Party's headquarters) on the February and October elections of 1974. 
To begin with, however, we shall detail the process whereby the 
SNP selects its parliamentary candidates (who later represent the Party 
in the parliamentary constituencies) since in this primary process one 
might expect to find an examplar of the decentralised motive. 
Candidate Selection 
Activists in the constituency parties often find their 
greatest fulfilment in the selection of their candidate 
The local parties operate broadly under procedural rules 
drawn up by party headquarters. The headquarters make 
available lists of candidates and they have the right to 
approve the eventual nominee ..• It is a myth that the 
party leaders can plant a candidate. (2) 
This quote, though about the major British parties, can also, 
within limits, summarise the process as it operated within the SNP. 
And as far as Jack Brand is concerned, the Nationalists' candidate 
selection method is further evidence of the decentralised nature of the 
Party, and confirms his view that it is much more devolved in its 
management structure than either the Labour or Conservative parties: 
Once again we can see the openness of the Nationalists and 
the degree to which as many party activists as possible are 
brought into the process of selection. (3) 
Later, he observes: 
It seems clear ... that the SNP .•• involves more of its 
members in the selection of parliamentary candidates than 
is true of the Labour or Conservative parties. (4) 
In fact, as we shall see, there are similarities between all three 
parties when it comes to selecting parliamentary candidaces, but that, 
if anything, the balance of central control more heavily favours the 
SNP than the Labour or Conservative parties. 
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Anyone who wishes to become a parliamentary candidate must get 
the agreement and sponsorship of two branches or of a constituency 
association. Thereafter he attends a weekend conference, organised 
by the influential Election Committee, to determine his suitability, 
or otherwise, to go on to the list of prospective parliamentary 
candidates. He is then interviewed, examined for his knowledge on 
political and economic questions, and subjected to a critique of his 
public speaking skills. Only when this process is completed does the 
Election Committee make a recommendation to the NEC to have the 
candidate'S name placed on the aforementioned list (as we noted in a 
previous chapter the Election Committee was highly elitist and 
potentially powerful, and its recommendations were invaribaly 
accepted) . 
Once the name is placed on the list, branches then nominate 
individuals to go before the entire branch membership (or at least 
every member is entitled to attend) for vetting. The individual 
branches, after discussion, then select their preferred candidate from 
the total nominated. The branch delegates then meet at the constituency 
association to elect someone from the list nominated by the branches 
(the branches have as many votes as they have delegates at the 
constituency association). After the election the delegates are then 
asked to unanimously endorse the winning candidate. Finally, the latter 
must be endorsed by the NEC. 
The decision of the National Executive Committee on 
contesting any election and the selection of a candidate 
shall be final and binding. (5) 
In the case of a by-election the NEC can remove the sitting candidate 
and replace him with a person they deem more suitable. 
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Now, whilst the foregoing procedure is now in operation and 
theoretically allows for the participation of all the members, such 
was not always the case. In September 1973, Ian Macdonald, Vice-
Chairman (Organisation), circulated a guide to the constituencies 
outlining the then current procedure for selecting candidates. In the 
document (6) he clearly specified that delegates to the constituency 
association could elect a prospective candidate without reference back 
to their full branch membership (this meant that the prospective 
candidates could be invited along to the C.A. directly, thereby cutting 
out the first stage interview with the branches). 
Brand writes of the Labour and Conservative parties: 
In the other parties the actual selection of the candidates 
is done by the constituency party without any general 
consultation of the general membership except in so far 
as they are represented by their delegates to the 
constituency party. (7) 
As we have seen this was precisely the procedure used by the SNP prior 
to the elections of 1974. 
What other similarities, or differences, exist in the selection 
procedures of the SNP, Labour and Conservative parties? According to 
Pulzer (8), the Conservatives have a 'List of Approved Candidates', 
from which local associations are urged to select prospective candidates, 
but there is no compulsion. And, in fact, Beloff and Peels have noted 
that Central Office cannot compel the constituency associations to 
accept a candidate against their wishes: 
the list is large, and local associations have proved so 
determined to maintain their freedom of action concerning 
candidate selection that such attempts as EdWard Heath's 
efforts to ensure a greater social mix by tightening the 
vetting procedure have been unsuccessful. (9) 
The Labour Party makes available two sets of lists to the 
constituencies: list A contains the names of those sponsored by a 
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trade-union, and approved by the Party's National Executive Committee. 
List B includes the names of those, who although unsponsored, also wish 
to be considered. The Constituency Labour parties need not, however, 
consult either list. At the actual selection itself, however, a Party 
official is present (as with the SNP) to ensure that the constitutional 
procedures have been observed. Finally, the candidate must be approved 
by the National Executive Committee of the Party. 
Now, in fact this means that in so far as selection is concerned 
the SNP is (and, more especially, was) more centralised than the other 
two parties. However, in the case of all three parties it would only 
be in rather extreme circumstances that the leadership would ignore the 
preferences of a constituency party. The evidence appears to indicate 
that, so far as candidate selection is concerned, the SNP does have a 
marginally more centralised approach than either the Labour or 
Conservative parties. 
The 1974 General Elections: Central Pl~ 
Victor Hanby has said of the SNP: 
••. the primary organisational emphasis is one of 
decentralisation and branch autonomy, a fact which 
seems to have clear implications for the tone and 
type of campaign that the SNP mounts at any given 
election and may contain a germ of an explanation 
detailing the reasons for tileir meteoric success in 
particular constituencies in 1974. (10) 
Hanby beH'eves that both the February and October election campaigns 
were typically decentralised, although October was less so in that the 
newly elected parliamentary contingent had a greater role to play in 
the national campaign (11) 
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Writing before 1974, Mansbach (12) as critical as ever of the 
'decentralised' structure, noted that: 
The independence of the local organisations and lack of 
cooperation among them casts doubt on the efficiency of 
the Party's machinery at parliamentary elections, particularly 
to organise and finance a Scotland-wide campaign. (13) 
How representative of the SNP's approach to the 1974 campaigns 
are these criticisms and observations? Was there an absence of central 
planning and control, and did the SNP's leadership leave the 
constituencies to their own devices during those critical weeks? 
The SNP actually began planning for the elections which eventually 
came in 1974 in the middle of 1973. Moreover, as we have already noted 
in a previous chapter, the Nationalists were running an expensive and 
widely publicised series of campaigns on the theme of 'Scotland's Oil' 
throughout 1973 and 1974. Therefore they were off to a flying start 
when the February election date was announced. Bearing in mind the 
degree of detail and central planning which went into these campaigns, 
the election preparations were all the more remarkable since they 
went close to rivalling the former in their explicitness. 
In August 1973, the NEC was presented with a highly detailed 'Pre-
Election Campaign (Autumn) Schedule (14) It ranged over the entire 
spectrtlm of conceivable election activity: demonstrations, press 
conferences, finance, manifesto, general publicity and election rallies. 
Drawn up by Gordon Wilson, it closely resembled, in type, the package 
of proposals we highlighted in our chapter on the 'oil campaign'. 
Indeed the programme was to be as vigorous locally as it was to 
prove nationally: a pro-forma election address was drawn up; pre-
election leaflets prepared; the logistical strength of the constituencies 
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analysed; candidate 'action-packs' made available (set speeches, facts, 
etc.)o A national letter campaign was planned; local advertising was 
to include the supply of texts and design; the strategic and tactical 
problems raised by the local demonstrations were to be raised by a 
certain date (September 1973). The dates of these, and many other, 
events were clearly specified, as were the names of the individuals 
with responsibility for their implementation. The document was the 
quintessential forward planner, and highlights the extent to which the 
SNP leadership was involved in ensuring that the election machine was 
geared to fight an effective campaign both at local and national level. 
The Party had the advantage of not only having the rank-and-file 
actively engaged in the 'oil campaign', there was also the considerable 
boost to morale, and national standing, which came in the wake of Margo 
MacDonald's by-election victory at Govan in November 1973. 
The absence of any organisational base in the constituency did not 
prevent the SNP from waging an aggressive campaign. As Ian Macdonald, 
Vice-Chairman (Organisation), noted ten days before the poll: 
The Party as a whole rallied round very rapidly, unlike 
the usual slow start at previous by-elections - an 
indication of the high state of morale now existing. (15) 
Macdonald said of Govan and Edinburgh North (a by election held on 
the same day in which the SNP achieved only 18.9 per cent of the vote (16) -
it was a safe Conservative seat): 
the Organisation Committee had already put the activists 
Team into these constituencies to distribute leaflets and 
B. R. C. 's ... 
I believe the Party is stronger and better organised than it 
has ever been. (17) 
The remarkable success at Govan greatly strengthened the leadership's 
hand; they were seen to be organisationally expert and politically astute. 
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This meant that the job of rallying the activists for the forthcoming 
electoral battle was greatly aided. 
Yet still the communiques poured out of headquarters. For example, 
in January 1974 the constituencies were sent samples of headquarters' 
inspired 'election addresses' which they could use, mutatis mutandis, 
. h' . 1 . . (18) In t elr partlcu ar constltuenCles 
Also in January, agents and candidates were sent a form which 
explained in great detail what candidates should say in the event of 
them having to phone headquarters during the campaign: 
1. Ask for General Election Room. 
2. State your name, position (Election Agent etc.) to ... 
(Candidate) in ... constituency. 
3. State your telephone number. 
4. Organisational Review. (19) 
The document then went on to list four topic headings considered 
essential by headquarters, such as events in the constituency, and 
publicity ideas. TIle document not only left little to chance, but, in 
fact, was intent in minimising extraneous data. It denotes a centre 
closely in touch with the periphery, and making every effort to 
influence constituency events. 
Early in 1974, Rosemary Hall was appointed Campaign Director. 
She had previously been a Party official, and then was later the 
Party's National Secretary. She had, therefore, very considerable 
administrative experience within the SNP, and was also in the happy 
position of lcnowing that the General Election preparations, begun in 
August 1973, were well under way (20) The draft election manifesto (21) 
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was available at the beginning of January 1974. Throughout the month 
of February 1974, the campaign team in headquarters was in constant 
touch with the constituencies, answering queries, sending out information, 
and generally guiding the agents and candidates. Not only this, but 
clear attempts were made to instil a sense of purpose into the potentially 
isolated constituency workers. The General Election Campaign Bulletin, 
number four (22), detailed the overall electoral approach: 
This election is about self-government 
in Scotland's Oil ... 
Keep your campaign to Scottish issues. 
••• from now on get in among 
shoppers queues 
and the prosperity 
Don't get sidetracked 
clubs and institutes 
Bingo fans 
crowd scenes generally 
factories and industrial plants 
markets 
The document continues in the same vein: candidates were advised as to 
how best to get an introduction to a club or factory, they were given 
advice on how to answer questionnaires and circulars: 
Candidates should use their own judgement as to whether 
or not to reply, but, if you are in doubt about any of the 
issues and would like further guidance, please let me know. (23) 
A special edition of the Scots Independent (24) carried on its front 
page a map showing Scotland's oil-fields, and proclaiming that this was 
what the Election was all about. 
The Nationalists' campaign was the most visually effective of all 
the parties in Scotland. It relied heavily on spectacle, and the techniques 
which the SNP had been developing throughout the 1960s: cavalcades, 
musical jingles, and saturation window postering. 
Large areas in the seats which the SNP fought seriously 
were blanketed with their bill-posters stressing the 
themes 'Its Scotland's Oil' and 'Its Time for Self-
Government', and it was backed by the largest and most 
enthusastic group of workers. (25) 
Of the February campaign, Rosemary Hall wrote: 
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•• , thank you to all of you - candidates and election 
agents - for your active help to me in my efforts to 
coordinate many aspects of the campaigns at national 
and at constituency leveL.· (26). Lit! S P "'Ill S Q.n Se.ot:S Ir'\'l~ ~~C.I~ 9t:: ~r ~QVlt o~ t:::~~ vom..) 
Following upon the electio~ William Wolfe wrote to each candidate 
and election agent asking for a report on the campaign 'with a view to 
obtaining information and opinions which would be useful for future 
campaigns' (27) He received 56 replies from the 70 constituencies 
fought. The most common response was on the need for 'better organisation' 
at the constituency and branch level. Although the reports ranged over 
a wide variety of concerns there was no mention or criticism of inadeqlute 
central direction or coordination. 
From what we have already seen there is no reason to suppose that 
there was any lack of overall coordination or planning by the centre. 
Indeed the issue of 'Scotland's Oil', which played no small part in the 
campaign, had been at the heart of the SNP's electoral strategy for well 
over one year prior to the election. This coupled with the Party's 
arguments about 'self-government', were instituted and managed by the 
Party leadership. All that was left for the constituencies to do was 
to utilise both of these themes and the material so regularly sent out 
by headquarters. 
But it is really in the October campaign that we see the full 
extent of central planning. There can be little doubt that at both 
local and constituency level the SNP was in a state of almost continual 
election preparedness between February and October 1974. 
Hanby (28) writes that in June 1974 a massive publicity campaign on 
oil was launched, and it followed the usual lines: first of all there 
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was a saturation leaflet campaign, this was followed by an extensive 
poster effort. He quotes John MCAteer, the Party's National Organiser: 
It has been non-stop action since the February election. 
We assumed that there would be a quick election again 
this year and we mounted a campaign throughout the 
constituencies to make sure we were not caught out. (29) 
Despite this, as we have seen, Hanby believes that the campaign 
remained decentralised. In fact, the evidence suggests that, on the 
contrary, an intensive central effort began long before even the 
February campaign. Ian Macdonald wrote to all candidates, constituency 
organisers and secretaries in the middle of 1973, cataloging a series 
of 'do's' and 'don'ts' in preparing for a future election. Macdonald 
went to very considerable lengths to emphasise what he considered 
lengths to emphasise what he considered vital. Indeed he left little 
room for doubt or misunderstanding. 
We are now approaching the General Election. It must 
corne within two years ..• (30) 
He went on to list the need to elect a candidate, an agent, a constituency 
election committee the purchasing and addressing of election envelopes, 
planning local advertising 'gimmicks', canvassing cards drawn up, and 
the location of election headquarters: 
Further circulars will be sent to you as the Election 
approaches •.. try to ensure that your Election Agent 
or Constituency Organiser and your candidate attend the 
Conference to be held in Stirling ... (31) 
A pro-forma 'election address' was planned as early as August 1974, 
and distributed to the branches before September. Poster sites 
throughout Scotland had been chosen for a campaign which was to start 1ll 
September, and election meetings were scheduled for Glasgow, Aberdeen, 
Edinburgh and Dundee (32). A' campaign team' was set up at the end 
of August 1974 (it was composed of Donald Bain, John McAteer, Stephen 
Maxwell and Angus MacGill very - all employees of the Party). Rosemary 
Hall was, once again, Campaign Director. 
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During the election proper, daily releases were sent out by the 
'campaign team' to the candidate s . These included research bulletins, 
press releases and general guidance. On top of this, phone calls to 
the agents, or constituency headquarters, to keep the centrE in touch, 
were regularly made by the Edinburgh team. 
The maj or themes of the campaign were, in the circumstances, 
inevitable; "oil" and "self-government". 
At a special National Council meeting held in Dundee in September (33) 
Gordon Wilson announced that 'oil' was to be the major subject of the 
General Election campaign (the formal announcement of the date of the 
Election did not come until 18 September). At this same Council 
meeting a 'confidential report' from Margo MacDonald, highlighted that 
the overall tone of the campaign would be 'We're Winning', and there 
would be a 'throwaway' leaflet on the SNP's record of having doubled its 
vote at every General election. Following upon this, press statements 
and speeches would take the line that there was no reason why the SNP 
should not double its vote again. Further, there were to be 'special 
interest' broadsheets on nursing, farming and defence. Speeches should 
also make reference to the fact that the Labour or the Conservative 
parties could not afford to pay for their election promises. MOreover, 
economic stability and the end of inflation could only be achieved 
through self-government. 
There could be no doubt, therefore, that the Party leadership had 
a firm grip on the direction of the campaign, not only during but 
prior to the election itself. This was as true in thematic terms as 
it was in the direct organisational sense. Butler and Kavanagh 
observed that: 
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Voters in Scotland were as concerned with rlslng prices 
as voters elsewhere; but the SNP had thrust devolution and 
oil development into the forefront of the campaign. (34) 
Labour responded with a poster which proclaimed: '~~ke Sure Its Your 
Oil, Vote Labour' (35) The irony could not have been lost on the 
Nationalists. 
As to the campaign organisation itself, Butler and Kavanagh 
recognised the importance of the senior Party figures in devising 
strategy: 
There was a campaign committee in Edinburgh ..• the committee 
dealt largely with queries from the Press and broadcasting 
media and sifted the reports from the constituencies. But 
initiative in campaign strategy were left to the Party's 
senior candidates. (36) 
Despite the recognition of the role played by the leadership, the 
writers go on to report that: 
the Nationalist campaign was essentially left to the 
candidates who could tie the two main themes to local 
interests. (37) 
We shall return to this view in a later section, however, it is 
worth noting that such an approach need not have diminished the overall 
control that the leadership had on the campaign, and in any case it 
was inevitable that the candidates and the constituencies would shape 
national issues to suit local circumstances. 
We examined the reports of agents and candidates who responded to 
Headquarters' requests for information about their assessment of how 
the October campaign had gone organisationally. Forty-one replies 
were received. Only seven reports expressed dissatisfaction with 
Headquarters I performance: 
••. little evidence of national campaign. Very little 
seemed to be coming from the centre, (Pentlands) . 
•.. generally dissatisfied. (Ross and Cromarty). 
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National campaign did not impinge much on Constituency ... 
Research material late in arriving. (Hillhead). 
National campaign little impact on Constituency. (Queen's Park). 
Lack ot coordination between H.Q. and Constituency during actual 
campaign, with particular reference to press releases and public 
statements made by public spokesman. (Coatbridge and Airdrie). 
Poster campaign effective, but little else seen from H.Q. 
(South Angus). 
No definite national policy to which all candidates could adhere 
to. (Kinross and West Perth). (38) 
Balanced against these complaints was a clear majority who 
considered that headquarters' coordination and supervision was, at 
least, satisfactory. These totalled twenty-two in all: 
.•. you were shaping campaign very well ... (Roxburgh, Selkirk 
and Peebles). 
Overall, the effect of the national effort and campaign has 
been good '" (Central Ayrshire). 
Satisfied. (Bute and North Ayrshire). 
Very good. (Kilmarnock). 
National Campaign was carried out in a responsible fashion ... 
(East Renfrew). 
Generally considered extremely good ••. We are mindful of all 
assistance given by H.Q. (Bothwell). 
National campaign reasonably effective. (Rutherglen). 
I have absolutely no complaints about the service provided 
by H.Q. (Edinburgh Central). 
Generally satisfied. (Edinburgh East). 
Quite satisfied. (Midlothian). 
Very good. (Hamilton) . 
. .. generally satisfied. (West Stirling). 
Generally I think we had good value for money ... (Dundee West) . 
Candidates' services could not be improved on without the 
involvement of a greater nwnber of experienced people. (Kirkcaldy). 
The daily information services from Party Headquarters proved 
invaluable in keeping up to date (sic) and was sufficiently 
concise to permit enough time to read. (Central Fife). 
Good. (South Aberdeen). 
Excellent. (Lanark). 
National campaign seemed very encouraging. (Orkney Branch) . 
National campaign very good, appreciated releases and election 
specials. (Shetland). 
National campaign excellent. (Springburn). 
Campaign material very effective. (Central Glasgow). 
National campaign very good. (Shettleston). 
By a margin of over three-to-one the constituency reports supported 
the view that the national campaign, and the part played by headquarters, 
was, at least satisfactory - if not better. The other twelve reports 
either made no reference to Headquarters or suggested some improvements 
for next time round. 
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In the circumstances it is difficult to understand Pentlands' 
complaints about 'little coming from the centre'. As we have already 
seen, daily bulletins were sent from Headquarters, and regular phone-
calls were made by the latter in an effort to ensure communication 
wi th the constituency campaigns. Beyond this were the posters, leaflets, 
election addresses, and media reported speeches, which were all 
centrally inspired and organised. 
In the next section we shall turn our attention to the question 
of campaign financing. 
Financi?g the Election _Campaign 
Mansbach asserts that: 
The independence of the local organisations and lack of 
cooperation among them casts doubt on the efficiency of 
the Party's machinery at parliamentary elections, particularly 
to organise and finance a Scotland-wide campaign. (39) 
As we have already attempted to demonstrate in a previous chapter, 
there was no lack of assistance from the centre to constituencies 
which found themselves fighting by-elections. Nor were the branches-
sluggish in channelling cash back towards headquarters. All-in-all 
there was considerable movement of capital within the Party, even if 
the dominant pattern was upwards from the branches to the centre. 
This section will dispute the assertion made in the above quote 
by Mansbach. In doing so we shall seek to show that the SNP's 
approach to the financing of elections typified a party which was not 
only efficient in the harnessing of scarce resources, but also one in 
which the leadership played a formative role in the determination of 
how much of this cash was spent. 
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Even before the General Elections of 1974, the National Treasurer, 
Michael Murgatroyd, reported to National Council, at the end of 1973, 
that: 
1973 is unique in the history of the Party in that we 
have fought three by-elections in one year. The financial 
responsibility for these campaigns rests with Headquarters 
and consequently H.Q. levies each Branch. As H.Q. had 
already levied for the Dundee East by-election and the 
second oil campaign this year it was decided that the levies 
for the Edinburgh North and Glasgow Govan (sic) be held over 
until 1974. (40) 
In the end, totals of £1,447 and £1,360 were received for Edinburgh 
North and Govan respectively. These Sum6 were composed entirely of 
donations and levies (41) Bearing in mind the other, very considerable, 
demands on branch resources, these were very substantial amounts indeed. 
Headquarters' concern for cash transfer from wealthier to poorer 
constituencies was evident in a discussion which occurred at the NEC 
meeting held early in 1974 (42) This meeting recognised that there 
were constituencies which, for financial reasons, would not be in a 
position to contest the forthcoming Election. Thus, money was either 
to be given or lent to these constituencies - at least to the extent 
of paying for the deposit. It was agreed that other constituency 
associations would be asked to donate cash to a fighting fund to aid 
their penurious colleagues. Moreover, it was overwhelmingly agreed 
to make available £4,000 from Headquarters' funds in aid to the 
poorer constituencies. 
In the 'appeal letter', which was sent out from Headquarters' (43) 
to the constituency associations, it was noted that a similar appeal 
mounted in 1970 had enabled six constituencies to fight in the General 
Election of that year, who would otherwise have been unable to do so. 
By the end of February 1974, the appeal had realised £2,524. (44) 
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In the end, Headquarters spent some £3,000 in grants and loans 
to constituency associations during the February campaign, and on ton 
of this the centre spent around £1,800 on publicity. 
By the October General Election the levels of Headquarters' 
expenditure had climbed - though not, interestingly, in terms of grants 
to constituencies. Overall expenditure by Headquarters during the 
October Election was as follows: 
Table 15 
Headquarters' Expenditure for October 1974 GerteralElection (£) 
H.Q. Grant to Govan 500 
Phone-In campaign 700 
Press Adverts/Publicity - 3,971 
Poster Campaign - 1,843 
Election Campaign 639 
Additional Accounts - 3,865 
Total 11,518 (45) 
This cash, although small by the standards of the major parties (46) 
was still a significant amount of money when one considers (a) the 
fact that the SNP was entirely dependent on branch and individual 
donations, and (b) the small size of Scotland. }~reover, in terms 
of average expenditure per candidate the SNP compared favoowably with 
the Labour and Conservative parties in Scotland: 
Table 16 
Average Expenditure per Candidate I£) in Scotland (October 1974) 
Conservative 
1,161 
Labour 
1,137 
Liberal 
550 
Of the expenditure incurred during the 1974 Elections, the 
Treasurer, Michael Murgatroyd, said: 
SNP 
822 
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Headquarters have struggled through financially because 
of the substantial increase in the level of donations 
throughout the year and particularly at each election 
and additionally the increased income from the sale of 
membership cards. (48) 
The SNP financed its 1974 electoral efforts in its usual fashion: 
a combination of donations and branch levies. The leadership of the 
Party instituted and coordinated the efforts necessary to raise this 
income. Moreover, as we have seen, there was considerable movement 
of income horizontally and vertically - enough to keep the individual 
and national campaigns solvent. 
In the next section we shall look at the amount of the direction 
the constituencies appeared to have taken from the centre in the 
formation of the content of their election literature and propaganda. 
This would be an aspect of the election campaign most amenable to 
local initiative since it is the most common point of contact between 
activists and the voters. Therefore, the constituency association and 
the candidate might have been expected to have availed themselves of 
the opportunity of emphasise issues they deemed to be most consequential. 
This would be especially true, if, as some of the quotes given above 
suggest, the SNP's campaign was decentra1ised with an emphasis on local 
initiative and issue setting. 
Campaign Themes 
Of the February 1974 Election, Butler and Kavanagh, wrote: 
The Nationalists candidates in Wales and Scotland were left 
to emphasise the themes of national independence and oil 
(in Scotland) without proddings from headquarters. (49) 
Of the same campaign, they later observed: 
The minute research staffs of the nationalist parties 
meant that candidates for these parties were largely left 
to their own devices. (50) 
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As was noted above, these same writers argued that during the 
October Election, candidates adjusted national themes to suit local 
circumstances. They correctly point to the twin issues of 'oil' and 
'self-government' as dominating the national campaign of the SNP 
during October (51). During the pre-election period the Nationalists' 
election slogan was, 'Now SNP - This Time Self-Government' (52) This 
was more or less a continuation of the February campaign, and like so 
much else was centrally inspired. We can confirm this by analysing 
the minutes of the NEe meetings of the period (53). We also analysed 
the election material (mainly election addresses) of fifty-three 
candidates from the two elections of 1974 (54) We paid particular 
attention to two main areas: the slogan utilised by the constituency 
associations and the main themes emphasised in local literature. 
If there was a locally orientated campaign then we might have 
expected to find a slogan extolling the virtues of the individual 
candidate and/or some other non-centrally devised rallying cry. 
Secondly, the literature - if the SNP was more decentralised than the 
major parties - shOUld have had a significant, if not dominant emphasis 
on non-national issues. The Nuffield study analysed the election 
addresses of the constituency candidates, and observed: 
Many election addresses were little more than compilations 
from the party manifestos, together with a biographical and 
political st3Bment from the candidate. (55) 
Findings 
So far as the slogans were concerned 27 of the 53 had 'Its Time 
for Self-Government', or a variant thereof. A further 16 were locally 
orientated, and made reference either to the candidate by name or some 
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constituency matter. Another nine had national-type slogans but were 
not directly related to the 'Its Time ... ' theme. For example, 'Rich 
Scots, Poor British' (which was also centrally inspired). The remaining 
one had no obvious slogan. 
Therefore 36 of the 53 had nationally orientated slogans, with 
the great majority following the centre's lead. 
There was an almostIDtally consistent commitment to national, 
leadership devised, themes in the constituency literature. The usual 
source of such propaganda being the manifesto. Oil, self-government, 
and the benefits which would flow from both, dominated. Subsidiary 
themes were the 'English malaise', and, by the October election, what 
the SNP parliamentary group had achieved for Scotland. To some extent 
also a wholesale critique of the 'Cornmon Market' had a place in some 
of the literature. 
There was evidence that in 'special interest' constituencies (farming 
and fishing) considerable efforts were made in expounding what advantages 
would be derived from 'Independence' for these constituencies. But 
even this tended to be in a national context. 
Only in the following constituencies was there a detectable bias 
towards the candidate or localist concerns: Western Isles, Inverness, 
Govan, Ross and Cromarty, Orkney and Shetland, Perth and East Perthshire, 
Pollok and East Aberdeen. One can see that of these e', (\1'1 t cons ti tuenci es , 
.,J 
six were rural with farming and/or fishing interests. 
TIle following selection is typical of the content of the literature 
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from the 1974 elections. The leaflets were chosen on the basis of 
geographical spread; industrial and agricultural constituencies; those 
with well organised associations and those with poor organisations. 
South Angus. (October 1974). Fishing, prices, pensions, education, 
Common Market, SNP in Westminster, and biography of tile candidate. 
Garscadden. (October). Poverty, removal of nuclear bases, declining 
value of the Pound Sterling, oil, Independence not devolution. 
Kirkca1dy. (October 1974). Land, energy policy, education, poverty, 
SNP achievements in Parliament, and a biography of the candidate. 
Rutherg1en. (October 1974). Declining value of the Pound Sterling, 
'self-government', and oil. 
C~atbridge and Airdrie. (October 1974). Wealth and poverty in Scotland, 
prices, 'self-government', natural resources and education. 
Aberdeen North. (February 1974). English economic crisis, Scotland's 
potential wealth. 
Central Fife. (October 1974). Wealth and poverty, prices, Scottish 
government, biography of candidate. 
West Stirling. (October 1974). Scottish government, land resources, 
industry, agriculture, social services, trade-unions, education, the 
'common market', the future. 
Edinburgh Central. (October 1974). Wealth and poverty, prices, 'se1f-
government', democracy. 
Banff. (October 1974). The achievements of the sitting M.P., Hamish 
Watt, since the Election of February 1974. 
Clydebank. (October 1974). Pensions, employment and wages, poverty 
and oil. 
West Lothian. (October 1974). Oil, SNP in loga1 government and 
Parliament, national resources, housing, 'common market', education, 
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land etc., and a profile of the candidate. 
Aberdeen South. (October 1974). Strong Scottish Pound, 'common market', 
new industries, mortgages, and Scotland's sufferings as part of the U.K. 
Hillhead. (October 1974). Oil, the benefits of 'Independence', falling 
value of Pound Sterling, and the improving quality of life in Scotland. 
Edinburgh South. (October 1974). English economic crisis, Scotland's 
oil, biography of the candidate. 
Provan. (October 1974). Westminster's failure, falling value of Pound 
Sterling, agriculture, education, housing industry, employment, pensions, 
and biography of the candidate. 
Ross and Cromarty. (February 1974). Oil, Independence not devolution, 
the 'common market', and biography of the candidate. 
Berwick and East Lothian. (1974). Poverty, social policies of the 
SNP, education, housing, agriculture, fishing, the SNP's policies for 
the fishing and farming communities, oil, and the constitutional 
position of an Independent Scotland. 
Bothwell. (October 1974). Housing, education, land, the 'common 
market', the Scottish constitutional position, and the candidate's 
biography. 
West Renfrew. (1974). Scotland's resources, poverty, higher costs of 
food and utilities in Scotland than in England, and a biography of the 
candidate. 
Dunfermline. (October 1974). Self-government, oil and Scotland's 
economic potential. 
Pollok. (October 1974). Heavy emphasis on the candidate (Don Paul 
Macquarrie), plus the potential of oil, poverty, education and social 
problems. 
Orkney and Shetland. (October 1974). Farming, fishing, oil, Scotland's 
resources, comments by the candidate to the electorate. 
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Motherwell. (1974). Land, external affairs, Scotland's resources, 
poverty, housing, agriculture, education, and comments on the quality 
of the candidate. 
The characteristics pointed to by Butler and Kavanagh apply with 
equal force to the SNP: national issues dominated election propaganda. 
The daily research bulletins together with nati onal leaflets - which 
were heavily utilised - were reinforced by the campaigns which the 
Nationalists had embarked upon prior to the February General Election. 
On top of this, candidates, agents and activists had several 
opportunities to meet together between the elections and be informed 
of campaign themes. There is no evidence, which we could find, that 
any but a small number of constituencies fought the campaigns on local 
issues as opposed to centrally determined concerns. 
In the concluding section we shall attempt to explain why certain 
writers believe the SNP's electoral organisation of 1974 to have been 
typically decentralist. 
Conclusion 
The view of the campaign from a local party headquarters 
may contrast sharply with that from Smith Square. (56) 
Control by the centre during an election campaign will always be 
difficult. However, as we have attempted to demonstrate in this 
chapter, the SNP's leadership worked within parameters which gave 
them considerable powers of initiation and coordination in the 
management of elections. In matters as diverse as candidate selection, 
where the NEC was the arbiter of candidate suitability, and the 
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determination of campaign themes, the Party's leadership played a 
crucial role. 
As the foregoing quote indicates, it is impossible to monitor 
every aspect of a candidate's schedule, or political behaviour pattern. 
But, in the absence of a full-time agent reporting back to the 
leadership about a candidate's performance, the SNP achieved considerable 
contact with the constituency organisations. Certainly from the 
examination of constituency reports (see above), there is every reason 
to suppose that the SNP was in no wise worse off, in terms of centre-
periphery contact, then the major parties. As Butler and Kavanagh 
say: 
Candidates, as local representatives of a national party faced 
the problem of keeping in touch with what their party head-
quarters were doing. All parties emphasised the need for 
coordinating the central and local campaigns. We asked 
candidates if they had followed the national campaign closely 
through the mass-media, the speeches of party leaders, the 
opinion polls, or communication from party headquarters ..• 
It is surprising therefore that only a third of the candidates 
responding to our questionnaire claimed to follow the national 
campaign closely. (57) 
Yet, unlike the other parties, the SNP did not get as much media 
attention, which, on the face of it, one might suppose would keep the 
rank-and-file in touch with the leadership and the national campaign. 
Rather they had to rely upon the communiques from headquarters, the 
telephone, and perhaps a constituency visit. Despite this, there is 
reason to believe, given the evidence of the reports, that many more 
Nationalist candidates were aware of the national campaign than their 
equivalents in the other parties. 
We believe that it was limited media access which gave rise to 
the view that the SNP' s electoral efforts had, by necessity, to be 
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decentralised, with a limited leadership role. According to Pulzer: 
The growing centralisation of campaigning means that it 
is the national, not the local propaganda which matters. 
Radio and television, advertBing and newspaper reports have 
largely displaced the more traditional forms of electioneering. 
It is the slogans, quips and faux-pas of the party leaders, 
not the individual candidate, that set the tone of the debate. (58) 
But, as we have seen, the SNP leaders compensated for this exclusion 
by ensuring that every other feature of the campaign, over which it 
had control, was well organised and coordinated. The election campaign 
began long before February, and continued right through 1974. In other 
words, the Party was in a state of almost continual election preparedness. 
Another feature of the SNP which encouraged this decentralist 
view, was the almost total absence of dynamic, charismatic, political 
leaders. It is not merely media attention which tends to centralise 
campaigns, but also the focusing on a small group of political notables 
as the epitome of what their particular party stands for. 
This is reflected in opinion polls where it is not uncommon to 
find a part of the questionnaire given over to a popularity index of 
party leaders. The SNP's leaders were more anonymous (with a few 
exceptions) and very often, as we have seen, spent much of their time 
preoccupied with management matters. In such circumstances one can 
understand why observers might have considered it probable that 
activists would be forced back on their own resources to compensate 
for an absence of national leadership. 
However, the SNP had other strengths, and these were largely the 
responsibility of the leadership; the campaigning momentum of 1973, 
the enthusiasm of the activists (59), the issue of 'self-government' 
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and 'oil', the novelty of the campaigning techniques, and the quality 
of research and propaganda coming daily from Headquarters. These 
factors must be seen against a background of the leadership inspired 
organisational and electoral advances of 1973 which readied the Party 
for 1974. The SNP's electoral efforts in 1974 were planned and co-
ordinated by the centre. It was only after the themes, the literature, 
the research, the finance and the candidate selection procedures had 
been planned, that the constituency workers were left to complete the 
process through canvassing, leaflet distribution and car cavalcades, 
etc. Essentially these tasks, vital though they were, were about as 
much initiative as could be found at the constituency level. 
Decentralisation of workload was NOT the equivalent of decentralisation 
of administrative power. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Observations on the Organisa!,ion of the Labour and Conservative Parties 
In the previous chapters we have been looking at the organisation 
of the SNP in isolation. The essential element of comparison with 
other parties has been largely absent; just how centralised was it 
when compared to both the Labour and Conservative parties. We have 
seen how many writers on the SNP have taken the view that the SNP was 
more 'open' and 'devolved' than its major rivals in British politics. 
Is this true? 
Although we spent some little time examining candidate selection 
in the Labour and Conservative parties, and compared these to the 
SNP's methods, we have not as yet undertaken a similar exercise for 
the other, essential, elements of party organisation; finance, 
publicity, and campaign management. Therefore this chapter will focus 
on these three areas as they operate within the British Labour and 
Conservative parties. The intention is to enable us to make a 
judgement as to the extent of centralisation within these organisations, 
and then to compare it with our findings on the SNP. In other words, 
was the degree of centralisation discovered in the SNP also prevalent 
in the two major parties? 
The Scottish National Party differs from the 'big two' in several 
respects. The Labour and Conservative parties have very substantial 
representation in Westminster, so much so that we may justifiably speak 
of parliamentary parties which are a core element in the power structure 
of both organisations. Both parties have substantial bureaucracies which 
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must also be seen as potentially a part of the organisational power 
system. Then of course there are the activists in the constituencies 
who come together at, and between, the respective conferences of their 
parties. They too clearly constitute an important component in the 
power hierarchy. Indeed, it is really the rank-and-file's place in 
the scheme of things which interests us; are they subject to the same 
kind of organisational control which we found to be typical of the 
activists of the SNP? 
Besides not having either a parliamentary grouping or a large, 
salaried, bureaucracy, the SNP did not have competing ideological 
groupings which could function as alternative power blocs. Both the 
Labour and the Conservative parties do have the presence of such 
groupings wi thin their ranks. Tribune and Ma.nifesto in the former, 
the Bow Group and the Monday Club in the case of the Conservatives 
(a coherent left wing grouping does now exist within the SNP; the 
'79 group). 
The importance for the SNP in not having such groupings lay in 
the fact that the leadership was not faced with a potentially permanent 
opposition on a structured basis. Although in the cases mentioned the 
divisions - so far as they exist - are on a pOlicy as distinct from an 
organisational level. Nevertheless the absence of such bodies (between 
1960 and 1974) made it easier for the leadership to direct the affairs 
of the Party. 
In common with the SI~, the major parties must raise income to 
finance their electoral and propagandising activities. HOW, and from 
where, this income was derived will, just as for the SNP, tell us much 
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about the nature of organisational control within the two major parties. 
The next section will concentrate on the sources of party finance. 
Finance in the Labour and Conservative Parties 
According to Richard Rose: 
The autonomy of the different parts of the two major parties 
is most clearly demonstrated by an analysis of party finance. 
Of all commodities money is in principle among the easiest to 
transfer. Yet neither the Conservative nor the Labour Party 
has any institutional mechanism by which money can be centrally 
located. (1) 
We have observed how, in the SNP, the Party leaders were able to 
institute programmes and mechanisms whereby the branches would raise 
the vast bulk of the Party's income, and transfer a substantial 
proportion of it to the centre. This state of affairs was necessitated 
by the absence of any other major locus of funds for the Party. 
How then do the major parties finance their activities? 
So far as the Labour Party is concerned the overwhelming 
preponderance of its funds comes from tile trade-unions. Rose has 
calculated (2) that between 1967 and 1970 57 per cent of total Labour 
Party income came from the trade unions. By 1972 the figure had risen 
to 60 per cent. Yet according to Finer (3) between 1975-1977 
constituency Labour parties raised 59 per cent of total party income. 
However, whenever the Labour Party is in desperate need of cash, for 
example, at elections, it is the trade-unions which meet the bill. 
This represents a critical element in party finance. 
The Conservatives, for their part, show a much greater reliance 
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upon the efforts of the membership. Something like two-thirds of total 
Conservative Party income comes from the constituencies (4). ~~re 
recently Finer (5) has estimated that fur the period 1975-1977, 
Conservative constituency associations raised 80 per cent of total 
Party revenue. This is a view which is shared by Norton and Aughey (6) 
In the case of the Labour Party, it can be argued that whilst 
this dependence on the trade-unions decreases the degree of autonomy 
the leadership has vis-a-vis the latter, it has the concomitant effect 
of liberating them in their dealings with the constituency activists 
(members of 'Militant' may have similar autonomy from Transport House 
in that they appear to raise income independently of the Party 
leadership) • 
Superficially, one might feel free to assert that the very large 
amount raised by the Conservative associations would give to them a 
very significant voice in the management of the Party: 
The financial self-sufficiency of the local associations 
together with the personal independence of the party 
workers greatly reduces the ability of Central Office to 
impose its will. (7) 
This latter view of a fairly devolved financial structure existing within 
the Conservative Party appears, at first, to contradict the traditional 
view of the Party as bei~g overtly leadership-dominated. Moreover, 
if it is true that this financial dependence on the associations 
increases the latter's autonomy within the Conservative Party, how can 
this be equated with our argument about leadership dominance of the 
SNP where there was an even greater reliance upon the branches for 
funding? 
The main reason stems from the fact that within the Conservative 
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Party the associations had existed as organisations for decades. They 
had considerable experience as fund-raisers, campaigners, and in many 
cases, had their own agent and Member of Parliament. They were not 
novitiates, but rather time-served activists who knew a great deal 
about organisational practices. Even so, there is evidence from the 
recent past that whenever the constituencies fell into organisational 
torpor, the Party leadership was capable of instituting programmes to 
raise incomes, and to have such proposals accepted by the rank-and-file 
in the constituencies. Under the leadership of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 
a major re-examination of tile organisational structure of the Conservative 
Party was initiated in 1965. This followed upon the Party's election 
defeat of 1964, and subsequent demoralisation. The re-organisation of 
Party structure: 
.•. represented one of the most ambitious efforts at internal 
reform ever undertaken by a British party and deserves to 
rank with the modernising era of the Conservative Party after 
1945. (8) 
On the specific question of finance it was felt that lack of funds 
may have prevented the Party from instituting an effective advertising 
campaign. Thus, Robert Allen, one of the Party's Treasurers, 
recorrnnended: 
... the doubling of constituency contributions to Central 
Office, a rise in the annual subscription and the setting 
up in each constituency of a special fund-raising corrnnittee. (9) 
Such a frontal attack on the matter of declining finance was, as 
we have frequently noted, a recurring feature of the approach taken by 
the SNP's leadership to solving, what was for them, an endemic problem. 
In the case of the Conservative Party, the rank-and-file, which had 
a tradition of autonomy in financial matters, had just seen their Party 
lose a General Election. The defeat was, in part, explained by 
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inadequate organisation, and, therefore this had to be remedied. In 
such circumstances acceptance of central direction was not hard to 
understand. 
The SNP branches were content to follow their Party leadership in 
such matters as Alba Pools, increasing quotas, publicity levies, and 
by-election dues, because it was felt that such contributions were 
vital to the organisational health of the Party. Moreover, they 
recognised that there were no other major sources of income available 
to headquarters. Finally, unlike the Conservative associations, there 
was no tradition of effective fund-raising; for most of the 1960s the 
SNP activists were new to the business of political campaigning and 
organisation, and therefore needed guidance and direction. 
The Labour Party has, over the years, been unable to extract 
sufficient cash from the local parties to finance their activities: 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Party's attitude 
to its head office throughout its history has been its 
evident reluctance to provide funds for staff and facilites 
to enable head office adequately to fulfil its task. (10) 
When Rose looked at the total income of the Labour Party between 
1967 and 1970 (11) he found that the trade-unions contributed 57 per 
cent to the total, the constituency parties some 19 per cent, and the 
cooperative societies 11 per cent, the other four per cent came from 
Transport House itself. It is obvious from these figures that although 
the constituencies are important, if the Party relied upon them for 
most of its income then the overall level of Party activity would, by 
financial necessity, diminish. 
There can be little doubt that the constituency Labour parties -
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at least in so far as raising revenue for the centre is concerned -
appear to have been highly autonomous. That is to say, they were left 
largely on their own so far as the business of raising income was 
concerned. Certainly compared to the SNP, where well over 90 per 
cent of the Party's income, prior to 1974, was coming from branch and 
individual members, and where the leadership was almost continually 
calling for greater sacrifices in the cause of improving Party finances. 
A possible exp1anationnr this flabbiness in Labour Party internal 
fund-raising may have lain in the fact that the associations knew that 
the trade-unions would always provide the wherewithal for Labour's 
organisational necessities. Moreover, as Rose has commented: 
At the constituency level, the maintenance of small, poorly 
financed party, dependent upon the loyalty of a few volunteers, 
maximises the influence of individual volunteers. (12) 
Contrasting with the experience of the SNP, and even the Conservative 
Party, attempts to institute new fund-raising schemes, and initiatives 
have foundered: 
The institutionalised resistance to change of those 
in charge of the status~quo was most firmly demonstrated 
from 1966 to 1970 when Oliver Stutchbury (1971), a City 
financier, became the Party's honorary and active financial 
adviser. Stutchbury's various schemes to raise money gave 
him by his own admission, four frustrating years of failure. (13) 
What conclusions can we draw about the income sources of the major 
parties in so far as they affect power relationships between the 
respective 1eaderships and local associations? 
Clearly, in the case of the Labour Party, there appears to have 
been little direction of the local bodies by the central leadership, 
and when this did occur the response was disappointing. Finer's 
figure (14) of 59 per cent of total Party income coming from the 
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constituencies still includes donations made by trade-unions to the 
local branches and associations (in any case his estimate appears to 
be very high). Transport House may complain, but apparently it does 
little else: Rose discovered (15) that in 1969, at least one-third 
of the associations failed to pay the required affiliation fee to 
headquarters (in 1969 the minimum fee was £50 per association or Sp 
per member). Association autonomy, or, perhaps more accurately, 
isolation, is the predominant organisational pattern so far as 
financial matter, in the Labour Party, is concerned. Indeed since 
local associations also receive donations from the Unions they are 
actually the chief beneficiaries of the internal flow of funds within 
the Party (16) 
The Conservative Party has a very much greater reliance upon their 
local associations for Party income. However, the very strength of 
these bodies, together with their traditions, has meant that they too 
have considerable autonomy in financial matters. But whenever 
organisational difficulties emerge, as in 1965-1966, they have accepted 
guidance and direction from headquarters. 
Finally, one should also remember that the major parties draw 
financial support from a diverse series of interest groups which tends 
to increase organisational centrifugalism in respect of finance: 
The methods used to finance political activity illustrate 
the limited organisational cohesion of British parties ... 
if the activities of 'para-political' pressure groups, 
business firms intermittently or incidentally concerned 
with nationalisation, and trade unions and Co-operative 
societies are inCluded, electoral finance appears even more 
disjointed and disorganised. (17) 
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Campaign Management in the Labour and Conservative Parties 
The basic problem which confronts would-be campaign managers in 
the two major parties stems from the fact that the structures of both 
are not vertically uniform. Instead there are the parliamentary parties, 
as well as the bureaucracies in London and the regions. But the 
bureaucracies, unlike the SNP, do not function as part of an identifiable 
political leadership. Rather, they are almost anonymous with largely 
administrative roles. 
The Conservative Party has a dual organisational structure. Central 
Office inspires and coordinates the work of the Party in the country (18) 
The National Union brings together all the constituency associations 
(there is a separate structure in Scotland, but all Scottish constituency 
associations are affiliated to the National Union (19) The Official 
Ulster Unionist Party is associated with the Conservative Party, and is 
represented on the Central Council (2°1. Th.e Union's principal role 
is the raising of cash and the fighting of elections. However, according 
to "McKenzie (21), the National Union is cumbersome and unwieldy, and 
not really all that effective in coordinating the work of the affiliated 
constituency associations. The latter are 'tight-knit and efficient' 
organisations, but their autonomy is sufficient to prevent the National 
Union from imposing overall control over them. In fact, its national 
role seems restricted to: 
Serving as a two-way channel of communication which keeps the 
Leader and his colleagues in Parliament informed of the mood 
of their followers in the country and which enables the leaders, 
in turn, to explain their policies to their supporters in the 
country. (22) 
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The job of the professionals in Central Office is to ensure that 
the associations are, in fact, doing their job of fund-raising, etc. 
Indeed, Central Office fulfils the management functions which one might 
have expected the National Union to perform: 
The members of the National Union have grumbled from time 
to time but they have made no concerted effort to win 
control of the management of the affairs of the Party. (23) 
This ~e facto control of organisational matters by the professionals, 
together with the inability of the Union to manage the constituency 
associations appears to have left tile latter with a great deal 
organisational autonomy. According to Pinto-Duschinsky, 
K~ 
Conservative Politics is bestAas a continuing series of 
feints and manoeuvres between various sections of the 
party, each seeking to push forward its opinions, each 
realising, however, the immense costs of disunity. (24) 
Thus campaign management within the Conservative Party was (and is) 
likely to be more complicated than in the SNP, where coordination was 
effected quickly by the leadership. This is not to say that the 
Conservative Party organisation was typically decentralised. But 
rather if we compare it to the SNP of the 1960s, then, in fact, the 
local associations did manifest greater self-management than was true 
of their equivalents in the SNP. 
The constituency associations of the Labour Party do not rival 
in organisational strength their equivalents in the Conservative Party. 
Over the years they have grown progressively weaker in both membership 
and financial terms ('Militant', appears to have grown stronger as the 
associations have become weaker). TIlis organisational weakness must 
also be seen against a background of greater control by the leadership 
than is found in the Conservative Party. McKenzie asserts that: 
If any tiling, however, the Labour constituency parties are 
subject to rather more detailed control by the central organs 
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of the party than are the Conservative associations. (25) 
and, later: 
It is evident ••. that the activities of the mass organisation 
of the Labour Party ... loom much larger in the affairs of the 
party as a whole than do the activities of the National Union 
on the Conservative side. (26) 
As we saw in the first section of this chapter, there is little 
evidence that the centre had any great success in instituting programmes 
for improving Labour's financial position. We shall now turn to the 
campaign management of the Party (and the Conservative Party) to try 
to ascertain if Transport House and Central Office were any more 
successful in instituting, and effecting, campaigns which were later 
carried out by the constituency parties. If they were not, would this 
not mean that the supposed control exercised by the centre over the 
constituencies was more apparent than real, or at least was much less 
centralised than the SNP? 
As we observed on the previous chapter, the SNP's constituency 
associations functioned during the election campaigns as representatives 
of the centre. The latter planned the campaigns, determined the main 
themes, purchased advertising space, and agreed upon the slogans. The 
leadership also devised the literature and manifesto, and even made 
available a standard election address. We also noted that the over-
whelming majority of constituencies and candidates based their local 
campaigns on these centrally-devised election issues. Moreover, they 
also had regular contact with the centre during the course of the 
campaign itself. 
All of this, in effect, meant that the constituency workers carried 
on the sorts of activities which only they as activists at the local 
level were capable of fulfilling: canvassing, leaflet distribution, 
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car cavalcades, and public meetings. How does this compare with the 
Labour and Conservative parties? 
In describing and analysing campaigns there is a grave 
risk of intellectualising the process and attributing 
too much initiative to the campaigner; the manoeuvres 
of candidates are too often limited by pressures 
resulting from scarcity of resources, expectations 
of voters, pre-arranged strategy, and previous policy 
commitments. (27) 
There is much wisdom in the above quote, yet evidence from the 
elections of 1974 suggests that the major parties may have had slightly 
greater difficulties with their local associations than was the case 
for the leadership of the SNP. For example, Finer has argued: 
In both major parties only policy making, research, and 
publicity are centralised; campaigning, finance and the 
selection of the candidate are highly decentralised. (28) 
We have seen that prior to the February campaign of 1974, the 
Scottish Nationalists had already began an expensive publicity campaign, 
and also instituted central strategic planning which involved the 
constituencies as well. There was, then, a coordinated national effort. 
Butler and Kavanagh found (29) that this was not the case for the major 
parties: 
In many constituencies the campaign was strikingly remote 
from that at party headquarters .•. On this occasion the 
inevitable dissociation of the two campaigns was heightened 
by the rush which made it even more difficult for many hard 
pressed candidates, agents and party workers to follow the 
national campaign. (30) 
This same study found that many local campaigns were hardly 
influenced by national matters, indeed their tactics remained unaltered 
after the campaign had started (31) However, it was discovered that 
more Labour candidates than Conservative followed the national campaign. 
In fact, a majority of Tory candidates claimed that they did pay close 
attention to the overall national contest. (32) 
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One outstanding advantage the SNP had over the other parties was 
that communication between the grass-roots and the centre was direct, 
and not filtered through regional offices. The Nuffield study found 
that in the February campaign this was one of the predominant 
characteristics of centre-periphery liaison: 
The party headquarters continued to rely largely on the 
reports of the regional and area organisers for information 
on the mood of the voters, expecting them to act as filters 
for the reports from the constituencies. (33) 
After the February 1974 Election the Conservative campaign had, 
by the usual standards, failed. As we have seen, the majority of SNP 
candidates were satisfied with the conduct of the centre during the 
same campaign, and by the standards of seats gained the Nationalists 
had done well. 
Unlike the Tories, the Labour Party had reason to be happier with 
the planning and execution of its electoral strategy; they had won 
the Election. But more than this, the Labour Party .. did, in fact, 
greatly improve its organisational back-up; it had, for the first 
time, a daily polling service, the Campaign Committee at Transport 
House had video facilities to monitor the performance of Party leaders 
on television, there was a telex link with regional organisers, and: 
In their post-election analysis Labour organisers claimed 
that there was little scope for improvement of their 
campaign management. (34) 
This is reflected in the amount of attention that the candidates 
paid to the national manifesto. Butler and Kavanagh found that over 
four-fifths of Labour candidates paid close attention to the Party's 
manifesto, whilst less than two-thirds of Conservatives made the same 
claim (35). As we indicated in the previous chapter something like 
84 per cent of SNP candidates utilised the Party manifesto (that is 
to say, they drew upon it when making speeches and writing letters 
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to the press, etc.) for their constituency campaigns over the two 
elections of 1974. 
By the October General Election it was discovered that the amount 
of attention paid by the Labour candidates to the 'manifesto' had 
fallen by 20 per cent, whilst the figure for the Conservatives had 
increased, by eight per cent, to 73 per cent (36) Both figures are 
considerably below that for the SNP over the two campaigns. 
In both elections the major parties did many of the things which, 
as we have seen, the SNP had sought to do: daily bulletin~, to the 
candidates, regular communication with the constituencies, making 
available leaflets and newspapers, and pro-forma election addresses. 
Yet unline the SNP's election planners who knew that they had no 
alternative but to utilise these methods, since media access was 
severly limited (37), tile leadership of the major parties believed 
that the campaign would be won via the national media. Of the 
Conservatives, Butler and Kavanagh noted: 
The party leadership had clearly decided well in advance 
of 1974 that the news media and advertising were more 
important than constituency organisation for cummunicating 
with the mass electorate. (38) 
There is little reason to believe that matters differed much in the 
Labour Party. 
A consequence of such media-dominated campaigns was that the 
constituencies were likely to work away on their own. MOreover, since 
there was such a vast concentration on the national campaigns of the 
major parties it was entirely possible that the sort of coordination, 
and centralised direction, typical of the SNP, would have seemed 
unnecessary. Thematic appeals could be lauched via television with 
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the constituency activists merely following along. The SNP's share of 
television time was extremely small by comparison (see above). Therefore, 
the Party had to compensate by ensuring that all parts of the Party 
machine worked in unison. This may also explain why the SNP appeared 
to be the most visible and active of the parties (31) 
Another essential part of a party's organisation is publicity. 
This, of course, is not restricted to election campaigns. It is, 
therefore, to the publicity mechanisms of the major parties to which 
we now turn. 
Publicity and Organisation 
The widest, or at least most spectacular, use of publicity tends 
to come during election campaigns, but as we discovered, and as the 
Finer quote given above testifies, publicity tends to be a centralised 
function. It is not surprising, therefore, that major parties have 
parts of their bureaucracies specifically given over to publicity 
matters. 
In the Labour Party there is the Information Department (40) which 
disseminates, as its title suggests, information concerning the Party's 
policies and programmes, etc. It circulates to the candidates and the 
local parties position papers and policy documents which, in turn, are 
utilised for local press releases and/or campaigning. Finally, it 
controls campaign advertising, the drawing up of pro-forma election 
addresses, campaign literature and posters. 
Conservative Central Office has three deputy directors of publicity 
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each responsible for press, broadcasting, and publications respectively (41) 
It is fairly obvious that they cover the same areas as their equivalents 
in Transport House. 
It has long been recognised that the centralisation of publicity/ 
propaganda is essential in an age of almost instant communication between 
centre and periphery. But, as we have seen, even when there is limited 
access to the national media, as in the case of the SNP, there is still 
a premium placed on centralisation. The reason is simple: the need 
to ensure a thematic campaign, one in which a party's programme and 
image are viewed in a similar way in diverse parts of the country. This 
also has the advantage of minimising potentially embarrassing local 
campaigns which ignore the themes devised by the leadership. Finally, 
there are sound management reasons as well; a centralised campaign is 
easier to control and monitor. It also goes some way to ensuring that 
each part of the country is getting some coverage by the party. Rose 
offers yet another explanation for centralised propaganda, and in doing 
so certainly touches upon a raw nerve of organisational management: 
Within the ranks of the party, propaganda can be used to 
sustain morale by providing tangible evidence to partisans 
that their leaders are doing something to get the party's 
message to the electorate. (42) 
Both the elections of 1974 offer sufficient evidence to suggest 
that publicity centralisation, albeit of vary~g degrees, was the norm 
for both major parties. During the February campaign, for example, 
Conservative Central Office prepared leaflets for distribution to 
specific target groups like immigrants, young voters, and Jews (43) 
In fact, the Tories also had three 'regional' publicity officers who 
assisted local agents and candidates in exploiting opportunities 
offered by the local media. However, the Nuffield study found a certain 
variability among Conservative candidates in the emphasis each placed 
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upon the national campaign (44) This was a problem which apparently 
did not affect the Labour campaign to the same degree. 
Labour candidates paid close attention to the themes of the 
national campaign (45). Yet as we highlighted in the last chapter, 
the Labour campaign, which was supposed to be 'synchronised' (46) was 
certainly no more so, in publicity terms, than that devised, and 
fought, by the SNP. 
The October campaigns of both parties appear to have been marginally 
more centralised - probably because of the impact of two elections in 
one year. Centrally-produced leaflets were widely circulated, indeed 
the Conservativeshld twenty offset lithograph machines in the vicinity 
of critical seats with the purpose of producing high quality leaflets 
at short notice (47) Election addresses, local speeches, and press-
releases emphasised national themes. In fact, just as we have found 
for tile SNP, there were few references of any kind to local matters (48) 
Whether candidates, agents or activists paid close attention to the 
actual speeches of the national leadership is doubtful. What is not is that 
the great bulk of publicity themes was determined by the respective 
party headquarters. 
Yet publicity is not merely limited to election campaigns, although 
this is certainly when it becomes most tangible. The major parties' 
publicity machines are motivated by a concern to ensure that the 
national media report the speeches of the notables, relate policy 
statements, and otherwise inform the electorate of the positive aspects 
of the party in question. For most of the time the constituencies are 
not much affected - in pUblicity terms - by headquarters. The activists 
! 
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can merely pick up a national newspaper, or switch on their televisions 
or radios to hear the latest news about the party. 
Such luxuries were not afforded to the SNP before 1974. Thus 
they compensated for this deficiency by centralising even non-election 
pubJi:ity. MOre importantly, and more specifically, by the late 1960s, 
and certainly throughout the 'oil campaign', the SNP became a 
campaigning party. This meant that the overall publicity strategy 
had to be devised and coordinated by the centre. It meant that the 
branches had to utilise the material provided by the leadership, and 
that the latter knew the amount of coverage each part of the country 
was enjoying. Centralisation of publicity themes, together with the 
strategic aspects of campaigns such as 'oil' or 'Its Time - For Self 
Government', was the norm. 
Of the three areas examined, finance campaign-management, and 
pubJi:ity, only publicity could be said to be distinguished by any degree 
of marked centralisation so far as the two major parties are concerned 
mainly due to literature, posters and campaign themes. The other two 
areas, albeit in varying degrees, were much less centralised in the 
Labour and Conservative parties than in the SNP. 
In matters of finance the Labour Party's leadership had little 
control over, and even less reliance on, the constituencies (49). 
The Conservatives did depend, to a much greater degree, on the local 
associations for cash, but because of their very strength, expertise 
and tradition, they were typically autonomous. However, they did 
respond positively when called upon by the leadership, to participate 
in raising more revenue for the overall national effort. 
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In campaign management the degree of centralisation varied as 
between the two parties. But what is clear is that neither, at least 
in 1974, came close to rivalling the coordinated approach adopted by 
the SNP, this was most especially true of the February campaign. The 
major difference, certainly in 1974, was that the SNP had been in a 
state of almost constant mobilisation - as a consequence of the 'oil 
campaign', - whilst the other parties were taken somewhat by surprise 
by the first election of the year. 
Finally, the SNP had the advantage of organisational momentum built 
up behind it in 1973/74. It had been accumulating both membership and 
finances, and planning a series of campaigns which served to raise 
Party morale. The Labour and Conservative parties, on the other hand, 
were faced with bureaucratic staleness, a feature of organisational life 
not uncommon in older, more established institutions. 
Only in publicity do have clear indication of centralisation and 
headquarters' dominance in the major parties. Yet even in this sphere 
the SNP was at least as centralised as the other two. In fact, if we 
go beyond election pUblicity into overall publicity effort, for example, 
in the planning and execution of inter-election campaigns, then the 
SNP was without doubt a far more centralised organisation in the 
management of publtity. 
The structure of the major parties encourages this less centralist 
approach. The unions, the parliamentary party, the NEC, the Transport 
House bureaucracy, and the ideological groupings in the Labour Party 
are reflective of a diverse organisational power structure. _And in 
the Conservative Party, the division between the National Union and 
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Central Office, the traditional strength of the constituencies, the 
parliamentary party, 'big-business', the regional divisions of the 
Party, and the dependence on the local areas for financing the work 
of the machine as a whole, all have a decentralist impact upon the 
Conservatives. 
As we have argued above, between 1960 and 1974 the SNP was 
preoccupied with the erection, and then the solidification, of its 
organisational structure. Centralisation followed inevitably in the 
wake. For most of the time, policy considerations, and ideological 
distinctiveness, took a back-seat. Such concerns would become more 
pressing as the SNP became more established and as its procedures were 
formalised; organisational centralisation was the key to success 
electorally. 
The SNP's electoral defeat of 1979 gave rise to demands within the 
Party for a more vigorous ideological debate. Some members began to 
argue that one of the supposed strengths of the Part~, that is, a non-
class based ideology, prevented it from breaking into the Labour Party's 
heartland in West Central Scotland. 
Such critics argue that, by itself, good organisation will never 
be sufficient to capture the working-class voter, cmd that 'left-wing' 
socio-economic policies should be adopted in a bid to change both the 
image and the power structure (by replacing some of the older personnel 
in the leadership) of the Party. Since 1979 these arguments have indeed 
led to considerable changes in both the 'ideology', and among leading 
personnel wi thin the SNP. We shall endeavour to explain the significance 
of these developments, within the context of this thesis, in the 
POstScR'tPt. 
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Po,Su<:"i Pb . 
As we have attempted to show in this thesis, the leadership of 
the SNP during the 1950s faced the potential extinction of the Party as 
a functioning organisation. This crisis led to a fundamental re-appraisal 
of the organisational structure and overall direction of the SNP. 
Out of crisis was born innovation. A comparatively small number of 
individuals innovated and instituted new approaches to the problems of 
electioneering, the raising of finance, and the apportionment of managerial 
responsibility. Some of these individuals had been active both in the 
Party and in the leadership for a considerable time, for example, Arthur 
Donaldson and Dr. Robert McIntyre. Others like Gordon Wilson and Ian 
Macdonald were comparatively new. 
The leadership of the late 1950s and early 1960s recognised that 
there existed in Scotland a substantial body of support for 'Home Rule'. 
With this in mind they set about restructuring the SNP along lines which 
would mobilise this support. 
By the early 1960s the plans and programmes of the leadership group 
had begun to bear fruit; membership was growing rapidly and electoral 
advances were occurring, for example, at Bridgeton. 
As we have demonstrated the great majority of the new members were 
political novices. Consequently, they were more than usually reliant 
upon their leaders for guidance and direction. Secondly, the leadership 
group was manifestly successful in improving the standing of the Party. 
Next, as we have seen from our analysis of organisational theory, a 
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rapidly expanding organisation does tend to give rise to a centralised 
and hierarchical management structure. Finally, in any case, certain 
of the programmes and mechanisms introduced by the leadership, for 
example, the Wilson Report, consciously sought to introduce centralisation. 
As Michels' pointed out (1) such oligarchical tendencies need not 
carry any ideological commitment on the part of the leaders. On the 
contrary, they may retain a formal attachment to decentralisation and 
organisational democracy. Such was the case for many of the SNP's 
leaders. Rather the events and realities of rapid growth pushed the 
Party towards administrative centralisation. 
What mattered to the majority of SNP members and their leaders, was 
that the Party should prosper and continue to grow organisationally. 
For so long as these aims looked as if they were being achieved, then 
the rank-and-fi1e's impotence on organisational matters was a small price 
to pay. 
That the leadership was more concerned with administrative/ 
organisational questions than with policy, can be gauged from the amount 
of attention given by the leaders to the two areas at NEC meetings, 
National Council and Conference. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the National Assembly was specifically 
created to deal with policy, and to deflect the membership, or their 
delegates, from taking a hand in the administration of the Party through 
participation on the NEC. 
Policy was a luxury which would only become affordable after the 
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SNP had achieved significant electoral success and a strong parliamentary 
presence. 
The emergence of an eleven strong parliamentary group in 1974, 
created another centre of power outwith the NEC. MOreover, the very 
fact that the SNP had such a prominent parliamentary presence inevitably 
increased the importance of policy questions. As the SNP MPs were faced 
with voting on a whole range of socio-economic and political matters, the 
likelihood of conflict within the group and within the Party increased. 
Between 1974 and 1979 relations between the NEC and the Party's Mrs 
deteriorated. Neither group was willing to concede organisational pre-
eminence to the other. Some individuals such as Gordon Wilson, Douglas 
Henderson and Winifred Ewing were, as we have seen, previously members 
of the leadership group. Yet after the parliamentary elections of 1974 
they became detached from the interests of the NEC, whilst members of 
the latter, such as William Wolfe and Margo MacDonald, insisted that the 
NEC was still the superior forum. Their personal interests lay in 
Scotland and not at Westminster. 
In such a climate, organisational questions receded in importance to 
be replaced by policy matters such as devolution or independence, 
nationalisation or the continuation of private ownership, 'constituents' 
interests versus Party interests. Gradually these and other issues resolved 
themselves into 'left' and 'right' ideological questions. To some extent 
these divisions were kept in check through the recognition that open 
Party splits would damage the SNPs electoral chances. This factor 
disappeared after the 1979 Election. 
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After the 1979 General Election when the SNP lost all but two of 
its seats in Westminger, a coherent left-wing grouping, the '79 Group' 
emerged. By 1981 members of this group, including the fonner Labour MP 
Jim Si1lars, had gained a very significant presence on the NEC, and had 
seen many of their policies adopted by the Party Conferences of 1980 
and 1981. 
Both of these factors, the strong parliamentary presence (which 
divided the then existing leadership into those who had been successful 
candidates and those who had not), and the disastrous results of the 1979 
Election, changed the SNP utterly. 
In the years between 1960 and 1974 the Party concentrated all of its 
energies on organisational grOWtil. lmity prevailed through necessity. 
But it was also reinforced through success. In the main, the leaders 
had presided over growth. They were certainly temporary set-backs. But 
the overall direction was onward and upward. And it seems likely that 
this expansion kept tile lid on whatever internal dissent that might have 
existed. 
However, after the 1974 Elections the leadership was divided between 
London and Edinburgh. From this grew personality and policy clashes. 
Policy debates became inevitable when the Party carreface-to-face with 
tile issues which were tile staple diet of Westminster politics. The more 
the SNP ~4Ps disagreed with the NEC on policy questions, the more likely 
it became that the rank-and-file would also take sides. 
These divisions were exacerbated by electoral defeat. Those who 
believed in full scale independence blamed the devolutionists (the latter 
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had, after all, failed to secure a Scottish Assembly). The 'left' blamed 
the 'right', tile argument being that the SNP had not sufficiently 
identified with the Scottish working-class, and therefore, lost the 
biggest single group of electoral support. The SNP turned in on itself 
and organisation was no longer to the forefront of the leadership's 
attention. 
Prior to 1974, leadership unity was preserved in the cause of 
growth and electoral success. It was facilitated by virtue of the fact 
that there was only one power base, that is, the NEC. This united 
leadership was crucial to effective control over the machine. 
When compared to the Labour Party, for example, certain obvious 
features strike one immediately. The Labour Party has a fully established 
organisational base. Until recently there was less interest in 
organisational matters within the Labour Party - which may partially 
explain the rise of 'Militant'. Moreover, the Labour Party has at least 
two major sources of organisational power; the NEC and the Parliamentary 
Party. This often gives rise to internal conflict. These were aspects 
of party life which began to afflict the SNP after 1974. 
Finally, after its electoral defeat in 1979 the Labour Party, like 
the SNP, became wracked by organisational conflict. Electoral loss tends 
to initiate such debates in most political parties. 
During the course of this thesis we have attempted to demonstrate 
how certain organisational realities steered the SNP leadership towards 
centralisation in the years between 1960 and 1974. Centralisation was 
aided by the unified leadership structure and an absence of rancour on 
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policy matters. This was, of course, changed after 1974. Not only was 
that leadership split between Edinburgh and London, but in its turn this 
led to policy matters overtaking organisation in priority. MOreover, the 
very fact that the Party had secured 30 per cent of the Scottish vote must 
have seemed to many members as if the SNP's organisational problems were 
at an end. And as a consequence they could switch the bulk of their 
attention to policy. 
Electoral success brought its own rewards. However, it also brought 
to an end the very considerable concentration that the SNP leadership 
had given to the mundane but vital factor of organisation. 
As we have sought to show, the SNP between 1960 and 1974 was at 
least as centralised as the Labour and Conservative parties. The major 
parties had a number of major power centres. The SNP did not. Tradition 
and the experience of the Labour and Conservative activists had given to 
them more power over administrative matters than was enjoyed by the 
relatively inexperienced SNP workers. 
MOreover, policy was more critical to parties with an already strong 
parliamentary presence, indeed parties which regularly formed the 
government of the country, than to a party which prior to 1974 had only 
one MP in the House of Commons. 
Political parties which seriously aspire to achieving goal-realisation, 
for example, the government of their country, or as in the case of the 
SNP, the restoration of sovereignty to Scotland, must tackle and solve 
the basic problems examined in this thesis. They must secure a source 
of funding sufficient to sustain their propagandising and electoral 
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effort. They must establish an organisational structure which minimises 
internal dissent, or at least manages to contain it. Failure to do so 
can lead to the party splitting and/or the electorate refusing to support 
it on the grounds that it lacks confidence and unity. 
One of the most important characteristics of the emerging party has 
to be stable leadership group which can guarantee continuity in the first 
five to ten years of the party's life. In this way the new members can 
be guided and educated as to the needs of the organisation and encouraged 
to play their part in its expansion. Moreover, it allows for expertise 
to filter down to the grass-roots. 
For all of these reasons we would argue that not only do emerging 
political parties need to be highly centralised in their initial years 
of growth, but also that organisational factors will be far more important 
than policy concerns. Furthermore, if the leaders of such a party fail 
to keep a tight rein on membership activity and do not attend to the 
development of the organisation, then they must face the ever present 
prospect of party disintegration. 
Before the early 1960s the SNP did not have a stable and sufficient 
source of income. It did not have a coherent managerial view of how 
best to run the Party. The nembers in those few brandles which existed 
were not ins tructed as to the mos t effective nethod of achieving growth. 
Nor did the leadership have a tight grip on branch acti vi ty and effort. 
The Party drifted along and was, as we have argued, only a shadow of an 
organisation. It was only when Wilson, Macdonald, Donaldson et.al. got 
down to thinking seriously about what makes an organisation work and what 
transforms the shadow into substance, that the SNP could realistically 
346 
be described as a political party. Thereafter, through a combination of 
organisational imperative and planned action, the SNP became one of the 
most significant forces in post-war British politics. 
1. Robert Michels, 
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Appendix 
Extracts from the Constitution and Rules of the Scottish 
National Party, (Edinburgh 1978). 
Clause 14 
(a) The Annual National Conference of the Party shall be the supreme 
governing body of the Party. 
(b) The Annual National Conference and Special Conferences shall 
consist of -
(1) the delegates from Branches, Constituency Associations 
and Affiliated Organisations, in accordance with the 
provisions laid down in P~~T TWO of the Constitution 
and Rules; 
(2) the National Office-Bearers as defined in PART TWO 110 of 
the Constitution and Rules, and the members of National 
Council elected in accordance with PART TWO 97 (e) of the 
Constitution and Rules; 
(3) the Scottish National Party ~~mber or ~~mbers of Parliament 
as the case may be during his or their period as such. 
(c) The procedure, including voting powers shall be as provided in 
PART TWO of the Constitution and Rules. 
(d) An Annual National Conference shall be held, and Special 
Conferences shall be held when necessary, in accordance with 
the provisions of PART TWO of the Constitution and Rules. 
(e) The National Conferences may delegate such powers and directions 
as they may think fit to National Council, or to Committees or 
other bodies of the Party. 
Clause 15 National Council 
(a) Subject to the over-riding authority of the National Conferences, 
National Council shall be the governing body of the Party between 
conferences, and its decisions binding on the Party and all 
members unless and until rescinded or modified by a National 
Conference. 
(b) National Council shall be constituted in accordance with the 
provisions of PART TWO of the Constitution and Rules. 
(c) It shall be competent for National Council to amend PA~T TIvO of 
the Constitution and Rules in accordance with PART ONE 33 - 36 
inclusive of the Constitution and Rules. 
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Clause 16 Na!iona1 Assembly 
The National Assembly shall be constituted in accordance with the 
provisions of PA~T TflO of the Constitution and Rules. It shall -
(a) provide a forum among representatives of the Party from every 
part of Scotland for the exchange of constructive ideas on the 
attaining of the aims of the Party, with particular reference to 
discussion of the current political situation in Scotland, and to 
the actions and attitudes of the London-based parties, and provide 
the Party's Headquarters departments with regular opportunities 
for discussing proposals for the improvement of the quality of 
Party activity in the Constituencies; 
(b) evolve and review policies; 
(c) Provide opportunities for inviting speakers from outwith the 
party to address the National Assembly on important subjects of 
special interest to members; 
(d) provide opportunities additional to those of National Conference 
for public debates on important topics; 
(e) conduct additional business which National Conference or National 
Council may delegate to it. 
Clause 17 National Executive Committee 
The National Executive Committee shall be constituted in accordance 
with the provisions of PART TWO of the Constitution and Rules. It 
shall be concerned with administration, finance, organisation, 
publicity, training, membership and other matters relevant thereto, 
but National Council may delegate to it such powers and duties as 
National Council considers necessary. 
Clause 18 Affiliated Organisations 
Affiliated Organisations shall be organisations which support the Aims 
of the Party, and whose membership does not include members of other 
political parties active in Scotland, and which, having paid to the 
Headquarters of the Party Affiliation fees as determined by National 
Council, have applied for and been granted the status of Affiliated 
Organisations of the Party by National Council. 
Clause 18A Scottish Natio~a1 Party Association 
A Scottish National Party Association may be established, and if so 
established shall be organised by the National Secretary (who may with 
the agreement of the National Executive Committee delegate the duties 
involved) for persons outwith the United Kingdom ineligible for 
membership of the Party but who wish to support the Aims of the Party, 
and who are not members of any other political party active in Scotland 
and who accept the Constitution and Rules of the Scottish National 
Party Association, which Constitution and Rules shall be subject to the 
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approval of National Council. Subject to the approval of the National 
Executive Committee, Councils of the Scottish National Party Association 
may be established covering the whole of any nation outwith the United 
Kingdom, and within each such Council there may be individual 
territorial branches groups. 
BRANCHES AND GROUPS 
Clause 37 
All applications for membership of a duly constituted Branch shall be 
submitted to a meeting of the Branch and, provided the applicants 
appearm be eligible and have paid the appropriate subscriptions, their 
membership will be provisionally approved. Branches shall submit to 
the Headquarters the names and addresses of their members, and, should 
any of these be found to be ineligible, the Branch concerned shall be 
informed and the membership shall be invalid. 
Clause 38 
All applicants for membership of a Group shall be provisionally approved 
as members provided tlley appear to be eligible and have paid the 
appropriate subscriptions. Groups shall submit lists of their members 
to the Headquarters at least once a year, and, should any of these be 
found to be ineligible, the Group concerned shall be informed and the 
membership shall be invalid. Each Group within the constituency shall 
be approved by the Constituency Association. 
Clause 39 
Should a Branch consider it necessary to suspend or expel a member from 
the Branch the decision to do so must be taken at a full Branch Meeting 
of which fourteen days' written notice has been sent to the members of 
the Branch, including the member whom it is proposed to suspend or 
expel, and the proposal to suspend or expel must be included in the 
agenda sent to memebrs with the notice of the meeting. The member 
concerned must be given an opportunity to submit a statement of 
explanation or defence. Branches shall notify the Headquarters of all 
suspensions and expulsions immediately they take effect. A member 
suspended or expelled from a Branch may appeal to the National Executive 
Committee and thereafter to National Council. 
Clause 40 
Each Brandl shall elect a Chairman, a Secretary and a Treasurer, and 
may elect such other office-bearers as it considers necessary. 
Clause 41 
Each Branch shall elect an Executive Committee and may appoint such 
other Committees as it considers necessary. 
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Clause 42 
All Office-Bearers shall be elected at the Annual General Meeting of 
the Branch, of which meeting fourteen days' written notice must have 
been given to the members of the Branch, except in the case of a new 
Branch, where the office-bearers may be appointed a pro tempore until 
the first Annual General Meeting. 
Clause 43 
Office-bearers shall not be changed except though resignations, or by 
default, or at a meeting of the Branch of which fourteen days' written 
notice had been sent to the members of the Branch, including notification 
of the intention to change office-bearers or by direction of National 
Council. 
Clause 44 
The responsibilities of the office-bearers, Executive Committee and the 
members of the Branch shall include ensuring that -
(a) adequate notice of all meetings is given, meetings are 
properly conducted, full records are kept (including 
Minutes of meetings, register of names and receipts into 
and payments made from the funds of the Branch), and all 
correspondence is dealt with promptly. 
(b) proper and adequate steps are taken to promote the cause 
of Scottish Nationalism and the interests of the Party, 
within the area covered by the Branch,including the holding 
of meetings, canvassing, literature distribution and sales, 
and periodical reports of all activities are made to the 
Headquarters of the Party. 
(c) in particular every endeavour is made to carry out the 
policy and direction of the Party as may be laid down 
from time to time by Conferences and National Council, and 
that nothing is done to modify or prejudice the aims, 
pOlicy, or general activities of the party; and 
(d) every endeavour is made in the mutual interests of Branches 
and the Party as a whole to co-operate closely with other 
Branches, with the Regional and District Associations for 
its area, with the Constituency Association and with the 
Headquarters of the Party. 
Clause 45 
It shall be the duty of every Branch to send to the Headquarters by 28th 
February each year a summary of the Branch's annual audited statement 
of accounts for the year ended 31st December of the preceding year and 
a statement of its assets and liabilities. 
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Clause 46 
Each Branch shall pay to the Headquarters such affiliation fees, levies 
and other dues and in such instalments as National Council may decide. 
Clause 47 
All affiliation fees, levies and other dues to the Headquarters in 
respect of the financial year to 31st December shall be paid on or 
before that date. 
Clause 48 
Any Branch which has not paid in full "the levies and other dues to 
the Headquarters by 31st December shall be entitled to representation 
at National Conferences as provided in PART TWO 71 of the Constitution 
and Rules. 
Clause 49 
The National Executive Committee may, however, decide in exceptional 
circumstances that if a Branch has paid in full all affiliation fees, 
levies and other dues at a date later than 31st December, the Branch 
may be represented on a basis to be determined by the National Executive 
Committee but not to exceed the representation provided for in PART TIVO 
69 of the Constitution and Rules. 
Clause 50 
Each Branch shall by 28th February each year lodge at the Headquarters 
a list of the names and addresses of all its members as at 31st December 
of the preceding year. 
Clause 51 
No money shall be collected in the name of any Branch of the Party, nor 
shall the name of tile Party be used for the collection of money, and no 
payments shall be made from the funds of any Branch, except for the 
purposes covered by the Constitution and Rules of the Party unless 
however, the approval of National Council shall previously have been 
obtained. 
Clause 52 
Should any Branch for any reason whatsoever go out of existence, be 
disbanded by National Councilor National Conference, or secede from 
the Party, all funds and properties pertaining to the Branch shall, at 
the option of National Council, become the property of the Party as of 
represented by the National Council and the Chairman, the National 
Secretary and the National Treasurer for the time being. 
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Clause 53 
All resolutions, amendemnts and nominations by a Branch, sent to the 
Headquarters shall be certified in writing by the Chairman and the 
Secretary as having been properly passed at a meeting of the Branch, of 
which proper notice had been given in writing to the members of the 
Branch. 
Clause 54 
Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and Rules, Branches shall 
have full authority to conduct their own affairs but each Branch shall 
have a constitution approved by the National Executive Committee, and 
all proposed changes thereto and any proposed new Constitution of a 
Branch shall be submitted to and be confirmed by the National Executive 
Committee before adoption by the Branch. 
CONSTITUENCY ASSOCIATION 
Clause 55 
Each Branch within the Constituency shall be a member of the Constituency 
Association and decisions taken by the Association shall be binding on 
all Branches and Groups within the Constituency in relation to internal 
organisation within the Constituency, including financial support for 
the Constituency Association. A Branch which fails to cooperate with 
its Constituency Association may be reported to the National Executive 
Committee for disciplinary action. 
Clause 56 
Each Constituency Association shall have a constitution approved by the 
National Executive Committee, and all proposed changes thereto and any 
proposed new constitution of a Constituency Association shall be submitted 
to, and be confirmed by the National Executive Committee before adoption 
by the Constituency Association. Representation shall, unless otherwise 
agreed, consist of an equal number of delegates from each Branch in the 
Constituency. Each group may be represented by one delegate. The 
prospective parliamentary candidate and his election agent shall be 
members of the Association. 
Clause 57 
Each Constituency Association shall elect a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, 
a Secretary, a Treasurer and an Organiser, and may elect other office-
bearers and committees as it considers necessary. 
Clause 58 
All office-bearers shall be elected at the Annual General Meeting of the 
Constituency Association, of which meeting one month's written notice 
must have been given to the members of the Constituency Association and 
to the Secretaries of all Branches within the Constituency, except in 
the case of a new Constituency Association, where the office-bearers 
may be appointed pro tempore until the first Annual General Meeting. 
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Clause 59 
Office-bearers shall not be changed except through resignation, or by 
default, or at a meeting of the Constituency Association of which one 
month's written notice had been sent to the members of the Association, 
including notification of the intention to change office-bearers, or 
by direction of National Council. 
Clause 60 
Each Constituency Association shall pay to the Headquarters such levies 
and other dues and in such instalments as National Council may decide. 
Clause 61 
All levies and other dues to the Headquarters in respect of the financial 
year to 31st December shall be paid on or before that date. 
Clause 62 
The expenses of the Association shall be met either by levy on the 
Branches or by such other means as may be decided upon by the Association. 
The funds of Constituency Associations shall be used only for purposes 
covered by the Constitution and Rules of the Party, and an annual 
audited statement of accounts must be rendered for the Associations's 
Annual General Meeting and be sent to the Headquarters. 
Clause 63 
It shall be the duty of every Constituency Association to send an 
annual report to the Headquarters by 30th April each year. 
Clause 64 
Should any Constituency Association for any reason whatsoever go out 
of existence, be disbanded by National Councilor National Conference, 
or secede from the Party, all funds and properties pertaining to the 
Constituency Association shall, at the option of National Council, 
become the property of the Party as represented by the National Council 
and the Chairman, the National Secretary and the National Treasurer for 
the time being. 
Clause 6E-
All resolutions, amendements and nominations by a Constituency Association 
sent to the Headquarters shall be certified in writing by the Chairman and 
the Secretary as having been properly passed at a Meeting of the Constituency 
Association of which proper notice had been given in writing to the members 
of the Constituency Association. 
PARTY DISCIPLINE 
Clause 66 
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It shall be within the power of the National Executive Committee to 
admonish, suspend or expel any Branch, Constituency Association, or 
other organisation or any member (either as a member or as an office-
Bearer) of the Party in consequence of any contravention of the 
Constitution and Rules, of any' decision made thereunder or of conduct 
inimical to the interests of the Party. This power may be exercised 
in the name of the National Executive Committee by the Chairman or the 
National Secretary but only in emergency and between meeting of the 
National Executive Committee, to which a report in writing shall be 
submitted. The National Executive Committee shall report all such 
admonitions, suspensions and expulsions to National Council. 
Clause 67 
Any such admonished, suspended or expelled Branch, Constituency 
Association, other organisation or member shall have the right of 
appeal to the first meeting of National Council, whose decision shall 
be final and binding. 
Clause 68 
Suspensions shall be for a specified period, at the end of which the 
National Executive Committee shall decide whether it will be continued 
or whether some other action is necessary, and it will report its 
decision to National Council. 
Clause 69 
The representation at Annual National Conference shall be 
(a) two delegates from each Branch whose membership does not 
exceed fifty and one additional delegate for every 
additional fifty members or part thereof, provided that 
affiliation fees, levies and other dues to the Headquarters 
have been paid in full and provided always that no Branch 
shall be entitled to more than ten delegates. 
(b) one delegate from each Constituency Association, and 
(c) delegate or delegates from each affiliated organisation, 
the number to be determined annually in December by the 
National Council foll~wing recommendations by the National 
Executive Committee. 
Clause 70 
Branches which have paid affiliation fees but have failed to pay in full 
levies and other dues to the Headquarters shall be entitled to representation 
in proportion to the amounts of levies and other dues paid, representation 
to be decided as follows -
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The total levies and other dues due by each Branch 
shall be divided by the number of delegates qualified 
for by membership, and a Branch shall be entitled to 
one delegate for each proportion paid. 
Clause 71 
Each Branch granted recognition by the National Executive Committee 
between 31st December of the preceding year and Annual National 
Conference shall be entitled to two delegates. 
Clause 72 
The National Treasurer shall be responsible for assessing Branch 
entitlement on the above basis and shall give adequate notice to 
Branches. 
Clause 73 
The representation from each Branch to a Special Conference shall remain 
at the same number as fixed for the previous Annual National Conference 
and each new Branch recognised since the previous Annual National 
Conference shall be entitled to two delegates provided affiliation fees, 
levies and other dues to the Headquarters are paid not later than 
fourteen days prior to the Special Conference. 
Clause 74 
The representation from each Constituency Association and from each 
Affiliated Organisation to a Special Conference shall be one delegate. 
NATIONAL mUNCIL 
Clause 96 
National Council shall consist of -
(a) one delegate from each Branch, to be nominated by the 
Branch. 
(b) one delegate from each Constituency Association, to 
be nominated by the Constituency Association. 
(c) delegate or delegates from each affiliated organisation, 
the member to be determined annually in December by the 
National Council following recommendations by the National 
Executive Committee. 
(d) the National Office-Bearers as defined in PART TWO 110 of 
the Constitution and Rules; and 
(e) Thirty members elected by Annual National Conference 
(referred to herein as the "Elected 1v1embers of National 
Council") . 
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(f) the Scottish National Party Member or Members of 
Parliament as the case may be during his or their 
period as such. 
No member of National Council shall be entitled to more than one 
deliberative vote by virtue of his membership of it under (d), 
(e) and (f) hereof. 
Clause 97 
The names and addresses of the delegates nominated by Branches, Constituency 
Associations and Affiliated Organisations shall be notified in writing 
to the National Secretary of the Party within twenty-one days from the 
date of Annual National Conference. 
Clause 98 
Each new Branch, Constituency Association and Affiliated Organisation 
recognised between Annual National Conferences shall be entitled to 
nominate a delegate within twenty-one days from its official recognition. 
Clause 99 
If a delegate resigns as such, intimation thereof in writing shall 
immediately be made to the National Secretary, together with 
notification of the name and address of the new delegate. 
Clause 100 
Ordinary meetings of National Council shall be held at least four times 
a year. 
Clause 101 
A quorum of National Council shall consist of 100 of its members. 
Clause 102 
The procedure regarding notice of meetings, matters cDncerning the agenda, 
conduct of business etc. shall be adopted from time to time by the 
Council, except that the procedure adopted in regard to the Annual National 
Conference as laid down in PART TWO 85 of the Constitution and Rules shall 
apply. 
NATION~ ASSEMBLY 
Clause 103 
The National Assembly shall consist of -
(a) Two representatives from each parliamentary constituency 
in Scotland, to be elected by the Constituency Association 
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in accordance with procedure and arrangements approved by 
National Council. 
(b) the Member of Parliament for each constituency, of the 
prospective parliamentary candidate for the constituency 
from the date of approval by the National Executive 
Committee of his adoption. 
(c) one delegate from each Affiliated Organisation. 
(d) the National Office-Bearers as defined in PART ONE 110 of 
the Constitution and Rules; and 
(e) the thirty Elected Members of National Council. 
Clause 104 
At least two meetings of National Assembly shall be held each year. 
Clause 105 
A quorum of National Assembly shall consist of one quarter of its 
membership. 
Clause 106 
The procedure regarding notice of meetings, matters concerning the 
agenda, conduct of business etc., shall be as adopted from time to time 
by the Assembly. 
Clause 107 
A National Office-Bearer appointed for the purpose by National Council 
shall be Convener of the National Assembly, and he shall in person or by 
depute conduct the proceedings at its meetings. 
Clause 108 
Notwithstanding PART TWO, Clause 108, the Chairman of the Party shall be 
empowered to convene and to chair meetings of the National Assembly. 
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITIEE 
Clause 109 
The National Executive Committee shall consist of -
(a) The National Office-Bearers as defined in PART TWO 112 of 
he Constitution and Rules; and 
(b) ten memebrs elected by National Council. 
f 
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(c) up to seven of the Scottish National Party Members 
of Parliament during their period as such to be appointed 
annually by the SNP Members of Parliament. 
No member of the National Executive Committee shall be entitled 
to more than one deliberative vote in that Committee. 
Clause 110 
The members elected by National Council as in 109 (b) above shall 
continue to serve on the National Executive Committee after Annual 
National Conference until replaced by nominees elected at the first 
meeting thereafter of National Council. 
Clause 111 
National Council shall have power towgulate procedure for filling 
casual vacancies on the National Executive Committee. 
NATIONAL OFFICE BEAHERS 
Clause 112 
The National Office-Bearers who shall always be members resident in 
Scotland shall be -
(a) a President 
(b) three Vice-Presidents 
(c) a Chairman 
(d) a Senior Vice-Olairman 
(e) an Executive Vice-Chairman for Administration 
(f) an Executive Vice-Chairman for Organisation 
(g) an Executive Vice-Chairman for Policy 
(h) an Executive Vice-Chairman for Publicity 
(i) a National Secretary 
(j) a National Treasurer; and 
(k) an Assistant National Secretary and an Assistant National 
Treasurer, each appointed by the National Executive 
Committee at its discretion, who shall, however, have no 
voting powers in the National Executive Committee, 
National Council, National Assembly or National Conferences. 
Clause 113 
The National Office-Bearers, with the exception of the Assistant 
National Secretary and the Assistant National Treasurer, shall be 
elected by the Annual National Conference in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution and Rules provided always that if no 
valid nomination is received or no election is made by the Annual 
National Conference for any particular office, or in the event of 
resignation or deatll of a National Office-Bearer, National Council 
shall have power to fill the vacancy. 
Clause 114 
No publications or official communications to the publicity media shall 
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be issued in the name of the Party except with the authority of the 
National Executive Committee. 
Clause 115 
Branches and Constituency Associations may, however, issue statements 
pass resolutions and make announcements in their own name provided such 
are in accordance with the policy and Direction of the Party and do not 
deal with internal affairs of the Party. 
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